

PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

VOL. XXV. No. 93

APRIL 1950

SOME COMMON FALLACIES IN POLITICAL THINKING

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I WANT to discuss and illustrate in this paper certain fallacies which we are all very liable to commit in our thinking about political and social questions. Perhaps "thinking" is rather too high-sounding a name to attach to the mental processes which lie behind most political talk. It is at any rate thinking of a very low grade, for a considerable proportion of such discussion in Press and Parliament and private conversation hardly rises above the intellectual level of disputes between boys at a preparatory school.

The first fallacy which I will consider is this. There is a very natural tendency for a person to base his judgments about present trends and future prospects on the quite recent history of a quite small part of the world, in particular on what has happened in his own country during his own and perhaps his parents' lifetime. Now the features which he notices in this restricted segment of space-time, and which he makes the basis of his political and social judgments, may depend on a concatenation of circumstances which have seldom occurred before, are unlikely to happen again, and perhaps never existed outside a small area. This may well lead to an unjustified optimism or an equally unjustified pessimism, and in any case to ill-founded judgments.

I suspect that all Western Europeans and their relatives in the United States are now, and have been for a century or so, particularly liable to commit this fallacy; and I suspect that Englishmen are even more exposed to it than their neighbours on the Continent. I will now try to explain and illustrate these statements.

Consider, e.g., the extreme peculiarity and the exceptional favourableness of conditions in England as compared with most other parts

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of the world from, say, 1066 to 1914, and in particular from 1800 to about 1900. In the first place, while practically all continental nations were repeatedly subject to invasions, which brought the horrors of war home to most of their inhabitants, England was free from foreign invasion, and, except on a very few occasions, free from any serious risk of it. The only wars within England were civil wars, and it may fairly be said that they were on a small scale and conducted with reasonable humanity in comparison both with simultaneous operations on the Continent and with present-day practice throughout the world. I am sure that this long and singularly happy experience has tended to make Englishmen oblivious to the irrational hatreds and rivalries, the bitter and justified mutual fears and suspicions, and the ever-present temptations to fanaticism and cruelty which are normal to the inhabitants of a large part of Europe and of Asia. It tends to make them regard as normal a degree of kindliness, straight-dealing, good sense, and readiness to compromise in all political relationships, which in fact is and always has been most uncommon. It is inevitable that calculations and expectations based on such illusions should often break down. We are then very liable to complain that we live in peculiarly evil times and among peculiarly ill-behaved neighbours; when in fact the times and the neighbours are much as they have always been, and it is we who are judging them from a very narrow and exceptionally lucky historical and geographical basis.

Still confining our attention to the peculiarities of fairly recent English experience, we may next consider how utterly exceptional was our economic position from about 1780 to about 1914. We had a very hard-working populace and highly enterprising employers, vast stores of easily exploitable coal and iron, and a very favourable geographical position on the edge of Europe and facing the New World, and we were in control of a considerable proportion of the richest undeveloped lands on earth. We built up a highly organized industrial and commercial system before anything like it had developed elsewhere. So for a long time we could sell our manufactured goods throughout the world without serious rivalry and could import cheaply food and raw materials. During this period we were able to make enormous investments in every part of the world, so that, even when the initial advantages which we had enjoyed over other nations had greatly diminished, the income which we received from these made up for the decreased rate of profit on our foreign trade.

Now it seems to me that the very natural mistake of regarding as normal and permanent this quite exceptional and temporary state of affairs, which in fact lasted for about four generations, caused Englishmen to make frightful mistakes of policy and continues to

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bedevil all our affairs. We committed the extraordinary error of thinking that, because free trade had suited us in that peculiar situation, it would inevitably be adopted by other nations; whereas the very facts which made it convenient to us made it inconvenient to them, and forced them to adopt protective tariffs. Under the influence of these beliefs we let our agriculture, which had been the finest in the world, go to ruin, and our population swell inordinately and crowd into towns. We banked on peace as something normal, whereas it has never been more than an interlude in European life, and we made our system more and more vulnerable to the direct and the indirect effects of war. Never perhaps in history has a community so whole-heartedly put its shirt on the wrong horse. We sold our heritage for a mess of pottage, and now the pottage is eaten and the mess remains.

It is a striking instance of the power of the fallacy which I am illustrating, that in 1946, when the conditions had plainly changed catastrophically and permanently to our detriment, a large proportion of the electorate and apparently many of the leading politicians of both parties believed that we could both improve our standard of living and diminish our hours of work. I suppose that the more responsible politicians and at any rate some of the less stupid of the trades-union leaders have by now ceased to believe this palpable nonsense. But, to use an excellent word coined by the late Lord Keynes, the process of "de-bamboozling" their followers is a very slow and painful one. Even now, when England has twice defaulted for vast sums to the United States, and when our not very exalted standard of living is precariously maintained by the sale of our foreign investments and by American doles, ungraciously granted and ungratefully accepted, a majority of the English wage-drawers still live in Cloud-Cuckoo Land. They still believe that higher real wages for less effort are just round the corner, and that they would be realized to-day were it not for the machinations of that mysterious entity "They" which has replaced the old-fashioned Devil in popular imagination.

Let us next consider an example of this fallacy which is common both to Americans and Englishmen. This is the very usual belief that what we know as "democracy" is a suitable article for export and a form of government which all and sundry could and should adopt. For my part I prefer to avoid the word "democracy" altogether, for it has become little more than an emotive noise with the minimum of cognitive meaning. What in practice it means for us is roughly this. It means that legislation and administration are subject to the control of a representative assembly, chosen at fairly frequent intervals by almost universal suffrage exercised by an electorate organized into two nearly equal political parties. It is assumed that

the electors record their votes and that the representatives conduct their discussions without serious interference from the executive or from powerful individuals or groups. It is further assumed that the magistrates hold their offices independently of the executive, the representative assembly, and the electorate; and that they habitually make their judicial decisions, even in matters which directly concern the government, in accordance with existing law and without being subject to pressure either from the executive or the populace.

Now I am not concerned to discuss the merits and defects of this form of government. What I do wish to emphasize is that it presupposes a certain very special kind of historical background and contemporary conditions; that these are absent in the greater part of the world; and that there is not the faintest reason to believe that it is a practicable form of government for most peoples at most times. Even if it be, as I think it probably is, in the abstract a less undesirable form of government than most of the known alternatives, it does not follow that it is the best form for those peoples in whom the necessary conditions for its success are lacking. It may be better to have a worse kind of government, suited to one's traditions and situation and national character, than a better kind imported from abroad which is a grotesque misfit. I will now develop this point in rather more detail.

So far as I am aware, this kind of government has never worked even moderately well except in Great Britain, Scandinavia, Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland, and in those non-European lands which were first peopled by emigrants from certain of these parts of Europe and are now occupied by their descendants. It is difficult to say with confidence that it has worked decently in France, and one can say with certainty that it has been a fiasco in central, eastern, and south-eastern Europe. One hardly knows whether to laugh or to weep at the naïvety of the common American belief that it is a suitable system of government to impose upon Japan; and our own talk of "educating Germany for democracy" seems to me little less ludicrous.

Judging from English and Swedish experience, I should say that a necessary historical background to this system is a long process of political development from pre-Christian times, in which kings, nobles, farmers, burghers, churchmen and lawyers all played their part, and in which men became accustomed to reach decisions by discussion and on the whole to abide by those decisions even when they went against their wishes and immediate interests. In both Scandinavia and England, though in different ways, the very ancient and quasi-religious respect for traditional laws, as something binding alike on rulers and ruled, for the authorized exponents of

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those laws, and for the courts in which they gave their decisions, has been immensely important.

Two other important conditions, which have existed in England and Scandinavia but are lacking in many parts of the world, are these. In the first place, the population is or believes itself to be racially homogeneous, and it is practically homogeneous in its religion or irreligion. How important this condition is may be seen by comparing the histories of the two neighbouring islands of Great Britain and Ireland. Secondly, there has not been a hopelessly deep cleavage between different classes of society, and above all there has been no violent revolution leaving embittered memories behind. It seems to a foreign observer that French political life, e.g., is poisoned by traditional hatreds and loyalties going back to the revolution, from which we are luckily free. I would add, for what it is worth, a certain degree of calmness and phlegm in the average Englishman, Dutchman or Swede which contrasts with the excitability that one seems to notice in many other races.

I think that it would be rash to assume even that this system will continue to work tolerably well in the lands in which it is native, now that the conditions have become so unlike those under which it grew up. A system which developed and flourished in a comparatively small society, mainly occupied in small-scale agriculture and handicraft, may easily break down when that society has enormously increased in numbers and has grown into a predominantly urban collection of factory and transport workers, shop assistants, clerks and minor government officials, largely dependent upon foreign trade. But, however that may be, it is plainly most dangerous to assume that it can be transplanted and will flourish in societies in which the essential historical background has never existed and the essential contemporary conditions are wholly lacking.

Finally, I will take an instance of this fallacy which is probably common not only to Englishmen and Americans, but also to most Western Europeans. This consists in taking as normal the peculiarly favourable economic conditions which prevailed in Europe from about 1850 to 1930, and assuming that, apart from occasional setbacks, they will continue and even grow more favourable. If I am not mistaken, that relatively fortunate economic situation, and the marked rise in the standard of refinement, decency and humanity which it made possible, depended on very special conditions which seem unlikely to recur in the foreseeable future. For a short period the resources of food and raw materials available to Europeans increased at a much greater rate than the population which could exert an effective demand upon them. This happened through the rapid exploitation of the virgin lands of America, Australia and Africa, and the simultaneous development on a vast scale of methods of

cheap and quick transport and of cold storage. As a part of this unusually favourable situation huge numbers of men and women were able to relieve the pressure of population in Europe by emigrating and settling in these empty fertile lands, where their labours not only supported themselves but also produced a surplus for those whom they had left at home. I do not see how anything closely parallel to this can happen again to Western Europeans. On the other hand, the population of these new lands has grown and will continue to grow. Their demands for food and raw materials will increase, and so too will their power of producing cheaply and efficiently all the manufactured goods that they need. They will thus have less and less to export to Europe and less and less inducement to take European manufactured goods in exchange. So far from the economic conditions which prevailed in the world during the lives of our grandfathers and fathers being normal, they may be compared to a tidal wave which has left Western Europe in general and England in particular stranded high and dry on a shelf on the face of a cliff, from which it is impossible to climb up and hard to climb down without disaster.

I could easily give other examples of this fallacy of taking temporary and local conditions as permanent and world-wide and basing one's political judgments and actions on that assumption. But it is time to mention and illustrate other common fallacies. I shall take next a bunch of them which it will be convenient to group together under the name of "causal fallacies," because they all involve a reference to causation though some of them involve other notions beside.

Quite apart from all metaphysical questions, the notion of cause is a complex one which needs a fairly elaborate and subtle logical analysis. It would be inappropriate to enter in detail into this here and now; it will suffice for our present purpose to say that the statement that *C* causes *E* sometimes means that *C* is a *necessary* though perhaps not sufficient condition of *E*, sometimes that *C* is a *sufficient* though not perhaps necessary condition of *E*, and sometimes that *C* is a set of conditions which are *severally necessary and jointly sufficient* to produce *E*. Now popular talk about this causing that does not clearly distinguish these alternatives. It is very common, e.g., to start from the fact, which may be quite trivial and even tautologous, that *C* causes *E* in the sense that it is a necessary condition of *E*; then to take for granted that *C* causes *E* in the important and doubtful sense that it is necessary and sufficient to produce *E*; and then to infer various far-reaching practical conclusions from this.

An example is the assertion, often made with a great flourish of trumpets by pacifists, that armaments cause war. Since war in-

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volves, by definition, a conflict between the armed forces of nations, it is a tautological proposition that armaments are a necessary condition of wars. From this nothing follows except the platitude that, if all nations simultaneously disarmed and remained disarmed, there would be no more wars. This does not give the slightest guidance as to what a particular nation should do, if it is practically certain that at least one fairly strong nation will retain its armaments. It is obvious that there are situations in which a diminution of armaments by a certain nation or group of nations increases the chances of war, whilst an increase in their armaments diminishes it.

This example illustrates another very common causal fallacy. It is alleged, rightly or wrongly, that if all the members of a certain class, e.g. all nations or all the individuals of a certain nation, were to act simultaneously in a certain way, certain very desirable results would follow. It is concluded that each member of that class ought to act in that way, regardless of whether the rest do so or not. This is crazy logic and crazy ethics. Often it is not enough that even a large majority of the members of the class could be relied upon to act in the way suggested if one or a few were to set the example. One of the greatest difficulties of social and political life is that the pace is inevitably so largely set by the most backward and most evilly-disposed individuals and communities. The existence of a single powerful aggressive fanatical nation, like pre-war Germany or present-day Russia, is enough to make it suicidal for other nations to reduce their armaments. And the existence of a comparatively small minority of criminals or lunatics or abnormally inconsiderate individuals within a community compels all its other members to take precautions and to support punitive and preventive measures which they would gladly do without.

Another common causal fallacy may be called for shortness the "extrapolation fallacy." It may be described as follows. It is known or reasonably conjectured that a change in a certain direction has produced predominantly good results. It is then uncritically assumed that further doses of change in that direction will produce still further predominantly good results, and that it is desirable to administer these additional doses as soon as possible. It is forgotten that almost any change involves at least some loss in some respects as well as gain in others, and that it often produces certain positive evils which would otherwise not have existed. The gains may well overbalance the losses, and the main positive goods may well be greater than the collateral positive evils, until the process has gone a certain length; but the losses and the collateral evils may begin to predominate if it is carried further. Again, even if it be desirable on the whole to continue a certain process further in the same direction, it is often most undesirable to do so with the maximum possible speed. People

who would benefit from a slow development, to each phase of which they had time to adapt themselves or to adapt their children, may be merely bewildered and demoralized if the pace becomes too hot for them.

All this is admirably illustrated by the transition from handicraft to large-scale mechanized production and the continued application of new scientific discoveries and techniques to the conditions of daily life. Up to a point there is clearly an enormous gain in handing over to machines much of the heavy drudgery of human work, in making possible the rapid transport of goods and persons over long distances, and producing and distributing food, clothing and other necessities and even luxuries on a scale which would otherwise have been impossible. But it is plain that there are great and increasing disadvantages to be set against this. The most obvious, and the one which lies not far at the back of the minds of all of us nowadays, is the almost unlimited power of destruction which the later developments of this process have put into the hands of individuals and communities much below the level of intellectual, moral and political development at which they can be trusted not to misuse it. I have little doubt that any benefits which mankind may have derived from the invention of the internal combustion engine are heavily outweighed by the fact that it has made the bombing aeroplane and the submarine warship possible and actual. It would be platitudinous to enlarge on the disasters with which mankind is threatened by the most untimely discovery of a means of releasing atomic energy.

I suspect that the only recent advances of applied science on which we can still on balance congratulate ourselves are in the regions of biology and medicine. But we must not forget that each branch of science and technology is so intimately linked with all the others that the advances which we welcome would be impossible without the conditions which have led to those which we deplore. It is the same great tree which bears the poisonous berries, the refreshing fruits, and the healing balsams, and it may even happen that some of its poisons are an essential ingredient in some of its wholesome products. (Cf., e.g. the use of the products of atomic disintegration as tracer elements in medical research.)

In this connection it may be worth while to note the following fact. Sometimes the development of a certain social trend leads to results which almost all decent and sensible people deplore. Yet the development of that trend in any one society may make that community so powerful in relation to others that they are compelled to follow suit and to impose it on themselves if they will not be rendered impotent and perhaps have it and even worse things imposed on them by others. Large-scale industrialization and the great increase of urban population which accompanies it are a case in point. This is

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a development from which a nation with a reasonably small well-distributed population and a comfortable balance between agriculture, fishery, manufacture, etc., might well pray to be delivered. But those nations in which such a development takes place become so powerful from a military and economic standpoint that they can and do dictate the conditions of life to all the others.

It will be of interest to consider some of the less obvious disadvantages of a too great or too rapid industrialization. In the first place, it is a very serious loss indeed that most men and women should spend their lives utterly out of touch with the sources in nature from which their food and clothing and raw materials ultimately come; that men should no longer have the pride and pleasure of exercising their natural and acquired skill in making entire articles for use or ornament with their own hands and with comparatively simple tools and machines; and that women should no longer be good cooks and housewives and seamstresses, but be content to buy ready-made food in tins or take meals in public restaurants. Leisure is very dearly bought at the price of becoming and knowing oneself to be a mere cog in a complex machine, with no resources in oneself, no pride or pleasure in one's work, and nothing to fill the vacuum except smoking and drinking reduced to a semi-conscious routine, listening to mechanical music, witnessing and betting on athletic contests in which one never participates, and enjoying vicarious sexual thrills as a spectator at a cinema or as a reader of the police news in the Sunday paper. Yet this is, in fact, what the leisure gained by industrialization means for a large proportion of its beneficiaries. Moreover, as industrialism develops, and with it the population grows and becomes more and more urbanized, relief from drudgery is paid for by increase of nervous strain, by the unhealthy tiredness engendered by travelling long distances in crowded conveyances from and to one's work, by the deafening noise and filthy stench of mechanized traffic, and so on.

Industrialization has already destroyed and continues to destroy natural beauty on a vast scale. But there seems good reason to think that it has begun to undermine itself by destroying the natural fertility of the soil and the natural balance of plant and animal life over huge areas of the earth. Nor is this the only way in which its inordinate development cuts away the branch on which it sits. I would venture to suggest that it engenders a psychological condition which in the long run may well be fatal to it. What I have in mind is this. As the organization of industry becomes more complex the connection of individual diligence and efficiency with economic or social reward becomes more and more remote. So, too, does the connection of individual slackness and incompetence with economic or social disadvantage. The remoteness of this connection tends to

be increased still further by the methods of taxation and the social welfare legislation which are characteristic of communities in which the balance of political power is in the hands of the wage-drawers. Now there is no evidence for, and much evidence against, the view that the average person under normal conditions will work hard and strive to be efficient in intrinsically uninteresting tasks when not under the stimulus of direct economic or social advantage or disadvantage to himself or his family. A rapidly decreasing number of wage-drawers still have the habit of working hard and efficiently as a kind of hangover from an earlier and simpler social system and the customs and standards of values which accompanied it. A few persons will always do so because they are made that way. A considerable number will do so for short periods under the stress of some crisis which appeals strongly to certain social feelings, e.g. when their country is visibly in danger of immediate defeat in war, or when a revolution is taking place or a new system which appeals to their emotions has lately been set up. But I see no reason whatever to believe that any but very direct and visible motives of economic gain or loss to themselves or their families can be trusted to call forth continued efficient work at dull tasks in most men at most times. Yet the system will not provide a high standard of living and leisure unless it can call forth steady continuous effort in the employees while they are at work, and enterprise and inventiveness and readiness to take risks on the part of the directors, whether they be private individuals or State officials.

I find it hard to believe that the communists have discovered any permanently effective alternative to the direct economic incentives which are now ceasing to operate in Western Europe and will probably in time cease to do so in America. At the moment they enjoy all the advantages of a religious revival combined with such a crisis-mentality as evoked prodigious efforts in England in 1940. Even so, this has to be supplemented by the daily terror of the concentration camp and the political witch trials, and has to be stimulated by increasingly strident propaganda, in which self-adulation and anti-foreign war scares are mingled in a welter of nonsense and mendacity which can rarely have been equalled in the long history of human folly and wickedness. If these things have to be done in the green leaf, what will be done in the dry when the Church Militant shall have become the Church Triumphant? I cannot but suppose that even Slavs eventually become inured to this stuff, and that it will become less and less effective as a stimulant in the dull, daily, irritating round of work in factory and field and mine. Then nothing will remain but naked terror, and I doubt whether this is an efficient method of stimulating production in the long run and on a large scale. I wonder what proportion of the populations behind the iron

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curtain even now are occupied as policemen, prison warders, *agents provocateurs*, and in the hundred-and-one other non-productive tasks involved in building the New Jerusalem.

For these reasons, quite apart from the high probability of a catastrophic upset in the near future through atomic and bacteriological warfare, I suspect that industrialism, like fermentation, generates by-products which gradually check its development and might even bring it to a not very stable state of equilibrium. I cannot pretend to shed many tears over this. I do not view with any enthusiasm a millennium in which there would be no square inch of the earth's surface that did not stink of petrol and humanity and re-echo with the blare of the wireless loud-speaker discoursing mechanical music, enunciating platitude or nonsense, and ingeminating hatred.

It is high time to turn now to another common causal fallacy, viz. that which has been called *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. From the nature of the case it is extremely difficult to say with any high degree of reasonable confidence whether a certain factor did or did not contribute to an important extent to cause a certain other factor in social or political phenomena. This is because it is practically impossible to isolate the facts to be investigated, to find really parallel cases, to devise and perform experiments intended to answer definite questions, and so on. But fools cannot be restrained from rushing in where logicians fear to tread; and, if some fairly outstanding social phenomenon *A* immediately preceeded some other fairly outstanding phenomenon *B* in some part of the world at some period in history, they will promptly generalize and conclude that *A* is necessary and sufficient to produce *B*. It will be entertaining to consider some examples of this.

I have heard it cited as an instance of the truth of Karl Marx's economic theories that they enabled him to prophecy that great wars would happen with frequency in the Western world, that they would be increasingly destructive, and so on, and that we have seen this prophecy abundantly fulfilled. As if wars had not been a regular occurrence in the history of Europe and the rest of the world throughout recorded time; as if they had not always been waged with the maximum resources available at the time to the belligerents; and as if those resources had not enormously increased through industrialization and applied science. How can any particular theory be verified by foretelling what could have been foretold with confidence on almost any theory or on no theory at all?

Another example concerns "democracy" in the Western sense of that word. It is often said by political speakers and writers in England and America that the superior efficiency of our system of government is shown by the fact that we defeated the non-democratic Germans in two great wars. The fact is that Germany came within an

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ace of defeating us, and that in both wars we had as an important ally Russia, a country which was in 1914 and is now at the opposite pole to all that we understand by democracy. The really relevant factors were that Germany, by stupid diplomacy, blundered into war with too many strong nations at once; that England was an island and the United States far too remote to be attacked; and that the combined industrial resources of these two countries, if once they were given time and opportunity to deploy them, were enormously greater than those of Germany. It should be added that nothing but the imbecility of the governments of England, France and the United States, due to their dependence on the votes of ignorant and ostrich-like electors, who wanted nothing but a quiet life and would not read the signs of the times nor listen to those who could, made it possible for Germany to re-arm and indulge in a second world-war after its defeat in the first. I think it might fairly be said that the main achievement of Western democracy between the two wars was to prevent those who knew what ought to be done from doing it in the economic and the military spheres and in that of international relations.

A consequence of fallacies of this kind is that what may roughly be called "parliamentary government" has acquired a prestige among peoples who have never experienced it and are most unlikely to be able to practise it successfully, which makes them eager to adopt something that looks like it whenever they emerge from tutelage. We have seen plenty of examples of this in central, southern and south-eastern Europe, and we are now witnessing more and bigger ones in the near and the far East. A little later on I fully expect to see a similar result arising from similar causes in connection with the communist system as practised by Russia and its satellites. It seems to me that the fact is that under almost any imaginable system of government which was not completely imbecile North America would have become one of the wealthiest and most powerful communities in the world. Under almost any imaginable system of government, not completely imbecile, the Russian empire, with its vast and as yet hardly scratched natural resources, will become at least equally wealthy and powerful. In the one case the credit has gone to the system which happened to prevail in North America, in the other it will no doubt go to the system which happens to prevail in Russia. We shall be told, and many of us will believe, that this immense wealth and power is "due to" communism, just as we have been told and many of us believe that it was "due to" democracy in the Western sense. In each case there is very little rational ground for believing that the system of government is much more than a fly on the wheel. Any government which kept internal order over these vast empty rich territories and avoided defeat and invasion, and

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which either allowed individuals or companies to exploit the natural resources or undertook that exploitation itself on a large scale, would secure much the same spectacular results in these exceptionally favourable conditions.

I will consider one other causal fallacy, which often leads to governments or individuals being unfairly blamed or extravagantly praised. Suppose that there is a critical situation in which a government or a leading statesman has a choice of one or other of a comparatively few practically possible alternative courses of action, *A*, *B* and *C*, including among these the possible alternative of doing nothing and letting events take their course. Alternative *A* is chosen, and we will suppose that the state of affairs which ensues is admittedly much worse than that which immediately preceded the decision. Then it is very common to hold that a wrong decision was made, and to blame severely the individual or the government which made it. Now of course such a judgment may be justified in some cases. But in most cases a whole nest of fallacies is involved. In the first place, even if a different decision would have had a more fortunate sequel, it does not follow that the maker of the actual decision was blameworthy. Before we can decide this we must know whether, in the situation in which he was placed and with the information which was available to him at the time, he might reasonably have been expected to see that the consequences would be much worse than those of some other alternative which he might reasonably have been expected to contemplate as possible. The mere fact, if it be a fact, that *we* can see all this *after* the event may have very little bearing on this question.

Secondly, the mere fact that the state of affairs which followed the choice of alternative *A* was much worse than that which preceded it is not sufficient evidence that the decision was mistaken. It may be that the ensuing state of affairs would have been much worse than the preceding *whichever* of the alternatives had been adopted, and that the results of adopting any other would have been still worse than those of adopting *A*. Men find it very hard to admit that there are situations in which *all* possible alternative developments will be changes for the worse, and where the wisest decision that can be made will do no more than minimize the inevitably ensuing evil. Suppose that we tacitly and unjustifiably assume that there are no such situations. Then we shall automatically conclude that there *must* have been some alternative open to the maker of the decision which would have averted the evils which in fact ensued and would not have been followed by still greater evils. And so we shall judge that the actual decision was mistaken. But there is no reason whatever to accept this premise, and therefore there is no reason to accept any such judgment as a conclusion from it.

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It is on such grounds as these, e.g., that the decision of the British Cabinet to go to war with Germany in 1914, or the agreement made by Mr. Chamberlain with Hitler at Munich, has been confidently asserted by many persons to have been unwise and to have redounded to the discredit of those concerned. Naturally I express no opinion here on the *truth* or *falsity* of these judgments. What I do contend is this. Most of those who make them with so much confidence have not begun to realize how many questions would have to be raised and settled before they had a shadow of justification for their assertions. Moreover, some of these questions can never be answered even approximately, for they involve conjectures about the consequences which would have followed if other alternatives had been chosen.

The last fallacy that I shall consider is of a very different kind. It is more trivial than those which I have noticed above; but it is so common and has such an inhibiting effect on many worthy persons that it seems desirable to mention and expose it. It is this. A citizen of country *A* condemns some contemporary public action or institution in another country *B*. Thereupon a fellow-citizen gets up and says 'We did the same', and produces in support of his assertion some public action which was taken or some institution which existed at some time in the history of their common fatherland. This is supposed by many to provide some kind of answer to the criticism on this action or institution in the foreign country. At any rate it is often felt to be relevant and embarrassing by the critic himself, and the fear that such remarks might justifiably be made often prevents scrupulous persons from condemning publicly incidents in foreign countries which they cannot but deeply disapprove in private.

It is obvious that there must be a number of suppressed premisses at the back of such an argument, and when one tries to make them explicit one sees that it is so hopelessly confused that nothing coherent can be made of it. I think we should all admit that a person ought to feel, and very often will feel, uncomfortable if it can be shown that at the same time he strongly condemns *x* and approves or tolerates *y* when the only relevant difference between *x* and *y* is that the former occurs in a foreign country and the latter in his own. Even this, however, would not show that he is mistaken in condemning *x*. The fact that a man is inconsistent in his judgments or his emotions does not show that a particular one judgment is false or a particular one emotion is misdirected. Sin is not less sinful when it is Satan who condemns it; and he has the advantage of expert knowledge. But suppose, as is very often the case, that a man not only condemns *x* in the foreign country but also quite consistently condemns similar actions and institutions in the history of his own country. Why on earth should the fact that something similar to what he condemns in another country exists or has existed in his own be thought

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to show that it is not worthy of condemnation? And, if he equally condemns similar acts or institutions in the history of his own country, why on earth should he feel embarrassed or diffident in publicly condemning them when they exist in a foreign country? Is bestial cruelty in contemporary Russian labour-camps any less evil because there was bestial cruelty in English slave-ships in the eighteenth century? And must an Englishman, who deplores that incident in English history and whose ancestors abolished that evil after a long and arduous Parliamentary struggle, hang his head in embarrassed silence and refrain from calling slavery and cruelty by their name when practised on a vast scale by foreign countries which claim to be the moral leaders of mankind?

I have assumed so far, for the sake of argument, that there really is something in one's own country which is closely or exactly parallel to that which one condemns in another country, and I have shown that even on that assumption this method of rebutting or silencing criticism is logically worthless. But in nine cases out of ten the alleged parallel will not survive a moment's critical inspection. Often it is merely verbal, as it would be, e.g., if one said that England made use of concentration camps in the latter stages of the Boer war and therefore Englishmen have no right to criticize the use of concentration camps by Germany or Russia. Often the only parallel which can be found to a present-day practice in a foreign country is something which formerly existed in one's own and has long since been abolished there by the efforts of reformers and is now condemned by everyone. Any attempt, e.g., to regard the harsh treatment of factory workers and of paupers in England in the early nineteenth century as a relevant parallel to present-day slave-labour in Russia and its satellites would be open to this criticism. The upshot of the matter is that I should advise anyone to whom this kind of argument is addressed either to pay no attention whatever to it or to answer the fool who uses it according to his own folly.

It is time for me to bring my paper to an end. It is not a cheerful paper, for I do not find mankind in their social and political relationships a cheerful subject to contemplate. Gibbon, who knew something of history, described it as mainly a record of the crimes, the follies, and the misfortunes of mankind. I see no reason to think that it will be fundamentally different in this respect in future from what it has been in the past. I suspect that there will always be, as there have always been, relatively infrequent and not very persistent oases of prosperity and culture in a desert of penury, ignorance and unthinking brutality. And at every stage any experienced and intelligent statesman will have occasion to repeat Axel Oxenstierna's words to his son: "Behold, my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed!"

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PROFESSOR C. A. CAMPBELL

I HAVE chosen my topic for this evening with an eye to something rather more than its intrinsic philosophical interest. Modern man, as we are all painfully aware, is facing a crisis of peculiar gravity. Perhaps the odds are not so very heavy against a third world war followed by world collapse into anarchy and barbarism. At such a time the philosopher is bound to ask himself whether there is no contribution which his science can make towards the succour of civilization.

And of course philosophy does have a contribution to make. That it is no part of the philosopher's function to prescribe specific remedies for specific practical problems, everyone is agreed. The philosopher, as such, cannot tell us what to do about the atomic bomb, or about the American negro, or about the Berlin impasse, or about the Jewish-Arab imbroglio in Palestine. The solution of such problems demands specialized knowledge which the philosopher *qua* philosopher does not have (though, *qua* citizen of the world, he may deem it his duty to acquire at least some of it). But obvious as this is, it is equally obvious that for large human problems of this kind specialized knowledge is not adequate either. If the best results are to be attained, specialist knowledge of the appropriate set of facts must be illumined by an understanding of principles of wide generality concerning human nature, human institutions, and human values. And here, surely, the philosopher *does* come into the picture. For is not systematic study of just such matters an intrinsic, indeed a central, part of the philosopher's office? I hope you will agree that it is. The old description of the philosopher as one who tries "to see life steadily and see it whole" may not be in accord with the fashion of the day. But it has the perhaps higher merit of being in accord with etymology, with common verbal usage, and with a tradition of 2,500 years.

It is therefore entirely proper, I suggest, that the plain man should look to the philosopher to-day for some light and leading upon the very fundamental and appallingly critical problems that confront mankind. And a few philosophers—in this country the names of Lord Russell and Dr. Ewing at once come to mind—have responded handsomely to the challenge of the times. I venture to think, however, that the gravity of the situation calls for something much more

¹ An address delivered to the Royal Institute of Philosophy on March 18th, 1949.

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nearly resembling mass action on the part of philosophers. And, personally, I should like to see this mass action concentrated very largely upon developing a single theme; that of the rightful dominion of *reason* in human affairs. For the conviction has long been gathering strength in my mind that a wider diffusion of the specific virtues that flow from a due respect for reason is an absolute precondition of any measures for civilization's survival proving effective. In the absence of these virtues, salvaging operations can, it seems to me, be no better than precarious patchwork. This paper is meant to explain why I find myself obliged to take this view, and at the same time to indicate the sort of thing philosophers could, in my opinion, with great advantage be saying to-day on the claims of reason to all who can be induced to listen to them.

There is already, of course, on this problem of the rôle of reason in human affairs, a certain measure of agreement among men. No sane person wants to deny that reason is at least a useful instrument for effective living. But plainly this carries us only a very little way. It is compatible with divergencies of view as violent as those we find, for example, in the attitude to reason of Fascism and liberal democracy respectively; or again, in the respective attitudes of "Fundamentalism" and liberal Christianity. As soon as one comes to anything like close grips with the problem, and particularly when one attempts comparative enquiry into the claims of reason *vis-à-vis* the claims of faith, or authority, or intuition, or emotion, or even common sense, conflicts of opinion of the most far-reaching order make themselves manifest at once.

Now if there were anything like the same disagreement in the ranks of the philosophers as there is among mankind generally about the claims of reason, there would clearly be little point in turning to the philosophers for guidance. But fortunately this is by no means how matters stand. The true situation among philosophers is apt to be masked by the label of "anti-intellectualism" which is affixed (properly enough) to certain systems of philosophy—e.g. to those of Schopenhauer and Bergson. But philosophical "anti-intellectualism" is a radically different thing from popular anti-intellectualism. What the two share is a distrust of the omni-competence of the intellect and, as a rule, a belief that some other mode of experience can make good a part at least of the intellect's shortcomings. It would be extremely difficult, however, to find anything in anti-intellectualist philosophies to lend countenance to the doctrine unremittingly propagated from certain "lay" quarters that civilized mankind attaches too great an importance to intellectual processes. The anti-intellectualist philosopher is well aware that the intellect, if not omni-competent, *is* competent, and has no substitute, over a very wide field of human purposes. He is aware,

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moreover that his criticism of the intellect has to take account of the fact that it is by the intellect alone that we can discover that the intellect has limitations; and discover, again, what these limitations are, where precisely supplementation is called for, and by what "faculty" (if any) the needful supplementation may be achieved. The complaint that the generality of mankind devotes too *much* labour to the cultivation of the intellect could hardly fail to strike the anti-intellectualist philosopher, as it would strike other philosophers, as merely ludicrous. In short there is, I think, no serious division of counsel among philosophers of any school about the guiding rôle which reason should play in human affairs. Virtually all philosophers would agree that it would be a great gain if people founded their beliefs upon a far more rigorous, extensive, and impartial survey of evidence than is common anywhere in the world to-day.

But with this common agreement among philosophers, why, it may be asked, have they been so signally unsuccessful, even in relatively enlightened ages, in persuading their fellow-men of the virtues of rational ways of thought? Does this failure not perhaps suggest that the philosopher's case is less strong than he supposes: that the philosopher, like the cobbler who thinks there is "nothing like leather," is insensitive to certain defects in reason which are plain enough to everyone else? I shall not attempt to anticipate here the vindication of reason, against the defects alleged by her critics, which is reserved for a later stage of this paper. At present it must suffice to draw attention to one consideration which goes far to show why the advocate of reason, no matter how strong his case may be, is apt to meet with a rather cool response from the society which he addresses. It is this. Reason, with its characteristic demand for evidence—whether of the truth of beliefs or of the value of institutions—is potentially a disruptor of the *status quo*. It is only to be expected, therefore, that in every community persons and groups with a vested interest in, or it may be a genuine admiration for, things as they are, will use the considerable influence which such persons and groups customarily possess to oppose and discredit the extensive use of so powerful a stimulus to change. Authoritarian States and authoritarian Churches are, of course, under a peculiarly strong temptation to discourage the free play of the intelligence on the part of their members: and that the temptation is not often resisted, their records in the field of educational policy bear notorious witness. But even in genuinely democratic communities there are always many who live in fear of the "dangerous ideas" which will certainly emerge if reason is given her head. Such persons will avidly seize upon and propagate anything that looks like an argument against the value of the intellect. And the plain man, of course, lends a most

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appreciative ear. He is not at all displeased to discover that he can with a good conscience absolve himself from an uncongenial form of labour, and he welcomes the suggestion that the "clever" people, whom he has never much liked anyway, have after all no claim upon his respect. If anti-intellectualist propaganda cannot get much support from logic, it can assuredly find plenty in human psychology.

At this point, however, one ought in fairness to make a distinction. Even within the non-philosophical brand of anti-intellectualism with which I shall alone be concerned this evening—for the philosophical brand, as I have already explained, I count as an ally in the cause of reason—there are at least two important senses in which the term "anti-intellectualism" may be used. It may be used to denote a hostile attitude towards the intellect "*in abstracto*," as it were, without reference to the use of the intellect at any particular time or place. Or it may be used to denote a hostile attitude towards the free use of the intellect in a definite historical situation—normally the contemporary situation. In the former of these senses I find little in the arguments of anti-intellectualism but sophistries and fallacies. But in the second sense I am by no means prepared to contend that anti-intellectualism is always mistaken. There surely could be, surely have been, historical situations in which a community's need for unity and solidarity is so great that it is a legitimate temporary measure to forbid radical criticism of its traditional beliefs and institutions, and thus to place a veto upon "free thinking." The two senses cannot, of course, be kept rigidly apart. Anti-intellectualism of the second sort may, and almost always does, try to strengthen its case by drawing upon arguments from anti-intellectualism of the first sort. For that reason the present paper, though its concern is with anti-intellectualism in the contemporary situation, will not be able to ignore the more abstract arguments against the intellect.

Having admitted that there may be historical contexts in which anti-intellectualism is the path of wisdom, I now wish to state unequivocally my conviction that in the present historical context anti-intellectualism is mischievous in the last degree. I believe that those to-day who—no matter in what "exalted" interest—labour to denigrate the human reason are making a sizable contribution to world catastrophe in the not too distant future. The full justification of this view can only appear in the body of the paper as a whole, but it may be serviceable if I devote a few minutes now to sketching in broad terms what is in my mind.

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Tensions between the peoples of the world such as exist at the present time are no new thing. Doubtless they have often been even

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more acute than those that now afflict us. Nor is it a new thing that such tensions should contain the threat of resolution by force of arms. But there are several new factors on account of which present tensions justifiably arouse over a great part of the earth a quite unprecedented fear and foreboding. They are well known. One is that the interconnectedness of the world to-day makes the "localizing" of a war next door to impossible. A war anywhere is likely to become a war everywhere. A second is that, partly through the development of aerial weapons and partly through the increasing importance of industrial war-potential, war is now totalitarian in character. Slaughter is no longer confined to armed forces, nor destruction to fortresses and arsenals. There are now virtually no non-combatants, and virtually no part of the fabric of a nation's life that may not suffer irreparable ruin. The third and most important factor is the production which recent advances in science have made possible of weapons of war so stupendous in power that any major conflict must now bring disaster on a scale hitherto unknown—disaster, one might almost say, in a new dimension. War as we must now envisage it, war that is universal, totalitarian, and of an incalculable destructiveness, might very well extinguish the light of civilization on this planet for centuries.

What hope is there of averting this world catastrophe?

The short-term answer is, I suppose, "by Blocs and Pacts between peace-loving nations for collective defence against an aggressor." No one, perhaps, is likely to have a great deal of confidence in what is, after all, only a slightly less vulnerable form of the old mechanism of the "balance of power"; but *some* immediate bastion must be raised, and doubtless nothing more effective is practicable for the protection of peace in the next five years or more. Though such devices may serve for a time, however, their chief value lies in their promise of a breathing-space in which plans for peace of a more fundamental character may have a chance to mature. At the same time as we take steps, by blocs or pacts or otherwise, to meet the immediate threat, it is absolutely imperative that we also lay the foundations of a solution that has some appearance of permanence about it. Clearly we must have a long-term as well as a short-term programme.

What then of the long-term programme? The thoughts of many will turn at once to some form of World Government as offering the only permanent safeguard for peace. And in a sense I think they are right. But there is one enormous obstacle on the road to this goal which it does not seem to me that the advocates of World Government ever quite squarely face. The obstacle is psychological. Must not the same attitude of mind which manifests itself in tensions between peoples so bitter and uncompromising as to make war seem a think-

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able solution, *also* operate to frustrate effectively any attempt to bring about the institutional unity of World Government? What real likelihood is there of the peoples of the world ever agreeing to the concessions of national sovereignty entailed by World Government so long as they face one another across yawning psychological gulfs of hatred and suspicion? For my part I must answer, just none at all.

The inference to be drawn seems to me inescapable; and of course it is not novel. The head and front of any long-term programme for peace that is worth serious attention must be measures deliberately directed towards bringing about a profound psychological change. It is much less simple a matter to name the precise change to be aimed at—for it has got to be one which it is practicable to bring about in a limited term of years, as well as one which would be effective if it were brought about. Thus "brotherly love" may or may not be practicable this side of the millennium, but it is plain that it is not practicable in the few years at our disposal. There is no use trying to fly as high as that. But a solution of our problem is, I believe, possible. I spoke of "tensions between peoples so bitter and uncompromising as to make war seem a thinkable solution." Tensions, disagreements, differences of viewpoint there always will be between peoples—it would not be a good thing if it were otherwise. But what there surely need *not* always be, what *can* be, if not eradicated, at least much mitigated, by deliberate, sustained, and concerted effort, is the psychological attitude for which the contrary opinion of others is either a folly or a crime: the blind, uncritical devotion to an idea or a cause which is so utterly sure of its own rectitude that "examination of the evidence" seems mere meaningless waste of labour; that temper of mind which, in a word, we call "fanaticism." It is fanaticism that is the arch-enemy—racial fanaticism, national fanaticism, religious fanaticism, ideological fanaticism. To the fanatic the compromise solution that arises out of the give-and-take of argument is ruled out from the start. For to him opposition is not something to be understood, to be reasoned with, perhaps to be learnt from, but just something to be crushed. Its very existence is a standing offence to the true doctrine, its extermination a sacred duty. So long as we permit the spirit of fanaticism to flourish on the earth with hardly an effort at restraint, it is surely the merest pipe-dream to hope for the coming of a world in which the savage arbitrament of war has ceased to be a thinkable way of settling disputes within the family of nations.

Perhaps the most disquieting thing about fanaticism, from the point of view of possible world concord, is its ubiquity. In extreme form, no doubt, it is confined to the comparatively few—though a "few" dangerous to humanity out of all proportion to their numbers.

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In less extreme, but still dangerous form, it is the comparatively few who are *not* guilty of it in some context of their mental lives. If it be the mark of the fanatic to refuse to look at evidence against his beliefs, or, if he consents to look at it, to do so not in the spirit of the judge who seeks the truth but in the spirit of the advocate who seeks to defend a brief, how many of us can honestly claim to be wholly free from the stigma of fanaticism? The fact is that there is not among men generally any real sentiment of abhorrence for fanaticism as such—only for fanaticism in causes which they happen to deplore. We denounce with high indignation the fanaticisms we dislike, but we do not seriously object to—sometimes we positively admire, in the field of religion particularly—the fanatic who is on “the right side.” Yet until men come to see fanaticism, whatever its “direction,” for the ugly and pernicious thing that it is, and are prepared to show their contempt and repugnance for it wherever it is manifested, it seems to me that the degree of mutual understanding and mutual respect among the peoples of the world necessary to make institutional mechanisms for world unity work effectively must inevitably be wanting.

Fanaticism then, I submit, is “Public Enemy No. 1.” But how is the psychological reform involved in the extermination of fanaticism to be brought about? There is, I believe, one way, and one way only: by the building up, through all the channels of formal and informal education that offer access to the minds of men, of a solid sentiment of respect for reason. Respect for reason and the intolerance of the fanatic are absolute incompatibles. But—and this is vital—respect for reason has got to be something much more thorough-going than the half-hearted lip-service which so many people delude themselves into supposing entitles them to regard themselves as “reasonable” beings. It is not enough that the paramount claims of reason be acknowledged in, e.g. the field of science, or the field of industry, while at the same time they are denied, at least by implication, in matters of religion, or ethics, or race, or national and international politics. It is precisely in these latter spheres that the imperviousness to argument and evidence typical of fanaticism is at once the most common and the most menacing to the future of civilization. A due respect for reason can admit no exemptions whatsoever. It is all-important that reason’s advocates should leave no room for dubiety on that score. What in detail is required by a “due respect for reason” in the religious field is a question of much moment which will shortly engage our special attention; but it can safely be said at once that there is required at the very least a temper of mind wholly alien to the obscurantism and sectarian bitterness which disfigures too much so-called “religious” life even at the present day.

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So much must serve as a broad outline of the present situation as I see it. The peoples of the world have the choice between finding a *modus vivendi*—and finding it soon—or perishing. But the fundamental problem is one not of institutions but of psychology. Without a pretty radical reform in common mental attitudes, the most skilfully contrived mechanisms for international unity can accomplish little. And the only way, in my opinion, of bringing about the needed reform is by co-operative effort in building up a strong sentiment of respect for reason, as the one effective prophylactic against the virus of fanaticism.

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It is time now that we came to closer quarters with our problem. If we are to hope for any success in appealing for a wider recognition of reason's right to rule, we must articulate more precisely what the rule of reason involves, and try to show that it has overwhelming claims upon man's acceptance. To that task I now address myself. Beginning with a formal definition of "the life of reason," I shall examine in the first stage what seems to be the only positive alternative to reason for the guidance of human life that is seriously advanced to-day—at least in the Western world. In the second stage I shall be concerned to rebut certain direct criticisms of reason. I shall not be able to deal with all of these; but I hope to omit none that is sufficiently plausible to have currency in anti-intellectualist propaganda.

I offer, then, the following as a definition of the life of reason adequate to our present purposes. "The life of reason is the life in which the practice is habitual of founding belief upon critical examination of the appropriate evidence, and of guiding action, save where the urgency of a situation calls for a more immediate response, by reflective comparison of the merits of alternative courses in the light of considered principles." And to this definition I propose at this juncture to add no comment. The defence of the life of reason which ensues will, I hope, bring any elucidation that may be required.

We are to examine in stage one a certain alternative to the dominion of reason. I confess to some diffidence in naming it. For the alternative offered is the dominion of *faith*: and I am very well aware that even to raise a question about the merits of "faith" is apt to give pain to persons whom one would not willingly offend. But no one who sets out seriously to defend the life of reason can evade discussion of this topic. Moreover, there are special considerations which force such a discussion upon us to-night. For precisely the same claim is being advanced for faith by many voices to-day as we have ourselves been advancing for reason; viz. that only in its dominion over the minds of men is there good hope of civilization's

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survival. Now unless the faith that is desiderated is given a meaning that is much more consistent with *concern for evidence* than the meaning in which it is commonly understood by those to whom the appeal is addressed, increase of faith seems to me far more likely to aggravate than to mitigate the discords that threaten humanity. And there is all the greater need to consider soberly what is implied in the dominion of faith, since the call to a new age of faith is being made to-day under exceptionally favourable conditions, and may achieve no small success. Where men are weighed down, as they are to-day, by anxiety and perplexity of mind, they are especially prone to despair of rational solutions and to fall back upon the private refuge and comfort of faith. But a faith which repudiates reason is just one form of fanaticism; and, as history amply shows, a form that can be productive of the most revolting evils.

It behoves us, then, to try to discover just what those who tell us that the great need of mankind to-day is "more faith" really mean by this expression. First of all, faith in what? The answer is far from clear. It is safe to assume that some kind of religious faith is intended, and that a form of faith like that of the Communist in the coming of the classless state would not be admitted into this category. But what *form* of religious faith? Will *any* form do, so long as it is sincerely held? Is the desired objective that each community should exhibit deeper devotion to its own traditional faith, whether it be the Christian, the Jewish, the Hindu, the Moslem, the Shinto or any other faith? A very little reflection shows that this cannot be what is in the minds of those who call for "more faith." For conflict of faiths is sometimes the direct cause of, and often an exacerbating influence upon, the feuds and dissensions that afflict the human race. It is hard to see how a strengthening of mutually conflicting faiths to-day could do other than heighten existing tensions. Increase of faith may or may not be desirable on other grounds, but certainly not on the ground that it will minister to the solution of the problem of life or death that immediately confronts humanity.

It is fairly clear that what is really in the minds of those of our spiritual leaders, in the West at any rate, who plead for more faith, is not more of *any* faith but more of the *Christian* faith. And of course there is point in the appeal. If all or most men became sincere Christians, it might be hoped that the Christian ideal of brotherly love would in great part dissolve existing hatreds, and that the notion of settling disputes by mutual slaughter would in time become unthinkable. But if we give "more faith" *this* meaning, there is an insuperable difficulty staring us in the face. No one outside of a lunatic asylum really believes that there is the remotest likelihood of all or most of the inhabitants of the earth—or perhaps one should say of the "civilized" earth, to confine the issue to peoples who

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(strange paradox!) can be a serious danger to world peace—becoming Christians in any reasonably near future. This objection alone seems to me conclusive. I readily grant, indeed I contend, that no very speedy solution, no solution that will take effect in a twelvemonth, is to be looked for in our present crisis. But it is the *contemporary* world that we are concerned with, and a solution that is not practicable for this generation at least is not a solution at all.¹

It is worth while, in the interests of our general thesis, to carry the argument a little further. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that by some miracle of mass conversion the greater part of mankind did become devoutly Christian. Should we even then have good hope of a reign of peace and good will? History would hardly seem to support so optimistic a forecast. We dare not forget that there have been as ferocious wars waged within the ambit of Christianity itself (e.g. between Catholic and Protestant) as any between Christian and infidel. It looks, therefore, as if we should have to narrow down still further the kind of faith whose common acceptance is to succour us from our troubles to some specific form of the Christian faith. The ideal, from this point of view, would be to have everyone professing a faith so rigidly defined that it left no room at all for sectarian conflicts. But the narrower the faith that is required, the more fantastic, surely, becomes the notion that there could be any world conversion to it.

Perhaps we may be told, however, that history is here a deceptive guide; that within Christianity at any rate the principle of toleration is now so firmly established that there is no fear of a new age of faith involving a return to the old *odium theologicum*. One would fain believe that this is so. But surely we have seen in recent years too many of the cherished ideals of liberal civilization trampled underfoot, in too many quarters where they had seemed secure, to permit of any easy confidence on the matter! We cannot ignore the fact that even to-day, within the Christian community itself, the closed mind, and hatred of the "heretic," are far from extinct. Nor can we forget the extent to which the growth of toleration within Christianity has been due to hard campaigning, in the face of persistent vituperation and persecution from the ranks of the devout, by those who were outside orthodoxy, and often outside the Christian

¹ I should perhaps emphasize that I am not directly concerned in this address with what is sometimes called the "spiritual crisis" of our age. This refers in the main, I take it, to the vacuum left in so many minds by the loss of traditional beliefs, and to the clamant need for some new *Weltanschauung* which has power to appeal to the heart and intellect of modern man. This problem—though it has its own urgency—it is meaningful to discuss in terms of solutions which may not have much effect for decades. But unfortunately one cannot confidently assume that humanity has even one decade in which to solve the crisis I am dealing with in this address.

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communion altogether. The price of liberty, according to the old saying, is eternal vigilance. I suggest that the vigilance necessary to protect liberty of religious opinion is not to be looked for in those who are so surpassingly sure of the absolute truth of their own beliefs that they cannot conceive it as even possible that contrary beliefs should contain elements of value.¹

But with that we come to a most important question. The implication of what I have just said is that faith and the spirit of tolerance do not easily consort together. Is this true? The answer must depend, I think, upon analysis of the psychological attitude we call "faith," and in particular upon the relationship of faith to reason which that analysis discloses. Up to now we have been concerned with faith chiefly in respect of its variable content. Let us now consider it rather in respect of its abiding form, its characteristic structure.

It is, I think, common ground that faith "goes beyond" reason in at least one respect; the respect, namely, that what is believed in "faith," though it may be believed in *part* upon what is ordinarily called "rational evidence," is believed a great deal more strongly than the rational evidence alone will warrant. By "rational evidence" here I mean all those considerations bearing upon the truth of the belief *other than* the subject's own direct "revelational" experience.

It is not *quite* common ground, but would probably be fairly generally agreed, that this "going beyond" the rational evidence does not necessarily entail any formal conflict between faith and reason. For reason may itself recognize that rational evidence, as above defined, is not the only "appropriate" evidence in such matters. We may be led by strictly philosophical reasoning to the propositions (*a*) that there are questions upon which rational evidence is in principle inconclusive: (*b*) that questions about the existence and nature of God fall into this category: and (*c*) that there at least

¹ The danger to which I allude has been exposed in language stronger than I should have dared to use in a recent broadcast by a distinguished historian who certainly cannot be accused of a bias against Christianity: "The churches seem to me to have refrained from persecution—or reconciled themselves to the abandonment of it—very much in proportion as churchmen lost the government of society, or lacked the power to behave as they wished. Indeed to me one of the terrible things of history—an issue which I cannot be satisfied to evade—is the fact that the Christian church began a cruel policy of persecution from the earliest moment when it was in a position (and had the power) to do so; while at the other end of the story both Catholic and Protestant churches fought to the last point of cruelty not merely to maintain their persecuting power—but fought a separate war for each separate weapon of persecution that was being taken from them. All this is not in any sense an argument against Christianity itself, but it is a serious comment on human nature even as it appears in ecclesiastical history." ("Christianity and the Historian." Professor Herbert Butterfield in *The Listener*, Vol. XLI, pp. 582-3.)

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may be modes of direct personal insight which fill the gaps left by the rational evidence.

There is nothing startling about these propositions. Many philosophers would be prepared (as I should myself) to accept them. For those who do accept them, a faith which affirms more than the rational evidence warrants need not be in conflict with reason. For the affirmation may be based on a direct experience whose claims reason in principle acknowledges.

But in order that the attitude of faith should escape conflict with reason there is, I think, a further condition that must be observed. Faith is not irrational if it goes beyond the rational evidence in the manner described, so long as, at the same time, it pays respect to the rational evidence. But what are we to say of the faith which not only goes beyond, but also declines to take account of, the rational evidence? There is an attitude of faith (not less common, I should say, than the former attitude) which regards "rational evidence" in matters of religion as virtually irrelevant. For those who take this view, the "revelational" experience is everything. The so-called rational evidence is allowed no right to overturn or even to modify what is believed on the evidence of direct insight—though where it seems favourable to such belief, its use for polemical purposes is not always too strictly abjured.

Now it seems to me that faith so understood *must* be denounced as irrational. There are several objections which might reasonably be taken to making direct experience *per se* the basis for a set of beliefs; but it seems superfluous to cite more than one, for that one is surely fatal. It is this. The attitude in question implies for its validity that one can *know for certain* that an experience is a direct revelation of the Divine. And that assumption seems to be false. There is no internal mark yet discovered which enables one to distinguish the authentic from the spurious in the realm of religious experience. Mere subjective assurance, however strong, is almost valueless in this connection. It is common knowledge that vast numbers of persons have had experiences which seemed to them to be indubitable revelations of the Divine and which were quite certainly nothing of the kind. I am not saying, let me emphasize, that there is no authentic direct experience of the Divine. I *am* saying that no one has yet been able to tell us how we can know for certain when we have it. And that being the case, it is, I submit, contrary to reason to accept an ostensibly revelational experience as genuinely revelational (whether in one's self or in another) simply on the basis of the experience itself.

What follows from this? It follows, I think, that no faith has the right to call itself a "reasonable" faith, no faith has just claims upon the respect of rational persons, if it does not acknowledge an obliga-

tion to take account of what is ordinarily called "rational evidence." Since the "intrinsic" evidence is palpably insufficient, the "extrinsic" evidence must be given a hearing. This extrinsic evidence will be of many kinds. It will include, indispensably, the consistency of what is submitted for belief; both the mutual consistency of the set of propositions in question, and their consistency also with related propositions of a well-accredited sort got through other channels of experience. It must also include, I suggest, evidence about the trustworthiness of the "intrinsic" evidence: for although there is no internal mark which authenticates the revelatory claims of personal experience, there are many other considerations relevant to a sound assessment. The character and life-history of the experiencing subject, for example, are certainly relevant. We should rightly think differently of a claim to direct revelation emanating from a man spiritually disciplined in mind and will, and a similar claim from some unhappy neurotic who had already given independent signs of a tendency to compensate repressed desires by the projection of satisfying fantasies.

Now *which* kind of faith is the faith in whose increase so many people apparently see the one hope of the world to-day? Is it a faith that accepts the duty of scrutinizing the rational evidence in the way we have indicated? If it is, good and well. It will be consistent with the life of reason, and will contribute to the spirit of mutual toleration which, I have suggested, is indispensable to the establishment of a *modus vivendi* between the peoples of the world. But it seems to me not easy to believe that this is what "faith" implies for the majority either of those who recommend it or of those to whom the recommendation is addressed. It is rare that exhortations to "greater faith" contain even a hint that a faith worthy of a rational being entails an open-minded concern for rational evidence. It is not so rare for them to contain a good deal more than a hint of actual hostility to reason. At times, indeed, this hostility is perfectly explicit. One finds advanced with apparent seriousness such monstrous charges as that the present plight of man is largely due to his acceptance of "reason" as the guide of life. As if reason had ever been given the chance to be the guide of life! But the point is not worth arguing. Anyone who can bring himself to believe that the major ills of the contemporary world are the consequence of man's over-indulgence in the rational habit of looking objectively at all sides of a question, is really beyond the reach of argument.

If further evidence were needful to show that faith is not commonly regarded by its votaries as standing in need of any rational support in order to be valuable, I should be inclined to point to a phenomenon whose significance has, I think, been insufficiently noticed. I refer to the admiration so widely felt and expressed for the man of "child-

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like faith." Such a faith, a faith that knows no doubts and raises no questions, frequently has applied to it the adjective "beautiful." I wonder why? One can only infer that for those who take this view the absence of rational reflection is a positive virtue in faith. Surely the truth is that a "child-like faith" is "beautiful" only in a child. In an adult rational being it ought to be deemed ugly: just as a baby-face, charming in an infant, is to most of us a disfigurement in a grown man.

Let me sum up briefly the results of our discussion of the faith-reason relationship. There is no conflict between faith as such and reason as such. Faith involves dependence upon a non-rational mode of revelatory experience, and it only becomes "unreasonable" if this non-rational mode is accepted as completely self-certifying, to the total exclusion of the rational evidence. A reasonable faith, which acknowledges the duty of examining the rational evidence, can do nothing but good. It is in its nature antipathetic to the fanaticism which we earlier described as the arch-enemy of a civilized order. But faith as it is too commonly understood, we felt obliged to hold, is a faith which repudiates the just claims of reason. And this kind of faith is a menace. Intolerance, bigotry, persecution are its natural progeny. It is the attitude of mind which, ranging on a world scale over the fields of race and nationality and politics as well as religion, creates tensions irresolvable by peaceful means. That so many men of undoubted good will should be urging its increase to-day as (presumably) a means of abolishing world tensions, is a notable illustration of the harm that can be wrought by good will if it be not illumined by good sense.

We pass now to Part II of our defence of the life of reason. Bearing in mind the definition given earlier of the life of reason, we have to ask whether the rule of life indicated therein is in any way invalidated by direct criticisms of reason. I propose to take up in turn five distinct lines of criticism. This may seem to you a formidable programme, and its enunciation at this late stage in the proceedings somewhat alarming. In point of fact, however, no lengthy argument seems to me to be required to expose the ineptitude of most of the anti-intellectualist's arguments. The extensive hold they have gained over men's minds is to be attributed much less, in my opinion, to their intrinsic merits than to the fact, already alluded to, that a great many people *want* to be persuaded that the intellect does not deserve to be held in the honour accorded to it by the philosophers. I believe it is perfectly possible, therefore, to be at once brief and adequate in replying to most of these criticisms. The last criticism on my list offers rather more difficulty, and will receive correspondingly greater attention.

PHILOSOPHY

1. We may notice first a criticism that has already been partially met by implication in what we had to say about the relationship of reason and faith. It is sometimes alleged that to give ultimate dominion to reason in matters of belief is to assume that there are no *non-rational* modes of insight into reality. This assumption, it is urged, does less than justice to the many-sidedness of human experience, and in particular to the claims of religious, moral, and aesthetic experience.

But it is just not the case that to give ultimate dominion to reason implies rejection of non-rational modes of insight. It would be *irrational*, not *rational*, to ignore the claims of religious, moral and aesthetic experience to give knowledge of the real. What is implied in reason's dominion is that such claims must be critically examined by reason with a view to ascertaining the extent to which they are valid. For no one would be so foolish as to suggest that *all* the claims to knowledge made on the basis of these experiences are self-evidently valid. Indeed such a suggestion would be self-contradictory, since the claims made frequently contradict one another. Quite clearly there is need of some "instrument" to analyse and interpret the experiences and to weigh dispassionately the claims made on their behalf. If any one knows of some instrument other than reason equipped for this task of appraisement, it would be interesting to be told what it is supposed to be.

This is perhaps a suitable place to insert a brief remark about the relationship of reason to "intuition." It should be clear that the concern for "evidence" habitual in the life of reason does not mean that intuition of self-evident propositions is ruled out of court. The life of reason demands, according to our definition, concern for the "appropriate" evidence. But if there should be such things as self-evident propositions (and it is pretty certain that there must be some), *self-evidence* is the appropriate evidence; and intuition is the medium of their apprehension. It is, admittedly, the course of reason to adopt an attitude of some suspicion towards claims to self-evidence, since experience has shown how easy it is to deceive one's self on such matters. If other persons find themselves unable, in apparently similar conditions, to intuit a proposition which seems self-evident to us, this is in itself some evidence (though not, of course, conclusive evidence) against the authenticity of our "intuition." Hence the man who makes reason his guide will exercise rather special caution before accepting ostensible intuitions as genuine. But the rule of reason most certainly does not oblige him to reject in advance the very possibility of intuiting self-evident propositions.

2. A word now on Authority: for it is all too clear that the old battle of reason with authority is far from ended. And let us first note that it is not the case that the life of reason entails unqualified

rejection of authority in matters of belief. On the contrary, an important part of the "appropriate evidence" will often be the view of "authorities." Science is an obvious case in point. Reason does not prescribe that the layman (or for that matter the scientist in fields other than his own) should attempt the impossible task of examining at first hand the evidence upon which scientific conclusions are based before he accepts them. Rather it prescribes that he accept, albeit provisionally, whatever is regarded as established by virtually all competent authorities in a given field. Even here, however, the acceptance of authority should be no more than provisional. It will be the course of reason to maintain a constant readiness to modify, revise, or wholly abandon scientific beliefs in the light of new scientific research.

Authority in moral and religious beliefs is another matter. For here we do *not* find well-accredited results upon which virtually all the experts are agreed. But fortunately here also we do not encounter the same impossibility in making direct personal acquaintance with the evidence. The plea is often made, however—and one cannot withhold some sympathy with it—that only a small minority of men have both the capacity and the opportunity to grapple profitably with the abstract problems involved, and that it is therefore reasonable that the plain man should fall back on "authority." But the superficial nature of this view is obvious as soon as we ask, "*Which authority?*" Even the plain man knows—though he is often encouraged to forget it—that there are many respectable authorities offering conflicting solutions. How decide to which of them he is to entrust his immortal soul? Presumably not by the toss of a coin. He has got to do some *thinking*, whether he likes it or not; some thinking about the respective claims upon his allegiance of competing authorities. The only reasonable course for the plain man in this difficult situation is, I suggest, to entrust his immortal soul to none of the authorities, but rather to adopt *tentatively* the set of views which, in the light of his limited knowledge and understanding, seems to him soundest, while retaining *steadily throughout life* a lively awareness that a set of views thus chosen may very well be mistaken, and that intolerance of other views is therefore just plain stupid. The ordinary man is perfectly well able to recognize, if he is allowed to, that there is a vast amount of evidence relevant to moral and spiritual beliefs which he is not in a position to appraise; and he is quite competent to draw the obvious conclusion that he has no kind of right to be dogmatic about the particular set of beliefs he has come to favour. Many plain men do in fact arrive at this sensible conclusion. But it is, naturally, not a conclusion recommended by the authorities themselves. Too often the plain man is encouraged to exalt his belief into dogma, and to condemn with

passion all contrary beliefs; an attitude of unreason which goes far to nullify the efforts of those who labour to build up a spirit of concord among the peoples of the earth.

I suppose it will be objected against this view that man cannot live by merely tentative beliefs, that he demands *security of mind*, an "assured faith." The objection seems to me to be ill-founded. It is surely nonsense to speak as though "security" was a demand of our nature so over-riding and insistent that without its fulfilment the spiritual life of man crumbles into ruin. We must recognize as simple matter of fact that large numbers of men have preserved a steady serenity of mind throughout life, and in the face of death, on a basis of mere "probability"; and sometimes on a still slighter basis. No doubt most of us would *like* security of mind. But it is a mark of adult status to like *integrity* of mind still more. It is not the worst portion of mankind that feels the need of maintaining intellectual integrity to be something far deeper and stronger than any need for "security."

3. The next criticism we can deal with very briefly. It seems in one form or another to be popular in anti-intellectualist propaganda, and therefore cannot be wholly ignored, but its weakness is very apparent. In essentials the argument is this. The characteristic product of reason is "theory"; it is notorious that a belief may be "all right in theory" but fail to fit the facts; but true belief must "fit the facts"; hence reason is not a trustworthy source of true belief.

The answer is that the second premise is false. It may be notorious, but it is also quite untrue, that a belief may be "all right in theory but not fit the facts." A theory is an attempt to give a systematic explanation of a set of facts, and if it fails to cover even *one* relevant fact it is to that extent a bad theory, and is condemned as such by reason. Without doubt there is a rather wild type of theorist who tends to ignore facts obvious to common sense and who, on the basis of less familiar facts, erects fanciful speculations which excite justifiable derision. But "theory" is not to be condemned, surely, because of the vagaries of some misguided theorists? After all, even common sense cannot do without theory. The trouble about *its* theories is that, because based only upon the more striking and superficial facts, they are so very often wrong. But clearly this whole criticism of reason rests upon a fallacious opposition between theory and fact which it is strange to find surviving in an age in which we are confronted wherever we turn by examples of "theory made into fact." The countless triumphs of applied science should have made this sort of criticism obsolete long ago.

4. A still briefer answer will suffice to the rather odd criticism which seems to base itself upon the relatively small part which

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reason does as a matter of fact play in the generation of human beliefs. One must freely acknowledge the *fact*. Loves and hates, hopes and fears, social suggestion, hero-worship—the great influence of such forces in determining belief is beyond question. But what follows? Surely not that man *ought* to use his intellectual powers less? On the contrary, one would have supposed that the more clearly we are made aware of the many factors irrelevant to truth which are apt to influence our beliefs, the more eager we should become to guard in future against their intrusion. The “lesson” to be drawn from the facts is surely that we should make a deliberate effort to use our reason *more* not *less*.

5. I pass finally to a criticism of a much more interesting kind. It rests at bottom, I think, upon misunderstanding; but it merits respectful consideration, for the facts are complex, and we shall not without some trouble disentangle the main issues.

I refer to the familiar criticism that to make reason the guide of life leads to the diminution, and even to the partial atrophy, of that important side of our nature which we denote by such terms as passions, affections, emotions, sentiments, etc.—in a word, our “feelings.” The rationalist type of man, it is said, inclines to regard feeling as hostile to reason, as a distorting factor which deflects “judgment” from its true course. He distrusts feelings, in himself and in others; seeks to rid himself of them in order that he may be in a position to appraise situations by the pure dry light of reason; and, in proportion as he succeeds in his aim, develops into the sort of cold-blooded monster of efficiency whom most of us find a singularly repulsive figure.

How much truth is there in this? Does the disposition to “reflective comparison of the merits of alternative courses,” which we took to be characteristic of the life of reason, tend to produce this unsatisfactory result? Is there a real fear of it damming the springs of our emotional nature?

I don’t think so. Our “rational” man, let it be granted, will be in the habit of subjecting situations to intellectual analysis before acting, with a view to discovering which of all the possible courses of which the situation admits will be most likely to realize the more or less fixed ends or principles which he has come to accept. Now sometimes that analysis *will* have the effect of banishing an emotion aroused in him by his earlier, superficial reading of the situation. Othello, presumably, would have ceased to feel the pangs of jealousy before harm had been done had he been of a more reflective cast of mind. But it is equally possible that analysis should *evoke* an emotion where none was felt before. Thus the apathy shown by so large a section of the comfortable middle class towards the mass unemployment of the early ’thirties could hardly have survived a serious effort

to "analyse the situation." It must have been replaced in the normal decent citizen by pity and shame. Again, most common, perhaps, of all the consequences of "analysis" is the substitution of a *new* emotion for an *old* one. When, for example, a fuller understanding disclosed the execrable housing conditions of war-time evacuees from slumdom, the anger at first felt at the unpleasant personal habits of many of these temporary guests yielded naturally to horror and compassion, and not seldom to painful searchings of conscience. And a fourth possibility is, of course, that reflective analysis leaves the initial state unchanged, no new circumstances of emotive relevance having been brought to view.

It would seem, then, that the typical effect of the rational man's habit of analysing situations is not to diminish, much less to banish, emotion. The typical effect is, I suggest, to ensure that, where emotion is felt, it is an emotion which bears some appropriateness to the real nature of the situation; in other words, to ensure that emotions felt are *rational* and not *irrational* emotions. In that light we can understand, I think, in what sense it is true that the rational man is "distrustful of feeling." What he distrusts are his *immediate* feeling reactions excited by his first superficial apprehension of the situation. And surely he does well to distrust them? Often they do induce false and harmful judgment about the behaviour called for. Sometimes, of course, they do not. But in such cases they will survive critical reflection anyway, and no more will be lost than a certain expedition in taking the appropriate action. Nor will this loss of expedition be of serious account: for, as already indicated in our definition of the life of reason, the rational man will not stop to analyse, where the situation clearly calls for immediate response. If suddenly confronted by an angry bull, it will not be the path of reason to debate whether we should run for a fence, or climb a tree, or jump a river, or trust to a bold front and a stick. Reason dictates that it is more important to do some one of these at once than to delay until we have thought out what course would "in the abstract" promise most success.

I rather fancy, however, that the critic, even if he admits all this, will still be inclined to urge that there is something at bottom unpleasing in the general absence of spontaneity about the rational man's behaviour. "Is it not the case," he may ask, "that most of us tend to think much more highly of the man whose compassion for the forlorn-looking mendicant at his door moves to immediate alms-giving, as a direct expression of generous emotion, than for the man who first of all insists upon making careful enquiries to make sure that it is in fact a deserving case?" I agree. But I suggest that there is a big dose of sheer sentimentality in such valuations. The plain fact is that unreflective benevolence does often produce very

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bad results. Apart from anything else, it reduces the supply of aid available for authentic need. I cannot myself see any compensating factor which would entitle us to place a higher value on the behaviour which produces the smaller amount of social good.

Before taking leave of this, our final, topic of reason's relationship with emotion one ought, perhaps, to make a partial concession to the critic, for what it is worth. It is true, I think, that the rational man is much less subject to the *extremes* of emotion than is his less reflective fellow. We can easily see why. Accustomed to "look before and after," to view events not in and by themselves but in a broad network of relations determined by a comprehensive perspective of life as a whole, he is less prone to see in any particular happening occasion either for unalloyed rejoicing or for unmitigated despair. Unlike the unreflective man, he is seldom or never absorbed "without remainder" in the experience of the moment. But does the reflective man lose thereby by comparison with the unreflective man? If he will less often be lifted to pinnacles of ecstasy, he will, by the same token less often be plunged into inspissated gloom. Unless we suppose that some value resides in emotional intensity merely as such, it looks as though, even in respect of these rather exceptional emotional experiences, the rational man "gains on the roundabouts what he loses on the swings"! And of course if we go on, as in the end we must, to compare in value not just the occasional heights and depths of emotional excitement but the emotional life taken as a whole, there is a whole armoury of argument to draw upon in the writings of the philosophers from Plato onwards to show the immeasurable superiority of "the life according to reason."

But this line of thought, familiar though still not exhausted, there is certainly not time to explore to-night. I have already, I fear, compressed more than was wise into the discourse of an hour. Even so, I have said by no means all that I feel needs saying to-day on the claims of the life of reason. The great periods of civilization have, on the whole, been the periods in which reason was held in highest honour. To-day, I suggest, a heightening of respect for reason is imperative not so much for the enhancement of civilization as for its very survival.

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER PERSONS

J. R. JONES, D.Phil., M.A.

It seems to me certain that the perception of foreign bodies of a certain sort, although a necessary, is not the only, part of the basis of our belief in other persons. The greatest disagreement with this view that I know of has been expressed by Professor Aaron in a paper published in *Philosophy*, XIX, 72.¹ He claims that, since one does not really know "what it means to be a mind in one's own case," the question whether we can be certain that there are other *minds* is meaningless except as reducible to the question whether such propositions as "Robinson exists" are propositions which we can be certain about. And he tries to show that no more is involved in the analysis of "Robinson exists" than would be involved in the analysis of propositions of whose truth we can be *perceptually* certain, such as "That table over there exists" or "The Eiffel Tower exists." My assurance that Robinson exists is not the assurance that something called Robinson's *mind* exists. It is the perfectly ordinary perceptual assurance that 'the person over there' exists. "You ask me how I am certain that Robinson exists and I answer, 'Well, look, there he is.' It would be absurd for anyone to say that he does not exist when I see him here before me and hear him talk and watch him move that chair."²

Now it is so obvious that this would be one's natural response to being asked how one knows that a given person exists that it does seem, when the matter is put in this way, that the accepted phenomenology unnecessarily complicates the facts of social consciousness. The impression which Professor Aaron gives, however, of effecting a radical simplification of the problem is, to my mind, a false one. He only makes it seem as if 'that person over there' were the same sort of expression as 'that table over there' by not inquiring too closely what it is that we include in what we are asserting exists when we assert that 'that person over there' exists or that 'other people' exist. It may well be that *instances* of what we mean by these terms are identified perceptually. But what is the full connotation of terms like 'person' and 'people'? If I point in a certain direction and say, "Look, there are people over there," it is certain that part of what I mean to imply is that there exist physical objects of a certain distinctive sort and that "those are some of them over there." It is equally certain that, to the question—Physical objects of *what* sort? the only answer that need be given to enable the

¹ *Our Knowledge of One Another*, pp. 63-75.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 72.

objects 'over there' to be identified as 'people' is—Physical objects of such and such a characteristic appearance and manner of changing. And this simply means, inasmuch as appearance and manner of changing are perceptible qualities of a physical object, that it is purely *perceptually* that the appropriate objects are identified as being of the sort called 'people.' (It is necessary to include the characteristic manner of changing of objects of this sort among their distinguishing marks because of the possibility that a seemingly 'human' object at which one is looking may prove to be a lay figure. Dr. Broad has shown that what ordinarily happens when an object is identified as a person is that a presumption "... based on its general appearance in the first instance ... is supported or refuted by the order and connexion (or lack of these) which we afterwards find in its behaviour."¹) But it surely does not follow that no elements of meaning are included in the connotation of 'person' beyond the perceptual tokens by which we identify objects of the appropriate appearance and behaviour as 'persons.'

It is a significant fact that we refer quite naturally to objects of this sort as 'others.' This means that we must be thinking of them as similar to ourselves. They are *other* instances of the sort of thing that we take ourselves to be instances of. But what sort of thing does one take oneself to be an instance of? I certainly am an instance of the sort of thing I perceive these 'others' to be instances of, namely, a body of characteristic appearance and behaviour. For by visuo-tactual exploration and the help of mirror-images, I am perceptually acquainted with a body of the appearance and behaviour in question which I take to be my own. But I also observe in myself such occurrences as 'remembering what I did at this time yesterday,' 'thinking whether or not to go out without an overcoat,' 'wishing that tea were ready,' 'feeling angry,' 'being in pain,' etc. The most obvious difference between these occurrences in myself and the outward appearance and overt movements of my body is the difference in the way I observe them. I may not be able to say what sort of thing a 'thought' or a 'wish' or a 'feeling' may be, but I can see very clearly that I do not observe events of this sort in the way I observe a wound on the back of my hand. This difference is expressed in philosophical language by calling the latter mode of observation 'perception' and the observation of events of the former sort 'introspection.' In adopting the latter term I do not wish to imply any particular theory of self-knowledge. I do not propose, for example, to inquire whether the introspection of my awareness of x involves an awareness of this awareness, or whether 'of' in both these expressions is used in the same sense. There is a difference between times when I am perceiving an object x and when I am not,

¹ *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 321.

when I am remembering an event x and when I am not, when I am angry or in bodily pain and when I am not. I shall use 'introspection,' in a minimal sense, for the bare intimation of this difference. I shall say that the plain man 'introspects,' not when he is performing some special process of self-scrutiny, but when that happens which he would express by saying that he "knows that he is having an experience." The expression enables those events in myself which no exploration of my body would enable *you* to perceive, viz., the experiences which I am having, to be conveniently referred to as 'introspectible events.' I propose to adopt this usage.

Now my being acquainted with introspectible events in myself does not necessarily mean that I understand "what it is to be a *mind* in my own case." For 'mind' here connotes either a substance or a logical construction. And it may well be that, so understood, as Professor Aaron shows, "one does not know one's *own* mind in any very satisfactory fashion." But it would be absurd to deny that one knows what it is to think of *a* or remember *b* or intend *c*, or how it feels like to be in love or in pain. And if, by calling a certain class of perceptible objects 'other persons' or 'others,' I mean to imply that they possess all the characteristics which *I* am aware of possessing, I must be including in the meaning of "Here is a person" the thought that the body of characteristic appearance and behaviour which I am perceiving has introspectible events that *I* cannot introspect connected with it. The thought of a thing being a 'person' includes the thought of its being a body of characteristic appearance and behaviour *with which such events are connected* and, possibly also, the thought that such and such are likely to be the specific events of this sort that are connected with the particular body in question. When, therefore, I say, "This is Robinson," in addition to a perceived object of characteristic appearance and behaviour, the total situation includes a complex meaning which constitutes as it were a two-layered structure. In order not to prejudice the issue by describing these layers in terms either of 'acknowledge' or of 'belief,' I shall simply say that, if I were to give full verbal expression to what I mean when, pointing to a certain sort of physical object, I say "Look, there is So-and-so," it would be in the form of the statements (*a*) Bodies of that sort have events of the sort I am acquainted with in introspection connected with them, and (*b*) Such and such are probably the specific events of the sort in question which *this* particular body has connected with it.

How do perceptual situations of a certain sort acquire for us this additional 'two-layered' meaning? That is how it seems to me the problem of 'our knowledge of other persons' should be stated. In most discussions of this problem, much time is spent in exposing the sophistications of the traditional Analogical Theory. I am in

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sympathy with the greater part of this criticism. I nevertheless believe that, unless it can be shown that we have *direct* knowledge of the experiences of others, we have to face the fact that the only path open to us to the thought that bodies other than our own have introspectible events connected with them is the path of analogy. In order that a body of characteristic appearance and behaviour should acquire for us the meaning of 'person,' it seems to me that either we must know by direct acquaintance with its thoughts, feelings and intentions that it has such introspectible events connected with it, or we must *impute* events of this sort to it by an analogical extension of the experiences which we introspect in ourselves. This seems to be the view Lord Russell takes in his recently published *Human Knowledge*. Our conviction that "other people have thoughts and feelings that are qualitatively fairly similar to our own," we cannot have acquired solely from observing their bodily behaviour. It is impossible to refute the view that their bodies are automata "by external observation alone." If, therefore, we believe that there exist introspectible occurrences other than our own thoughts and feelings, and unless (I would add) these foreign introspecta are somehow accessible to our inspection, it "must be in virtue of some inference in which our own thoughts and feelings are relevant" that we believe this. The appeal must be "to something that may be vaguely called 'analogy'."¹

This view cannot be regarded as established, however, without evidence that direct knowledge of other people's experiences is either impossible or does not in fact occur. It is immediately certain, supposing it does occur, that inspection of another's introspecta, or *extraspection* as it has been called, does not extend to all the experiences which we believe the other person to be having. For we repeatedly find that we have to resort to dubious reconstruction of people's thoughts and intentions in situations where, if extraspection of their state of mind had been possible, we would only be too glad to avail ourselves of the direct approach. This leaves open the possibility that there is some extraspective acquaintance with foreign introspecta and that it may, therefore, be the case that we know that bodies of a certain sort have introspectible events connected with them by direct acquaintance with *some* of these events. Using the expression 'telegnosis' in the sense in which I am using 'extraspection,' Dr. Broad once put forward the view² that, since it is "practically certain that there is such a mental power as telegnosis," it is to some small extent probable that occasional telegnostic intuitions are an indiscernible ingredient in our experience of other selves. These occasional insights would suffice to provide a basis in acquaintance for the judgment that foreign bodies of a certain sort

¹ *Human Knowledge*, B. Russell, pp. 501-5.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 331-32.

have introspectible events connected with them. But Dr. Broad seems to have no other reason for supposing that we have a 'power of telegnosis' than that it can no longer be disputed that the abnormal phenomenon of 'telepathic communication' occurs. And it has been repeatedly shown (by Professor Price and others) that telepathy is more in the nature of a mental transference or 'infection' by which the contents of another's thoughts or feelings are communicated to our own than of insight into the *enjoyment* of the experiences in question by the other mind. And if the only known form of extra-sensory communication between minds thus turns out not to be a genuine *telegnosis*, there cannot even be the faint balance of probability claimed by Dr. Broad in favour of supposing that indiscernible telegnostic insights are diffused through our experience of one another. There seems, therefore, to be no evidence that extraspection, which, in any case, could only be supposed to occur very rarely, does in fact occur at all.

And I strongly suspect that if the implications of supposing that an experience which *occurs* to one person can be *inspected* by another were squarely faced, it would become clear that 'extraspection' is the name of a form of awareness which cannot *possibly* occur. That is, I suspect that it is only by not inquiring too closely into the meaning of their words that philosophers have managed to make it seem plausible to talk of 'directly apprehending' another's state of mind. For what is supposed to happen when I have extraspective knowledge of you is that I apprehend, not the objects or 'contents' of your experiences but these experiences themselves, with the same immediacy as I introspectively apprehend my own. And I think it can be claimed to be involved in the very thought of an 'experience' that it is *impossible* that an experience *E* should be as *directly* apprehended by me as I apprehend certain experiences in introspection, when I do not have to *E* the relation which Alexander called the relation of 'enjoying' or 'living through' it and which is clearly the relation meant when I say of certain experiences that they 'occur to me' or 'are experiences of mine.' I think this is so because it seems to me, on reflexion, that by 'an experience' we in fact mean the 'having' or 'enjoying' of an experience. And I should claim that the extraspectionists, however they may think they can, are not really able to imagine what it would be like to inspect an experience which they did not themselves 'enjoy.' If we are to become directly acquainted with another's states of mind, they must become our own, and a state of mind which is one's own is *eo ipso* not another's. This means that the only *possible* inspection of an experience is introspection and that those who talk of *extra*-spection are merely compounding a term by placing two elements in meaningless juxtaposition and exploiting the analogy with *intro*-spection to make

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it seem as if the compound stood for a genuine possibility. But either extraspection is possible or we credit bodies of a certain sort with thoughts, feelings and volitions on analogy with our own. Some form of analogical theory, in short, is unavoidable.

Now the traditional Analogical Theory supposed that, in crediting bodies of a certain sort with events of the sort I am acquainted with in introspection, I argue from the datum that the general appearance of these bodies and their manner of behaving are perceptibly similar to the outward appearance and manner of behaving of my own body. And we have been repeatedly told that this analysis lays the traditional theory open to the fatal charge that it operates with a datum which is not a datum. If only the fact that certain bodies outwardly resemble my behaving body can justify my imputing to them qualities of the sort I am acquainted with in introspection, then I cannot possibly have acquired the belief in other minds in this way. For there is every evidence that I possess this belief (or, at least, behave as if I possessed it) long before I am sufficiently well acquainted with the external appearance of my own body to note its similarities of structure and behaviour to other bodies. Nevertheless, it seems to me that a possible reason why the traditional theory fastened on this particular datum has been overlooked. The postulation of unwitnessable happenings on grounds of analogy seems to demand a greater degree of intellectual interest and competence than the child can reasonably be credited with at the time it begins to show signs of 'knowing other persons.' And a modified version of the Analogical Theory has accordingly been put forward which supposes not that the young infant actually argues from analogy but only that things happen *as if* it did so argue. Now I take this to mean that the infant is somehow supposed to draw a conclusion which is in fact justified by an analogical inference, without itself making this inference. And I cannot see how that could happen unless the facts, whose weight as evidence for the conclusion the infant fails to assess, somehow affected it so disturbingly as to become psychologically coercive, compelling the belief (or quasi-belief) in foreign introspecta. A resemblance between two parts of its experience must so arouse its interest as virtually to take on the quality of a compelling *impression* of the presence of introspectible events in bodies other than its own. But can anything effectively arouse a baby's interest which does not somehow concern its bodily feeling? It seems to me that it was because it dimly felt the need to select a resemblance that would vitally *concern* the subject in this way that the traditional theory supposed the infant imputed introspectible qualities to foreign bodies from noting their similarities of structure and behaviour to its own body. It supposed that at a stage when the subject is largely preoccupied with events in its

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somatic field, those objects are likely to arouse its interest in the way required which resemble that somatic field in its exterior contours and overt movements. The difficulty doubtless is that the subject cannot then have known what its body looked like on the outside. But the emphasis does suggest what needs to be done to emend the Analogical Theory. We have to find some observable resemblance of equal or greater concern to the subject's bodily interest which would not involve comparison of the external appearance of its body with that of certain other bodies.

Suppose the infant observed that objects were being re-arranged in its neighbourhood in a way resembling the way it would itself re-arrange them if it desired an end *E*. And suppose it further noticed that a sequence of events culminating in this re-arrangement of objects started at a body of characteristic appearance and behaviour. Would this lead it to the thought of a desire for *E* which was not its own but was somehow connected with that body? The inference could certainly be performed by a subject which had no idea what its own body or bodily movements looked like, provided it was familiar with the way its body re-arranged other objects in the pursuit of certain ends. But it is surely doubtful whether the subject could actually perform this inference at the stage envisaged. And the resemblance on which the inference is based does not concern the subject's bodily life sufficiently closely to arouse the degree of interest that could force the conclusion on a mind that had not consciously assessed the evidence.

Is there then a situation of the infant subject, other than the actual resemblance of its body to certain external bodies, which could be supposed to have this effect? Professor H. H. Price once suggested that the belief in other minds may be justified by the following sort of teleological argument. Suppose that "... whichever way I take in attempting to get to the spring to quench my thirst a shower of stones meets me: that the bridge breaks just as I reach it, that a rock falls and blocks the path, and so on. If these apparent accidents happen with sufficient frequency and variety, and always in just such a way as to prevent me from satisfying my desire, and do not happen except when I am trying to satisfy it: then it becomes more and more probable that they are not accidents at all; that there is an intelligent being who is *aware* of what I am doing, *desires* to prevent it, and *choses means* to that end." Or I may find "evidences of a design which is not hostile but friendly. I come in feeling cold and hungry and find a fire already lit, and the tea on the table."¹ Professor Price writes as if the belief in other minds could only be *justified* by an argument of this sort. But it seems to me that he has put his finger on a situation which may well also have induced the

¹ *Our Knowledge of Other Minds*, Arist. Soc. Proc., 1931-32, p. 73.

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belief in the first place. For he is certainly describing situations of a sort that the young infant must be familiar with. In the pursuit of elemental gratifications, its body too makes certain movements or sets going chains of physical events which, it must soon discover, are interfered with in ways resembling the way *it* would interfere with a sequence of events in its neighbourhood if it resented its occurrence and wished to terminate it. No comparison of outward appearances is involved here. The comparison is between the subject's own 'enjoyment' of 'interfering' behaviour, on the one hand, and certain felt frustrations caused by unsolicited external interferences with the pursuit of its ends, on the other. And between these it observes, not simply a resemblance which arouses its detached curiosity, but one which constitutes a sufficiently resented intrusion into its private life to become a coercive impression of the presence in its neighbourhood of foreign introspectible events. If it could speak it would say: "Somewhere there must be an awareness of the movements I am making and a wish to prevent them." But what comes to it in this way as ostensibly the discovery of foreign sources of awareness and volition must consist implicitly in the analogical extension of its own experience of resenting a situation in which it is placed and acting on the impulse to change it. The implicit inference, in other words, is analogical in character, as, I hold, it must necessarily be. But the error of the traditional analogical theory is avoided. For while it may take a long time before the child knows what shape its body has or what its movements look like to an external observer, it must know, from the time it notices anything, what happens *in its neighbourhood* when it is conscious of resenting some movement that is going on there and of trying to prevent it.

It is significant that when, in curious discordance with the main purport of his paper, Professor Aaron takes the analysis of social consciousness beyond its perceptual basis, it is substantially this argument from 'designed interference' that he gives. Beginning with "the certain and indubitable perception of objects in the world around it," the child soon learns "that some of these objects . . . by *meeting its special needs* . . . respond to it in a way in which others do not."¹ Professor Aaron insists that the child does not argue from these solicitous responses to "the existence of beings which it did not previously know." For his fundamental point is that there is *perceptual* acquaintance with human beings as "responsive objects." But what Price says is that from observing certain interferences in its life which are always, in principle, traceable to such responsive objects, the child does derive a proposition which it did not previously know, viz., that objects of that sort have introspectible events analogous to its own perceptions and volitions

¹ Op. cit., p. 73 (my italics).

connected with them. Events of this sort in bodies other than its own it could obviously never have *perceived*. And the curious thing is that Professor Aaron goes on to give what is substantially the same analysis. The child knew 'already' what was perceptually knowable, viz., the existence of certain responsive objects. But "*now* it realizes that the purposive activities which it observes belong to these responsible objects, and so it recognizes the latter as intelligences."¹ Precisely. The discovery of other *intelligences* goes beyond the mere perception of a class of objects whose manner of changing is describable generically as 'responsive.' It involves connecting these objects with certain felt frustrations and unsolicited gratifications in a way which transforms their 'responsiveness,' from a mere perceptual quality on a par with their shape or colour, to the expression of an *awareness* on their part of what I am doing and of an *intention* on their part of either thwarting or furthering my designs.

It seems to me that in this way the child may be conditioned to impute introspectible events to a certain class of bodies long before it can assess the evidence which logically justifies the imputation. How may it be supposed to proceed from that point? Its imputation of a capacity for awareness and volition to bodies of a certain sort must lead it to expect bodies of that sort to behave in a certain determinable manner at all times and in whatever circumstances it sees them placed. And bodies of the appropriate sort systematically fulfil its expectations. Its hypothesis that their significant movements are controlled by intelligent volition, though never strictly verified in experience, is repeatedly and diversely justified for it by the relevant adjustments which it continually perceives them making to unforeseeable changes of circumstance. But a hypothesis or imputation which experience thus systematically endorses must cease in time to have a consciously hypothetical character and become 'crystallized' in a Rule. It seems to me that at some stage or other the child's attitude to bodies of a certain sort becomes formulated in a Rule of the form: "Bodies of this sort have events of the sort I am acquainted with in introspection connected with them." I am not suggesting that the Rule exists in a verbalized form. The child does not say to itself whenever it confronts objects of the appropriate sort: "Objects of this sort have thoughts, intentions, feelings, etc., connected with them." The Rule exists in the form of a settled disposition to treat objects of this sort as if they had events of that sort connected with them. It is by the operation of this Rule, I would suggest, that perceptual situations of which the objective constituent is a 'person' acquire the 'added meaning' of which I spoke earlier.

¹ Op. cit., p. 73.

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But that meaning, we saw, is 'two-layered.' In addition to the general Rule that "Bodies behaving in such and such a determinable manner have introspectible events connected with them," we acquire specific inductive generalizations which correlate *determinate* ways of behaving, under this determinable, to determinate sorts of introspectible events. Having acquired the Rule that there are mental processes going on in bodies of a certain sort, I learn from experience, by the help of analogy, that such and such mental processes are correlated to such and such bodily movements. It is in this way, for example, that a connexion is inductively established between 'frowns' and 'resentment.' In the bodies to which introspectible qualities are imputed, a characteristic facial expression is repeatedly observed to accompany certain characteristic ways of behaving. When my body behaves in any of these ways, it is because I am feeling resentful. And thus, by an analogical extension of my own experience, I obtain the rule that "Whenever a body of the appropriate appearance and behaviour manifests the characteristic facial expression called 'frowning,' that body has an experience of resentment connected with it." There could obviously be circumstances in which one would be extremely rash to act on a generalization such as this. The truth is that natural expressions of introspectible events, like facial contortions, exclamatory noises and bodily gestures, are correlated to *different sorts* of experiences. This makes the establishment of precise correlations difficult and introduces a faltering and corrigible element into our stock of inductive generalizations concerning the behaviour of other human bodies which is quite absent from our initial Rule, justified analogically rather than by induction, that bodies of that sort have *some introspectible events or other* connected with them. This is what Dr. Broad had in mind when he wrote that "I may be practically certain that the body of my friend is animated by a mind; and yet very doubtful, on a certain occasion when I see him frowning, whether he is angry or thinking deeply or in pain."¹ Nevertheless, we do learn to correlate relatively determinate sorts of introspectible events with relatively determinate sorts of facial and other 'natural' expressions. And a person shows sensitivity in social intercourse precisely in proportion to the wealth and determinateness of the correlations of this sort that he succeeds in inductively establishing. What has been described as an "accumulation of analogical wisdom" enables such a person to know instinctively that such and such bodily actions are correlates of such and such states of mind and thus always to do the right thing in the right circumstances.

I shall now try to state what I believe to be the occurrent state of my mind on the occasion of confronting a body of the appropriate

¹ Op. cit., p. 319.

appearance and behaviour and 'knowing' it to be a 'person.' I believe what happens is that on perceiving a body of the appropriate sort I, automatically and without explicit verbalization, subsume it under my Rule that "Bodies of this sort have events of the sort I am acquainted with in introspection connected with them." And if the body behaves in a characteristic way, if, for example, it screams, shows a deathly pallor and holds its hands to the pit of its stomach, I, a little less automatically and with possibly some hesitation (for the person may be feigning distress), subsume it under a generalization which I have inductively acquired that "Bodies of the appropriate appearance which behave in this determinate way have the experience of 'violent bodily pain' connected with them." I am not occurrently aware of arriving *by an inference* at the conclusion—"Therefore this is a person," or, except under certain conditions, at the conclusion—"Therefore this person is in great pain." Most writers on this subject rightly insist that my 'knowing another person' in the occurrent sense is not inferential knowledge. But the reason for this, I suggest, is that subsumption under a rule, while it may be voluntarily performed, tends with increasing familiarization to become a completely automatized and unconscious operation. The subsumptive process approximates to a conscious inference under the following conditions. If there is reason to suspect the significance of the movements or noises which a body is making, I may find myself seeking to *justify* their subsumption under the rule that movements and noises of that sort are generally correlated to such and such an experience. And I shall then be conscious of *inferring*, if the evidence on closer examination justifies the inference, that the person before me is having the experience in question. But it is only when what looks at first sight like a human body fails to behave like one that its automatic subsumption under my general Rule fails to take effect. If this happens, as it rarely does, I am conscious of weighing the available evidence and inferring that the body in question is or is not a person, that is, does or does not have some events of the sort I am acquainted with in introspection connected with it. Where an initial assumption, based on considerations of general appearance, that a body is a human body is afterwards supported by the order and connexion which we find in its behaviour, we accept its personality as entailed in the Rule "All bodies which both look and behave like this are persons" in the same automatic, unconscious way as we accept, for example, its mortality as entailed in the rule "All men are mortal."

This, I submit, is what 'knowing another person' in the occurrent sense of 'knowing' consists of. What does it mean to 'know one another' in the dispositional sense? This question is reducible on

my view to the two questions: (a) what is my state of mind in regard to the general rule under which I occurrently subsume bodies of the appropriate appearance and behaviour, and (b) what is my state of mind in regard to the specific rules or inductive generalizations under which I occurrently subsume certain determinate modes of behaviour of these bodies. By the question—What is my state of mind in regard to a rule? I mean to ask—Do I *know* this rule or merely *believe* it or is some third attitude to it possible?

With regard to question (a), by disavowing extraspection, I have implied that I do not *know* that "Bodies of a given sort have events of the sort I am acquainted with in introspection connected with them." Do I then *believe* this? I do not think so. Professor Price asserts that "our ordinary statements with regard to the existence . . . of other minds express not knowledge but belief."¹ I certainly agree that they do not express knowledge. But is the state of mind they express one of explicit belief? I should have thought that a state of believing which knew its belief to be justified by nothing better than analogical evidence would involve a disquieting sense of its own inconclusiveness. Is not this why, in attempting from people's facial expressions or bodily gestures to divine their thoughts or intentions on analogy with our own, we find ourselves saying such things as "I am *inclined to believe* . . ." or "I *rather think* . . . that So-and-so is thinking such and such or intends such and such a course of action"? But we never (or hardly ever) find ourselves saying, "I am inclined to believe . . ." or "I rather think . . ." or even² "I am practically certain . . . that this body (where "this body" refers to a body of appropriate appearance and behaviour) has some events or other of the sort I am acquainted with in introspection connected with it." We never (or hardly ever) have occasion to reassure ourselves of *this* proposition in words which imply that the evidence for it, however strong, is not grounded in extraspection and cannot, therefore, be conclusive. Our state of mind in regard to the general Rule, in short, can only be described as one of being *as if we knew* the rule. This means that we must be *taking for granted* that bodies of the appropriate sort have introspectible events connected with them. For to "take for granted" is to assent to a proposition without occurrently weighing the evidence for it. And it seems to me that it can only be by not occurrently weighing the evidence for thinking that certain foreign bodies have introspectible events connected with them that we can be *as if we knew* this proposition when in fact the proposition is only justified by an analogical exten-

¹ Op. cit., p. 72.

² I certainly would not say, as Dr. Broad does in the passage quoted on p. 143, that I am "practically certain that the body of my friend is animated by a mind."

sion of the experiences which we introspect in ourselves. Our dispositional attitude to the Rule, in other words, must be one of unquestioning acceptance of it.

In his opening paragraphs, Professor Aaron points to the absurdity of supposing that the existence of other persons is not *known*. "There can be no doubt that we *do* know one another. . . . We feel quite certain about such knowledge and cannot bring ourselves to doubt it."¹ This is certainly a fair description of what we feel our state of mind to be like. But there is no proof here that that state of mind is one of genuine knowledge. For we would *feel* in exactly the same way if our state of mind were one that simulated knowing psychologically. And there is a sense in which being in the habit of taking something for granted is psychologically indistinguishable from knowing, in the dispositional sense, that something is the case. If I am in the habit of accepting a proposition as true, I tend to feel, occurrently, *as if* I were certain of its truth. This, however, is not because the evidence for the proposition is conclusive and I am occurrently aware of this, but because, by never occurrently thinking of the evidence, I am unaware of its actual insufficiency. And, as Hobbes once said, a man is "as ready to affirm that of which he feels no doubt as the man who possesses perfect knowledge."

In answer to question (a), therefore, I suggest that our state of mind is one of habitual acceptance of the Rule that "Bodies of a certain sort have introspectible events connected with them." This means, in the first place, that our state of mind in regard to this Rule is not explicitly one of belief. And it means, in the second place, that we feel pre-reflectively as if we *knew* that foreign introspecta existed. This I take to be the phenomenological justification of the Intuitional Theory which holds that extraspection occurs.

With regard to question (b), it seems to me that dispositionally the attitude of believing on inductive evidence that such and such bodily modifications are correlated to such and such mental events is frequently 'fossilized' into an attitude of taking the truth of these correlations for granted. But an occurrent uncertainty in the subsumption of observed cases under rules of this type sometimes reflects a dispositional inconclusiveness in our attitude to the rule. This means that we *believe* that the correlation in question holds good and do not act as if we *knew* that it did. Verbalized, our attitude would be: "I am inclined to believe . . ." or "I rather think . . . that when people behave in such and such ways it is because they are having such and such experiences."

Now the reader may be disinclined to agree with these conclusions because he feels that, in certain situations, he has an unmistakeable sense of directly confronting another mind. How is this phenomenon

¹ Op. cit., p. 63.

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accounted for on the view that extraspection does not in fact, and perhaps cannot possibly, occur? Much of our knowledge of foreign introspecta comes from what people tell us about themselves in informative 'psychological' sentences. Even here our 'knowledge' is not direct but depends on the interpretation of certain conventional symbols and there is always the possibility that the other party may be playing the hypocrite and deliberately misinforming us. It is a great mistake, however, to suppose that what goes on in other people's minds is only revealed in the verbal information which they occasionally volunteer about themselves. While it is true, as Professor Aaron points out, that "I know most about my friend by the things he tells me about himself," it is surely an exaggeration to say, as he does, that our knowledge of one another "always contains [this] element of revealed knowledge."¹ Even the people with whom we have most to do, do not keep us thus constantly informed of what goes on in their minds. We have very largely to discover for ourselves what their thoughts, feelings or intentions are. And we do this by subsuming their observed gestures, facial expressions and evocative utterances under some inductively acquired generalization of the form: "Bodies of the appropriate appearance and behaviour which behave in *this* determinate way have such and such determinate introspectible events connected with them." We read off clues to their thoughts or feelings which they themselves are involuntarily providing us in the way their bodies behave in different sorts of situations, in what we perceive their bodies doing to other bodies and, not least, in the gestures their bodies make, the facial expressions which they wear and the exclamatory noises they sometimes emit. It is almost true to say that the only conscious mental processes to which there do not seem to be such public clues are a person's dreams. "The dreamer," someone has said, "keeps his secret because sleep quenches his responses."

Now I have stressed that, with repeated practice, the process of interpretation by subsumption under a rule comes to be so swiftly and competently performed as to be increasingly automatized. But the more this happens the more we cease to seem as if we were *inferring* the other person's un verbalized experiences: the more we come to feel as if we had some sort of direct insight into the introspectible qualities of the body before us. As in reading a page of print, we pass straight from the symbols to the meanings symbolized and are unaware of any relation of symbolization, or of any passage from sign to thing signified. And the effect is that, by merely looking into certain people's faces or listening to the sound of their voices, we feel as if we were in direct contact with their minds. The appearance of extraspective immediacy has clearly a *perceptual* origin.

¹ Op. cit., p. 75.

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When I perceive in the body of a close acquaintance movements of a type I have learnt to correlate with, for example, a certain emotion, the effect is as if I were *perceiving* this emotion itself. We talk of seeing another person's fear or anger "in his face" or "in his eyes." The illusion comes about by a substitution of the experience itself for its natural expression. Suppose I know inductively the correlation that a bodily gesture of the type *m* is a natural expression of an introspectible event of the type *e*. And suppose further that I am so familiar with the way a certain person *P* makes the gesture *m* that I am no longer aware, in his or her case, of the distinction of *m* from *e* as sign from thing signified. Under these conditions, it seems to me, my perceiving *P*'s body making the gesture *m* will be virtually a *perception* of *P*'s having the experience *e*. In this way the behaving body may be said to be refined into a transparent medium of the other mind, and constant intercourse with it must produce an incorrigible illusion of extraspective acquaintance.

That the extraspective insight is delusory there can be no doubt if the reasons I have given for rejecting extraspection be accepted. But this does not in the least mean that one who recognizes the delusion need be in any doubt as to the existence of foreign introspecta. For the moment we are assailed by doubts on this score, we instinctively appeal to the grounds on which the conclusion actually rests and thereby replace our attitude of accepting the existence of other minds by one of explicit *belief* in their existence. When, that is to say, on being told that we cannot really be extraspecting other people's minds, we begin to doubt whether, after all, introspectible events other than our own occur, we recall the analogical evidence which has all along justified our believing that they do. Accepting the Rule that "Bodies of a certain sort have introspectible events connected with them," I normally act in the presence of bodies of this sort as if I knew that they had events of that sort connected with them. But if challenged to state how I *know* that there are introspectible events other than my own, I would set about to answer as if the question had been—Why do you *believe* that there are foreign introspecta? And the most important part of my answer, I think, would be: I believe it because I live in a world where bodies of characteristic appearance and behaviour initiate changes which interfere with physical situations in precisely the way I would interfere with a physical situation if I were conscious of it and desired, for some reason, to change it.

OBJECTIVITY IN MORALS

WILLIAM KNEALE, M.A.

I

It is remarkable that we have to-day a number of philosophers who call themselves subjectivists in moral philosophy. For, although the name "subjectivist" is by no means new, philosophers have reserved it hitherto for their opponents, and usually for imaginary opponents at that. Perhaps the chief cause of the change which has taken place in recent years is the discovery of a distinction between descriptive and emotive meaning. In the past the only form of subjectivism considered by writers on moral philosophy was the suggestion that moral sentences such as "You ought to do that" were statements about the speaker's own attitude; and it was easy to refute this by pointing out that we discuss questions of morals in a way which would be unintelligent, and even unintelligible, if moral judgments were only reports of introspection. But those who now call themselves subjectivists maintain that the peculiarity of moral words is their expressive and evocative power. According to their analysis, a speaker who uses one of these words in an indicative sentence may be *stating* nothing at all, but is undoubtedly trying to *influence* others (and perhaps also himself) to adopt a certain attitude. This, they say, explains how there can be genuine disagreement about questions of morals and why discussion may produce results. If A tries to evoke one attitude in his hearers and B tries to evoke an incompatible attitude, their utterances are opposed, not indeed like contradictory statements, but rather like the efforts of men engaged in a tug-of-war. Language is not merely a vehicle for conveying information, but also an instrument for inducing approval or disapproval which will presently manifest itself in action; and if moral philosophy is to be distinguished from preaching, it must be the attempt to understand in detail how language serves this second purpose.

To some philosophers this recent development seems very dangerous. They think that no subjectivist can take moral distinctions seriously, and that if subjectivism spread beyond the study and the lecture room it would lead to moral anarchy and political tyranny. There are even some critics of subjectivism who profess to believe that it is the source of totalitarianism. This last charge seems to me absurdly unfair: Hegel's ugly child should not be laid on the doorsteps of other philosophers. Nor am I much impressed by fears about what might happen if the doctrine were widely accepted. No doubt

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some people who did not understand it properly would say, like Punch at the end of the puppet show, "The Devil is dead: we may all do as we like." But is the danger really any greater than that to be feared from general acceptance of the doctrine of self-realization or of St. Augustine's maxim "*Dilige Deum et fac quod vis*"? I do not see why anyone should cease to hate cruelty and to admire charity merely because he had read the writings of Mr. Russell or Mr. Stevenson. On the contrary, some tough-minded people who have hitherto felt rather embarrassed by references to morality may find that such reading liberates the preacher within them. Something of this sort happened last century to many who read Bentham's work, and the social results were in my opinion almost wholly good, although hedonistic utilitarianism is not a satisfactory theory of morals. There is at least this much truth in the emotive theory, namely, that the practical effect of the use of moral words depends largely on manner and tone of voice. If a philosopher says that "right" means *merely* so-and-so, his "merely" may have more effect than his definition. But if it seems to his hearers that, while abstaining from cant, he approves and disapproves heartily as they do themselves, they may swallow the most outrageous definitions of moral words and be none the worse for it, except intellectually.

I suggest then that we should not allow ourselves to be shocked by subjectivism, but examine it as dispassionately as we can. When I try to do this, I find myself more and more doubtful about the subjectivist's account of the way in which we use moral words, and I suspect my feeling is shared by a number of others who have made the same experiment. In this paper I wish to ask what sort of objectivity we should like to assert in our moral theory. Until this question can be answered, dispute on the main issue is useless, but the finding of an answer to this question may perhaps enable us to settle the main issue easily.

In order to avoid unnecessary complications I shall concentrate attention on words of the "ought," "right," "wrong" group, which are commonly thought to be moral in a special sense. It is true that moral philosophy is often supposed to include consideration of the nature of goodness and the making of a list of things which are good; but there is narrower usage according to which a moral question is properly one about conduct, e.g. a question of the form "What ought I to do in these circumstances?" When a man puts a question of this kind to a wise friend, he does not want a disquisition on the nature of virtue or the comparative worth of different motives. For it is to be presumed that he is already prepared to do what he ought to do, if only he can find out what that is. Nor will he be contented by remarks about the goodness of various possible states of affairs such as mutual affection between human beings. For, although

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considerations of this kind have some relevance, they do not by themselves provide an answer to his question. It is usually this narrower usage of the word "moral" we have in mind when we argue about objectivity in morals. We may even be prepared to agree that in some of its usages the word "good" can be explained satisfactorily in the way suggested by modern subjectivists. But the suggestion that sentences about obligation, rightness and wrongness have no objective reference sticks in our throats. I do not say yet that our reluctance to accept this suggestion is reasonable, but I report the facts as I find them, with the hope that I may presently be able to clarify them.

II

Those who try to defend objectivism in moral theory usually begin by pointing out that moral judgments about obligation, rightness, etc., look like assertions of fact. Here they are certainly right, for until recently no one tried to deny that these judgments are statements. But the important question is whether such judgments can be true or false in the ordinary sense; and on this we may perhaps argue as follows. When a man enjoys something such as a new kind of food, a book, a film, or a game, he may try to induce his friends to share his enjoyment; and if he says in this context that he has discovered something good, the word "good" may then be merely expressive and evocative. But no one can live for very long in a complex society without learning that it is impossible for him to make even his closest friends share all his tastes. And so we are always prepared to break off a discussion about taste by saying "Let's agree to differ. You go your way and I'll go mine. It takes all sorts to make a world." Now if discussions about right and wrong were fundamentally of the same kind, it might be expected that we should sometimes break them off in the same way. But this never happens. So long as we regard an issue as one of morals, we cannot say "Let's agree to differ." And it is natural to suppose that we cannot do so because we are not concerned with taste only, but with truth.

If the subjectivist is careful in the defence of his position, he may admit that there is an important difference between discussion about moral questions and discussions about matters of taste, but reply that the argument I have set out above proves no more than a very firm resolve on the part of all men to *produce* unanimity of attitude on issues they call moral. He may even go farther and say that a question of morals is by definition one on which we are not prepared to compromise by admitting that we are made differently and cannot be brought into agreement. If this answer is correct, the assertion of objectivity in morals is only a muddled expression of

the proselytizing zeal for which modern subjectivism makes full allowance. In order to complete his case the subjectivist would have to go on to explain why we tend to be tolerant of some differences of attitude but not of others, i.e. why we delimit the sphere of morals as we do. For although the objects of which an individual expresses specifically moral approval or disapproval may be very varied, they are not usually a random selection from the possible objects of interest. We know, for example, that many people like listening to music and try to persuade their friends to join them, but we should think it extremely odd if anyone declared that listening to music was a duty and apparently held towards this activity the same attitude as he held towards the care of his children. I shall not attempt to decide here whether or not the subjectivist could offer a plausible solution of this difficulty, because it is more important for my present purpose to return to the argument of the objectivists and consider what they mean by talking about the truth of moral judgments.

The philosophers who have talked most in this strain are the intuitionists from Richard Price to Sir David Ross. They usually discuss judgments of the rightness of acts, and they like to compare these with the apprehension of necessary truths in mathematics. Their reason for drawing such a comparison is not hard to understand. Although we often make singular judgments of rightness in the form "It would be right for you to do X in these circumstances," we cannot treat these as assertions of mere matters of fact. For we always maintain that it cannot be right to do X in given circumstances unless it is also right to do X in any precisely similar set of circumstances. That is to say, we do not think that the rightness of an act is apprehended by an intuition analogous to sense-perception, as though it were a quality belonging to a particular contingency. Admittedly some philosophers have talked about moral sense, but on examination their theories always turn out to be doctrines of moral sentiment, i.e. versions of subjectivism. No one takes seriously the suggestion that we can discover the rightness of an act as we discover the shrillness of a noise. If, then, we wish to maintain that a singular judgment of rightness is capable of truth or falsity, we must suppose that the man who makes it first notices some non-moral features of the situation and then recognizes that these entail the rightness (or fittingness, as it is sometimes called) of some act which is possible in that situation. According to this analysis, a singular judgment of rightness is always the conclusion of a kind of syllogism, and may be mistaken because of an error in either premiss: purely moral knowledge is always of universal propositions.

As presented in our day, this theory is opposed not only to subjectivism, but also to utilitarianism; but on the point which is of

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interest for my present inquiry utilitarians do not differ from intuitionists. They too believe that moral judgments can be true or false, but they think that all the universal moral propositions of the intuitionists which are really valid can be brought under the single principle that it is always right to produce the maximum good possible in the circumstances. Sometimes they suggest that they have given a definition of rightness, but in this they are surely mistaken. For if to say that an act is right means the same as to say that it is productive of the maximum good, the utilitarian principle which is supposed to introduce order and simplicity into moral theory reduces to the triviality that it is always productive of the maximum good to produce the maximum good. On the contrary, the status of our notion of rightness should be just as much a puzzle for the utilitarian as it is for the intuitionist, since both of them talk of it as though it were unanalysable.

Now many philosophers who are aware of this puzzle tell us that rightness is a non-natural quality, and that our notion of it is an innate idea or a *a priori* concept. This assertion makes me very suspicious, but I do not propose to discuss it here, because I think it extremely unpalatable to treat the notion of rightness as unanalysable. "Right," "wrong," "ought" and the other words of the same group are not peculiar to moral judgments, and it would be very strange indeed if their moral use were quite distinct from their use in other contexts such as the exposition of the law of the land. On the contrary, it seems obvious that the use of the words by moralists must be explained in the same way as their use by lawyers. Let us see where this suggestion leads us.

III

As used by lawyers and moralists the word "right" is equivalent to the phrase "in accordance with the law." Similarly "wrong" means the same as "not in accordance with the law," and "A ought to do X" means the same as "the law requires that A should do X." When the lawyer speaks in his professional capacity, the law to which he refers is the law of the land. When the moralist or the plain man of our day uses these words in a non-legal context, the law to which he refers is the moral law. We must consider presently why they should both use the same language, but it will be useful to notice first some consequences of this account of the way in which we use the so-called moral words.

"Obligatory," "non-obligatory," "right," and "wrong" can be arranged in a square of opposition, with "obligatory" and "wrong" as contraries and "right" and "non-obligatory" as sub-contraries. Since, however, any right action which was not non-obligatory would have to be obligatory and any non-obligatory action which was

not right would have to be wrong, we can simplify the scheme and classify all actions under three headings, "obligatory," "indifferent" and "wrong," with "indifferent" as an abbreviation for "right but non-obligatory." These three headings correspond obviously to "necessary," "contingent" and "impossible" in the logic of modalities. Indeed, the modal words "must," "may" and "cannot" are often used in a moral sense. But whereas logicians talk a lot about contingent propositions, moral philosophers have very little to say about indifferent actions. It is true that intuitionists often refer to the right, but they seem to assume at times that it is identical with the obligatory, although the word "right" never has that sense in ordinary speech. This is curious and unfortunate. One might almost say that the older moral philosophers had played into the hands of the subjectivists by concentrating attention on utterances which can with some plausibility be regarded as attempts to evoke attitudes of approval or disapproval. For who would be inclined to adopt an emotive theory of morals if he had started by considering such moral utterances as "You may if you like, but you needn't"? I do not say that it is impossible to extend the emotive theory to cover these cases; but I think that any such extension makes the theory much less plausible. If Mr. Stevenson's pattern of analysis is to be followed, the sentence I have just quoted must mean something like "I shrug my shoulders at the thought of your doing X. Do so likewise." This paraphrase is not at all emotive in any ordinary sense, and in order to cope with it a subjectivist would have to say that he understood "emotive" in a sense wide enough to cover "sedative." It seems much simpler and more in accord with good usage to treat moral utterances as we should treat corresponding statements by lawyers.

Now we all think that lawyers succeed in making statements by the use of words like "ought" and "right." Let us suppose for example that Mrs. A has let an unfurnished room in her house to Mr. B for occupation by the latter as a living room. When Mr. B arrives he brings with him a cat. This greatly distresses Mrs. A, because she has a pathological dislike of cats, and she tells Mr. B that he must not keep the animal in her house. Mr. B replies, correctly enough, that the cat is quiet, clean and well-behaved, and he refuses to take it away. Mrs. A then goes to her solicitor for advice. Now I do not profess to know the English law of tenancy, but I think the solicitor might perhaps say something like this: "You ought to leave the cat alone, so long as it does not enter your own living quarters, and you must on no account put Mr. B's furniture in the street. But you may give him three months' notice to quit. And if he doesn't remove himself and his cat at the end of that time, he will definitely be in the wrong." When the solicitor uses the words "ought," "may" and "wrong," he is talking about the way

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in which the law of England applies to the case, and no one doubts that what he says is either true or false. As a good citizen, he may perhaps use a tone of voice which is likely to work upon Mrs. A's emotions and induce her to keep the peace; but that is not part of the service for which he claims a fee. If he has the reputation of being a good solicitor, that is because he is nearly always correct when he undertakes to say what the law of England requires, allows or forbids in any particular case.

Similarly we all assume in our everyday life that moral advice may be true or false. Let us suppose that Mrs. C has good reason for believing that her lodger Mrs. D is unfaithful to Mr. D during the latter's absence as a prisoner-of-war in a foreign country, and that she is so worried about the matter that she goes to her clergyman to ask what she should do. She and the clergyman are at one in disapproving of adultery, and she fully expects him to begin his part of the conversation by shaking his head and saying "Tut, tut." But that is not all she wants to hear from him. She can see that there are various possible courses of action open to her (e.g. expostulating with Mrs. D, writing to Mr. D, turning a blind eye), and she is quite ready to believe that a person cleverer than herself might be able to think of other alternatives. Furthermore, she is already so much worked up about the affair that she is quite sincerely prepared to do what she ought to do, however unpleasant that may be for herself, if only she can find out what it is. This is where she expects help from the clergyman. If in these circumstances he says "You ought to do X," he purports to tell how the moral law applies to the case. This is certainly what Mrs. C wants him to do. If asked why she had consulted him, she would say that she thought he would be able to answer her question correctly.

IV

There is a close analogy, then, between the ways in which the lawyer and the moralist use such words as "right." This is not surprising, because there was a time when men did not make any sharp distinction between the moral law and the law of the land but spoke simply of the Law.

It is a comparatively new idea that there must be in each state some authority, the sovereign, who makes laws from time to time for the subjects. Even in modern England we retain the notion of a common law which was not introduced by the act of any human legislator and has no known origin. It is true that the judges are sometimes said to be legislators of the common law because their judgments in particular cases are precedents binding on their successors; but when they decide cases of a new kind the judges still profess to be merely applying a pre-existing law. In the city states

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of classical antiquity and in the primitive societies which have been studied by anthropologists during the past century there are many signs of similar conceptions, and I have little doubt that if we could investigate the social life of our remote ancestors we should find that this view of law was once universal. For the notion of deliberate legislation seems to be product of the type of civilization which has flourished in the past five thousand years, and we can scarcely suppose that men lived without any idea of law during the five hundred thousand years before the time of Hammurabi. Very often a traditional system of law is said to be of divine origin, but it is obvious that we cannot treat all such stories as true, and we must therefore suppose that some at least were invented after the event to explain why laws had been accepted as binding.

Now an undifferentiated system of law may contain elements which to our way of thinking are very different indeed. Thus injunctions against killing fellow tribesmen are of a kind we should call moral, but caste rules and rules requiring women to obey men look to us very like political provisions for securing the advantage of one group at the expense of another, and tabus about touching certain objects or uttering certain names appear to us at the best like warning notices such as we put near high-tension wires. It is a mistake, however, to suppose that the people who live under such a system must be able to make these distinctions: even in our society there are people who cannot see any clear difference between a rule against lying and a rule against playing games on Sunday, and in some languages there exist no means for drawing such distinctions easily. How then did men come to make the distinctions which seem familiar to us? I have not the historical knowledge to answer this question properly, and I doubt whether it is possible to generalize safely about the cause of the transition in all the various societies where it has taken place. But I think that the change has usually had something to do with the recognition of the possibility of devising alternative sets of rules, and that this in turn has been suggested by the activities of kings as legislators. When after some period of disorder a new king establishes himself and proclaims rules, his action, though he wishes to be conservative, may lead men to think of the dependence of the law of the land on human will; and once they have reached that point, they have started on a path which leads to Rousseau and Bentham. For they may then conceive of a moral law distinct from the law of the land. The word "moral" suggested originally a connexion with *mores* or customs, and in some contexts, e.g. the descriptive work of anthropologists and sociologists, it is still applied to unwritten codes of almost any kind; but in the common usage of our day the moral law is supposed to be something more fundamental or natural than the law of the

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land, and this conception, expressed in various ways, has had great influence on human thought and practice during the past few thousand years. Long before the Stoics talked of the law of nature Hammurabi asserted in the preamble to his laws for the land of Babylonia that the gods had delighted mankind by calling him, the renowned prince, the god-fearing Hammurabi, to establish justice in the earth, to destroy the base and the wicked, and to hold back the strong from oppressing the feeble.¹ For all its arrogance, this formula was an admission that his code could itself be judged by the standard of another law.

Although the notion of the moral law may have been evolved, as I believe, in contrast with the legislation of early sovereigns, it is not to be supposed that the moral law is always conceived as a set of general articles, each of them absolutely binding by itself. Sometimes, indeed, it is conceived in that way, particularly when it still has some connexion with religious belief; and one of the commonest sources of philosophical perplexity about morals is the discovery of apparent conflicts between duties, e.g. between the duty of telling the truth and the duty of helping a friend. But I do not think that this way of describing matters is essential to belief in a moral law. For men sometimes talk of that law as though it were a system of case law like the common law of England. According to a statement of Aristotle the Greeks often spoke of fairness or equity as something which could not be reduced to simple rules.² If this view is correct, the ordinary moral rules about telling the truth, etc., are to be regarded as *rules of presumption*, i.e. rules which suffice to determine the issue if no countervailing considerations present themselves. Assuming, then, that we are entitled to use the word "law" in this connexion without committing ourselves to a set of quite independent moral rules, let us go on to consider in more detail how the moral law is contrasted with the law of the land.

V

In the first place the moral law is supposed to be stricter than the law of the land—at least in a well-ordered state. But this fact may sometimes be overlooked, because in every well-ordered state the law of the land contains many articles, e.g. the rule of the road, which are not ordinarily included in a formulation of the moral law. The correct account of the situation seems to be as follows. When we distinguish clearly between the moral law and the law of the land, we think of the latter as a system of rules to be enforced within the land by pains and penalties. We recognize, of course, that the restrictions imposed by the law of the land may sometimes be

¹ Chilperic Edwards, *The World's Earliest Laws*, p. 13.

² *Nicomachean Ethics*, II 37^b 13.

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morally unjust, but when we believe that they are unjust, we believe that those in power ought to alter the law. This is as much as to say that nothing should be enforced as the law of the land which is not included within the moral law. If there is no moral obligation to observe traffic regulations which have been adopted by a certain process, then it is certainly wrong in the moral sense to enforce those regulations by pains and penalties, because to do so is an infringement of rightful liberty. But the fact that the traffic regulations are in a certain way arbitrary does not imply that there is no moral obligation to observe them. We have plenty of cases outside the sphere of state action where moral obligations have arisen from arbitrary conventions. Thus in England there is a moral obligation on any man wearing a hat to raise it when he meets an acquaintance, unless they have a mutual understanding to the contrary. Perhaps this has never been included before in a formulation of moral law, but that is only because such formulations usually deal with high generalities like respect for human personality. There are, of course, excellent reasons why some moral obligations should not be enforced by pains and penalties. If men were punished for not raising their hats, a large part of the good effect of hat-raising would be lost, and there would be an intolerable increase of police activity. But it is not always easy to draw the line, and there is plenty of room for intellectual disagreement about political questions between men of good will.

Secondly, the moral law is thought to differ from the law of the land in having no sanctions. Admittedly men have often believed in supernatural sanctions for the moral law, and it may be that in some stages of development they could not easily conceive a law distinct from the law of the land without thinking that it was enforced with pains and penalties by some divine sovereign. But in the later history of religions we find many statements to the effect that the gods command what they do because it is morally obligatory, and not *vice versa*. These show that the moral law is already conceived as something to which sanctions are not essential. Now when this aspect of the moral law is clearly understood, there arises a new interest in motives. This is natural enough. For if we institute sanctions for a law, we arrange by our own act that fear of punishment (or hope of reward) shall be a motive for men to observe the law; and we do this because we are determined that men shall observe the law for some reason or other, no matter what. For the time being we are interested only in observance as such. But when we talk to men of a law without sanctions, we assume that they may be moved to observe the law by motives which are in some way intrinsically connected with the nature of the acts required by the law, and we praise those qualities of character which dispose men on

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the whole to observe the law spontaneously. Similarly we dispraise those qualities which commonly dispose men to break the law; and in this connexion we may even dispraise qualities such as timidity and cupidity, which sometimes dispose men to observe the law, but do so only within a system of sanctions. This is not to say that the moral law enjoins or forbids motives whereas the law of the land does not, but rather that the emergence of the notion of moral law is very naturally accompanied by a new interest in motives. There is neither coincidence nor confusion when we use the same word "moral" in speaking of the moral law and of the moral character of a man.

Thirdly, anyone who has attained a clear notion of the moral law thinks of it as a system of orders which he himself concurs in giving. I say "anyone who has attained a *clear* notion of the moral law," because various intermediate stages are possible. A man may begin by thinking of a law as imposed from without by a god for some reason about which it is useless to inquire, but later come to say that the command of the god is intelligible and even necessary. When he makes this transition, he asserts in effect that the law has his consent, much as a subject in a dictatorship may express approval of some of the orders issued from above. If, however, a man regards a command as something wholly alien, then it cannot be for him what we call a moral law. This is not to say that he will not describe violation of the law as sin or wrongdoing. For the use of such words is no proof that a man has the characteristically moral attitude towards the violation. There may still be lacking an element which the children in our own society acquire only after years spent under the control of adults, during which they have heard such words quite often and perhaps also used them.

But the characteristics of the moral law which have been mentioned so far are not enough to distinguish that law clearly from other systems of orders. A man might utter a command of his own which was stricter than anything in the law of the land but had no sanctions attached to it, and yet not be thought by himself or others to be giving expression to the moral law. He might say, for example, "Go to every concert of Bach's music which occurs within five miles of your home." In order to complete our account of the moral law we must notice a fourth characteristic, more fundamental than all the others. The moral law is thought to be a set of commands which all reasonable men who possess the relevant information must concur in giving to themselves and their fellow men. If, as seems very unlikely, anyone expected all reasonable men to concur in a command to attend concerts of Bach's music, then he would regard that command as an article of the moral law. But this is not to say that it would in fact be an article of the moral law; for he might be

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mistaken in assuming that all reasonable men must concur in proclaiming it.

In the statement I have made above the word "reasonable" is all-important. We do not think that the accidental agreement of any number of men is sufficient to make what they will a moral law. We say rather that the moral law is what men promulgate in their capacity of reasonable beings; and part of what we mean by this is that the moral law is independent of the peculiar predilections which any man or group of men may have at any time. The law of the land may be, as Thrasymachus said, a set of orders designed by the sovereign to further his private interests, and the policy of a drug-addict may involve the deliberate sacrifice of all his long-term interests; but the moral law is supposed to be what a man would command if he were free from all the passions which lead to selfishness or imprudence. So far as relations between men are concerned, this is attested by many common usages such as the identification of moral justice with equity and its representation by a figure holding a pair of evenly balanced scales. It appears already in the charge of an Egyptian king to his vizier: "The abomination of the god is an exhibition of partiality. This is the instruction and thus shalt thou act: Thou shalt look upon him whom thou knowest like him whom thou knowest not, upon him who has access to thy person like him who is far from thy household."¹ When we treat imprudence as an offence against the moral law, we seem to assume that there can be something analogous to injustice in the effect of a man's present conduct on his own future life: the drunkard, we say, is his own worst enemy.

The close connexion of moral judgments with the notion of impartiality is illustrated in an interesting way by the conduct of civilized adults when they are angry. The adequate stimulus for anger is thwarting by another sentient being, as animals and young children show by their behaviour when they are prevented from getting what they want. But if a civilized adult exhibits naked anger when he cannot get what he wants, we look at him with surprise and begin to think that he is mentally diseased. For in our society the anger of adults is normally clothed as moral indignation, i.e. as a protest on behalf of an impersonal principle, and even those who profess to be so free from vulgar prejudice that they never make moral judgments discover a use for moral words when they are in a rage. The reason is obvious. A situation in which the desires of one human being clash with those of another is *par excellence* a situation calling for moral judgment. Our moral training has impressed this on us so firmly that anyone who ignores it is thought mad; and so even anger which is in fact selfish masquerades as moral indignation.

¹ Henri Frankfort and others, *Before Philosophy*, pp. 99-100.

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Perhaps Plato was deceived by this decent pretence when he suggested that the spirited or self-assertive element is specially fitted to play the part of policeman in the soul.

In order to explain the fourth and most important feature of the moral law, many philosophers from Plato onwards have said that this law is given by reason, which is each man's true self. Undoubtedly the legislator of the moral law must be rational in the sense of being able to see connexions and make generalizations; but it is not helpful to talk about reason as though it were a little man inside all ordinary men; and it is a mistake to suppose, as Kant did, that reason alone determines the content of the moral law. I am not referring here to the old charge that Kant tried to deduce absolute special rules from a purely formal principle; for it is possible that his critics have misunderstood him on that point. My objection is rather that reason is not a motive for anything, and so not a motive for the making of the moral law. If we try to characterize the moral law by saying that it is the will of a certain sort of lawgiver, we must be careful to describe the lawgiver in a way which makes his legislation intelligible. But the mere fact of being rational would not explain why a man should issue orders of any kind to his fellow men. In order to account for that we must suppose that he has some interest, however impersonal, in what is about to take place and wishes for one result rather than another. Perhaps those who talk of practical reason suppose this to involve a desire for consistency. If so, they are drawing attention to something which is indeed relevant to the formulation of the moral law. For we commonly say that an inequitable distribution of satisfactions is inconsistent. But equity may be achieved at various levels of satisfaction. Having realized that it would be inconsistent to give all men permission to use the road as they please, and inconsistent also, but in a slightly different sense of that word, to give such permission to some men but not to others, we might conceivably decide that no one should use the road. If, instead of doing this, we introduce a rule for the division of the road, we must surely be moved by a more complicated motive, namely, by the desire to let men have what they want so far as that can be arranged equitably.

Reasonableness, which makes men legislators of the moral law, is something more than rationality. For when in English we say that a man is reasonable, we mean not only that he is capable of reasoning, but also that he is *willing to consider reasons* for modifying his own preferences. If he shows his reasonableness in relation to matters which will affect his own future happiness, we call him prudent. But the more interesting case is that in which a man's preferences are modified by consideration of the way others will be affected. And here it seems to me we must introduce the notion of

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sympathy to explain the possibility of any modification whatever. In the absence of sympathy no consideration of the interests of other men could amount to a reason for adopting a policy; and although men might still be prudent, there would be no reason why onlookers should approve their prudence. When we say that the moral law is the legislation of the reasonable man, we seem therefore to mean that it is, as Adam Smith suggested, a set of commands such as would be given by an impartial spectator who was endowed with sympathy and intelligence and possessed all relevant information.

The formula of Adam Smith is attractive because it does justice not only to the intentions of Rousseau and Kant, but also to those of the utilitarians, who were not such fools as their idealist critics would have us believe. And it has two other merits which are, I think, of great importance. In the first place, it provides a way of determining the content of the moral law. This is essential, because there would be no sense in talking as we do of what the moral law requires or permits or forbids, if our assertions could not be verified in any way. The analogy between the pronouncements of the moralist and those of the lawyer would break down, if it were not possible to distinguish between good and bad moralists in much the same way as we can distinguish between good and bad lawyers. Secondly, the theory explains how each man can come to regard himself as the giver of the moral law, with the legislator's own motive for observing it. For by an effort of the imagination anyone who is accounted a moral agent can put himself in the position of an impartially sympathetic spectator. This effort is made easier by the study of history and the hearing or reading of fiction; and that is one reason why story-telling in all forms is an extremely important part of education. It is a curious mark of Plato's blindness to the good things in his own society that he put forward in his *Republic* a plan for preventing men from exercising their imaginations in a way which is essential for moral development.

VI

What bearing has all this on the question with which we started? We have discovered a sense in which it seems quite proper to talk of the truth or falsity of moral judgments, but we can scarcely expect the subjectivist to admit without more ado that our argument is fatal to his theory. He may allow the force of the analogy I have drawn between the clergyman's use of "ought" and the solicitor's, but go on to say: "Your analogy does not justify you in claiming that moral judgments are ever true in the ordinary sense. For the moral law is not objective, since it cannot be ascertained in a purely intellectual fashion, as the law of the land may be. When you say that it requires this or that, you are really acting then and there as

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a legislator of sorts, but expressing your legislation in a way designed to secure the concurrence of others." If I am right in thinking that the subjectivist will take this line, the question about objectivity in morals reduces to this: Is there any good sense in which we may properly speak of the moral law as objective?

Obviously the moral law cannot be objective in the same sense as a fact or law of natural science. That is to say, it cannot be independent of all minds. For the moral law is a system of orders, and it makes no sense to say that there might be orders although there were no minds. Kant was clearly right when he talked of imperatives in his account of morality, and it is very strange that some philosophers in our time have gone back to talking about facts of obligation which are not derivative from orders. I can only suppose that they are muddled about the possible meanings of "objective." In the context which concerns us the word must mean something like "impartial," "free from bias," "independent of personal taste," or, more explicitly, "common to all reasonable men." But with this use of the word we all surely wish to maintain that the moral law is objective. For it is just nonsense to speak of Jones's moral law and Smith's moral law, or of the British moral law and the Russian moral law, although there may, of course, be differences of opinion about the content of the moral law, just as there are differences of opinion about the foundations of mathematics or about Lord Keynes's theory of employment. The modern subjectivists are right in saying that we want others to agree with us in our moral judgments, but they fail to see that we expect agreement here as of right on the ground that these judgments are not merely expressions of our own preferences or those of our group, but applications of a law to which all men commit themselves when they claim to be reasonable.

In primitive societies, whether of savages or of schoolboys, the social pressure towards conformity with established standards of all kinds is strong and indiscriminating. And the result may be a quite remarkable degree of uniformity, even in what we should regard as minor matters of taste. If the archaeologists are to be believed, the style of pottery decoration has sometimes remained unaltered within a community for centuries. But during the historical period which has seen the emergence of the idea of an independent moral law there has been also a very notable growth in the spirit of tolerance. This is not to say that men do not now practise persuasion as much as they did, but rather that they realize better what they are about and are more ready to admit the possibility of failure in some connexions. In art criticism, for example, there are now few outside the Royal Academy who display the undifferentiated vehemence we may suppose to have been common among cave-men. Most of us recognize that some differences are inevitable

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among those who share a very complex culture, and in certain contexts we may even welcome variety of attitude. I have no taste for music, but I am glad that others find enjoyment in it. That is to say, I yield to their persuasion so far as to say that listening to music is good provided no one is made to listen against his will. Similarly, although I try to bring others to like philosophy, when I meet people who are very resistant I am satisfied if I can induce them to admit that my activity is respectable. So far as I know, the ancient Greeks were the first to adopt such a policy of tolerance with full consciousness of what they were about. It was just this tolerance that Plato condemned in his *Republic* as the peculiar vice of the democratic man. But Plato was a reactionary, as Professor Popper has argued in *The Open Society and its Enemies*. Although he had learnt from Socrates the notion of a moral law without sanctions, he proposed in effect a return to primitive uniformity through deliberate indoctrination and secret police action. In this he was surely misguided. For the notion of a specifically moral law seems to be inseparably bound up with the policy of mutual tolerance.

According to Plato's argument in the *Republic*, democracy is worse than oligarchy and next to the bottom in the scale of constitutions because it does not provide for the permanent subordination of one element in the state to another according to plan and so prepares the way for tyranny, or subordination without plan. But this is a caricature of the way of life he professes to describe. If a man adopts the policy of allowing the greatest possible satisfaction of diverse interests, he is committed to regulating the distribution of satisfactions by some principle independent of all the competing interests, that is to say, by some conception of moral law: when we adopt toleration as a rule of life, we must be prepared to suppress the intolerant. And conversely, no one would talk of a moral law who had not conceived a society in which there was inevitable diversity of interests and therefore the possibility of conflicts calling for impartial arbitration. We may perhaps speak of an interest in the observance of the moral law. But this interest is of a higher order, in the logical sense, than all other interests, and a man's advocacy of it is not to be treated like a recommendation for a sauce or a sonata.

Although I am convinced by these considerations that it is proper to speak of the moral law as objective, I can understand that a subjectivist may still feel impatient and wish to reply somewhat as follows: "At the best all this is just a lay sermon in favour of a certain way of life. But, being a professional philosopher, you have tried to pass off your sermon as a philosophical analysis by the device which Mr. Stevenson calls persuasive definition. When such

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different persons as a Buddha and a Thug utter words like 'right,' all that is common in their usages is the emotive function, i.e. the expressing and evoking of approval. You want to take advantage of that for your preaching, but, instead of admitting openly what you are about, you say that a right act is by definition one in accordance with the will of an impartially sympathetic spectator. I might perhaps be prepared to agree with you in *attitude*, that is to say, I might be ready to join with you in urging men to approve only such actions as would be approved by an impartially sympathetic spectator; but I must insist that it is a mistake to suppose that in ordinary English the word 'right' has the descriptive meaning you suggest."

Such an objection is based on a misunderstanding. I have not tried to maintain that the word "right" always means "in accordance with the will of an impartially sympathetic spectator." On the contrary, I have said that it means "in accordance with the law" and that the nature of the law under reference must be judged from the context. I might have gone farther and said that almost all the words we use in expressing moral judgments have non-moral usages (consider, for example, "good," "heroic," "noble," "gentle," "virtue," "vice" and "fault"); but I have deliberately tried to concentrate attention on those words which involve reference to a law, because these seem to be most important in a discussion of objectivity. Furthermore, I have suggested that the notion of a specifically moral law appeared comparatively late in the development of the human race. No doubt men who spoke of the law in earlier times often gave some moral flavour to their remarks, but the distinction which philosophers of our day are apt to take for granted seems to be the work of moralists and philosophers in historical times; it is not clear even yet to all ordinary men. If, then, we wish to explain the nature of the moral law, we must consider how the expression "moral law" and its connected phrases have been used by those responsible for the innovation. Although I have not tried to justify it by detailed consideration of the usage of Confucius, Buddha, Socrates and the rest, I think the formula I have suggested is at least a fair approximation to the definition we need. Anyone who wishes to criticize it should remember that it is *not* intended to cover all that anthropologists sometimes call morality when they are discussing the unwritten codes of primitive peoples, but only what men call morality in those cultures which distinguish moral law from mere tradition.

It is true, of course, that those who speak of the moral law often behave as though they were trying to induce their fellow men to adopt the point of view of an impartially sympathetic spectator. But this is natural enough according to my account of the situation.

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For anyone who has already adopted the point of view of an impartial spectator may be expected to wish that his fellow men all had a sufficient motive for observing the moral law he enunciates from that point of view. And the only motive which is sufficient in all circumstances to produce obedience to a law without sanctions is the motive of the legislator of the law. For if anyone asks "Why should I obey the moral law?", we cannot give him a general answer by reference to other motives. And if he does not already possess the motive I have just described as sufficient to produce obedience on all occasions, we cannot supply it by argument. Our only course therefore is to try to induce it in him by appropriate education of a non-argumentative kind. If presently we come to the conclusion that this can never be done, we say that he is morally insane. All this we may concede to the subjectivists. Perhaps we may even go farther and admit that the introduction of the notion of a moral law was itself only a means to the spreading of the attitude of impartial sympathy. For when men first talked of a law without sanctions, they were undoubtedly using the word "law" in a new and rather strange way. Their usage was justified by the possibility of separating out certain features of the old undifferentiated notion of law; but it could scarcely have occurred to anyone who had not started with the notion of a law enforced by sanctions; and its chief value in discourse is that it enables us to talk easily of acts whose performance we desire from a certain point of view, and so helps us to maintain ourselves and others in that point of view.

I hope these concessions will placate subjectivists. But I wish to say again in conclusion that they are not at all inconsistent with a claim of objectivity for the moral law. For it seems clear to me that the only sense in which I want to claim objectivity for the moral law is that which I have tried to indicate. And in this sense the moral law is objective by definition. If we overlook this, we miss what is distinctively moral in moral judgments.

DISCUSSION

LIBERAL MORALITY AND SOCIALIST MORALITY

(I)

The issues raised by W. B. Gallie in his article are of undeniable importance but his treatment of them seems to me lacking in clarity and comprehensiveness. He begins from the situation that different systems of morality exist in different ages and different places. It might be added that different moral systems also exist at different periods in the life of the individual.¹ The question then arises, whether there is in fact an indeterminate number of moral systems and moral standards which are equally valid, or whether there is only one true standard and system. Mr. Gallie distinguishes two chief attitudes towards this question, one of which he calls monarchic and the other polyarchic. Two other interpretations are dismissed very briefly, and it is at this point that the analysis is first limited in an unnecessary and unwarranted manner. If the monarchic view is to be rejected, and there is little evidence to dispose us in favour of it, we cannot rest content with a simple polyarchic view. It is natural and proper to inquire why this divergence in moral standards exists; and it is equally natural to suppose that it reflects differences in the life experiences of the members of different communities. I can see nothing "simple-minded or dogmatic" in this, but on the contrary a reasonable curiosity, in the absence of which we are bound to accept the differences as mysterious and inexplicable phenomena. In reality, no scientist or philosopher is willing to stop at this point, and Mr. Gallie himself suggests another procedure of comparison which we shall consider shortly. The basic question, which the first part of his article illumines, is that concerning the existence of an absolute moral standard; if we do not believe in an absolute standard we can legitimately regard moral standards as human phenomena which can be classified and compared in a similar manner to that adopted in other social studies, for example in economics and jurisprudence. Mr. Gallie's suggestion that anyone would contend that "comparisons and classifications can be of interest only to ignorant busybodies" is startling, and in my opinion very wide of the mark. It might just as well be proposed that we should have accepted the great variety of plants and animals as inexplicable occurrences and that botanists and zoologists consequently were all "ignorant busybodies." This analogy with the classification of plants and animals has a wider significance; it suggests that in the sphere of ethics as in that of biology, it may be possible to arrive at a theory of evolution, and I should contend that the most profitable recent discussions of moral standards (far more profitable than the minute verbal analysis which Mr. Gallie himself criticizes) have been those which have attempted a morphological classification and subsequently have sought for a principle of development within the limits of this classification. Among writers who have followed this procedure one of the best known and most successful was L. T. Hobhouse. More recently an attempt which is similar in some respects, though it differs in its choice of the principle of development, has been made by Julian Huxley. The fact is, therefore, that we are not left (as Mr. Gallie supposes) without any means for comparing different standards and pronouncing upon their validity other than a direct confrontation of their main concepts and a logical analysis of the latter.

We shall come back to this question; meanwhile let us consider the way in

¹ See for instance Frenkel and Weisskopf, *Wunsch und Pflicht* (Vienna 1937).

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which Gallie opposes to each other the two systems of morality, the Liberal and the Socialist, which he has selected for comparison. In the first place, he suggests that the confrontation of Liberal and Socialist morality occurs not only between individuals but also within the individual; but I am not sure that this does not confuse the specific reference of the terms he is employing. The fact to which he draws attention is the familiar dichotomy in the life of the individual living in society which appears under a variety of forms as the conflict of freedom versus organization, progress versus order, self-perfection versus the enjoyment of immediate experience, individuality versus social cohesion. The terms liberalism and socialism have to be stretched a long way beyond their normal reference if they are to be identified respectively with these opposite poles of individual impulse. In fact, we are not told anything in a direct and observational way about liberalism and socialism, but are presented with a number of statements about the liberal and socialist conceptions of justice, liberty and good government, without reference to the social environment in which these statements would be relevant. It is this unhistorical treatment of the differences which seems to me the most unsatisfactory feature of the discussion, and it is this lack of historical elements which allows Mr. Gallie to assume that "any moral cleavage in this country . . . is such that its results are to be found within individuals quite as much as between different groups or classes of individuals." This is quite clearly untrue. If there is a moral division corresponding with the political division (though in that case it would be between conservatism and socialism) it is very markedly one between social classes which can be easily identified, much more than a division within individuals irrespective of their social class. Thus in my view there are two distinct matters to which attention should be given, first the dichotomy which is apparent when the individual reflects upon his own experience and aspirations, and secondly the differences between complex systems of values which correspond in some degree with differences in social organization, the changes in value systems being correlated with social change. On this view the dichotomy within the individual will find a new expression in each succeeding form of social organization, though the issues will always be somewhat obscured by the persistence of social norms which are no longer relevant to the existing social situation. Mr. Gallie seems to have pitted against each other the moral notions of two centuries, the nineteenth and the twentieth, which have little in common and are only in conflict to the extent that our awareness of social life has not fully succeeded in emerging from its nineteenth-century forms.

Far more significant than the opposition between liberal and socialist morality as Gallie conceives them is the development of moral conceptions from liberalism to socialism, a development which on its philosophical side is best exemplified (in England) in the writings of Bentham, J. S. Mill and Hobhouse. In this development there are two principal features to which attention should be given, first the changing views concerning the relation of the individual to society as a whole, and secondly the growing appreciation of the positive role of social institutions in promoting individual well-being. So far as the first is concerned, the religious crisis of the nineteenth century seems to have been decisive; until that time it was assumed by all writers, as it is still assumed by religious philosophers, that there was a part of man not related to, and not answerable to, his fellow-men or social institutions. As a spiritual being the individual was considered subject to divine law and as possessing certain inalienable rights; but if there exists neither divinity nor divine law, there cannot exist either any inalienable rights, nor can the individual escape from society. All the empirical evidence goes to show that an

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infant growing up wholly outside society never becomes human, but is in adult life an idiot. Thus the individual is in one sense a creation of society, and all his rights, moral and other, are the outcome of his social life; equally, however, from another point of view, society is made up of individuals, is in fact nothing more than the totality of related individuals, and once individuality has become historically possible society exists for the sake of these individuals. In this modern realistic view of the social process there is no room for the notion of the individual emerging from a realm of spiritual obscurity into the sensible world and subsequently passing again into the spiritual realm without ever being totally involved in the material or social world, and with a part of his being maintained aloof and sacrosanct. The question of liberty now becomes one of determining and establishing in practice a sphere of personal freedom, and not of asserting an irresponsible and empirically meaningless sphere of inner freedom which can co-exist with actual slavery or serfdom. Here we approach the second point, concerning the role of social institutions. In the earlier nineteenth century it was easy to overlook their importance, and to exaggerate the long-term opportunities for the individual within a social system characterized in one particular phase by expansion, industrialization and a freely operating monetary economy. By the end of the century it was already apparent that the processes of socialization, the formation of new associations and the struggle between social groups, had not at all been superseded and replaced by contractual relations between individuals, but that out of the fluidity of the period of transition, the industrial revolution, a new institutional system had emerged in which the significance of the individual was greatly reduced. This phenomenon was quite clear to J. S. Mill when he wrote his essay on liberty, in which the pressure of institutions and of organized opinion on the individual is comprehensively described. It is increasingly common nowadays to refer to the latter part of the nineteenth century as an age of unequalled liberty, but the fact that Mill's essay was published in 1859 should itself provide a warning against accepting uncritically any such opinion. At a later date Mill himself helped to initiate an intellectual movement towards socialism, which on the level of social theory generally was occasioned by the recognition of the decisive influence of associations and the institutional forms which they brought into existence. The intellectual change of which Mill only experienced the feeble beginnings was in full flood when Hobhouse began his work. In one of his earliest books, *The Labour Movement* (1st edn. 1897) Hobhouse already stressed the involvement of the individual in society and asserted that rights are the creation of society, and he maintained and developed this view throughout his subsequent writings. From this standpoint ethical notions cannot be profitably discussed except in relation to the social structure to which they have reference and within which they are formulated. It follows that, to a great extent, ethics then becomes an empirical study, dealing with the relationship between social institutions and ideals, the comparison of societies which differ in their institutional structure and value standards, and the historical sequence of social forms and value standards within what is recognized as a single continuing society. Monarchic ethical theories assume that human nature is everywhere and always the same, and this is rightly a ground of objection against them; but the analysis of morality which Mr. Gallie presents, by its assumption that human nature is, if not everywhere, at least always, the same, concedes a great deal to the monarchic view. The confrontation of liberal and socialist morality as Mr. Gallie sketches them is only of interest to the history of ethics and of social life; I cannot agree that any contemporary conflict between these two moralities occurs in any but a very small number of people.

T. B. BOTTOMORE.

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(II)

Mr. W. B. Gallie's modest and fair-minded article on "Liberal and Socialist Morality" in *PHILOSOPHY* for October 1949 is intended to illustrate the general question "Ought we perhaps (reluctantly) to recognize not a single self-consistent system of morals but a plurality of systems, with no argument possible between their different points of view?" and further (a second question), "Must not many a conscientious person confess that such a plurality works within his own mind, and strains and distracts his own life?"¹

I am not quite sure whether Mr. Gallie is expressing his own view when he suggests (p. 320) "that there are and have been fundamentally different forms of human community, and of human language, art, religion and education; forms so different, that is to say, that even the theoretical possibility of mutual correction and supplementation between them doesn't arise." On the preceding page he has mentioned "a Chinese gentleman of the fifth century B.C., an Athenian citizen of the same period, a medieval monk and a contemporary citizen of Ealing or Nijini-Norgorod." Consider their art. Would a modern artist count himself educated if he had not learnt to appreciate the beauties, and to grasp something of the aims and ideas, in the art of China, of Athens, and of the Middle Ages? And have not his own mind and art been enriched and extended and purified in the process, however different the outcome? It seems to me to be a matter of degree. With greater unlikeness, more education and imagination and patience are needed to reach across, and often we shall fail; but I see no definite distance after which we have to despair of even the theoretical possibility of success. On the other hand, however small the unlikeness—even that between two artists of the same country and the same year, or between two works of the same man—the correction and supplementation can never be direct or simple.

"Can you settle disagreements by discussion?" is one of Mr. Gallie's tests (p. 320). If discussion meant only what can be put into words, then even within a single form of art few questions could be settled by its means. It is bound to include a continual reversion to "Look and see" and "Let me look again." Similarly even within the most closely organized moral system we must use penetrative imagination if we are to give concrete advice, and must experience a situation from within if we are to make a responsible decision.

The basis of such discussion (with others or with oneself) must in fact be the individuality of the situation we are dealing with—of the creation we are making or the need we are trying to meet. It speaks to us; confirms or repels what we do; asks for more of value x at one point, for less of value y at another. We respond, and co-operate with one another in responding, as best we can while hampered by the partial insensitiveness which varies from group to group and from man to man, and sometimes from day to day. A may respond most readily to values x , and B to values y , but neither A nor B is likely to wish that y or x should be annihilated. As Mr. Gallie insists indeed, we are often troubled and perplexed because both x and y draw our approval, in situations where they are competitors for limited means. In debating societies and election campaigns we may preach one against the other; in actual administration and concrete living we grope our way among questions of "how much" and "when" and "where."

While therefore "conflicting moralities, not mutually corrigible" can be constructed in many ways and form a picture which for some purposes is useful, I suggest that they must always be artificially constructed out of groups of x 's and groups of y 's, on the artificial assumption of normally com-

¹ In this paragraph the words in inverted commas are not quotations but my own summaries.

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plete absences of response on the other side. The picture cannot be pressed into permanent usefulness; on the one hand because for a continuous complex variation it has substituted a gulf; on the other hand, because of its misleading suggestion that within a proper single morality there would be no problem or conflict. The most earnest Liberal in a wholly Liberal world must soon face the task of feeling his way between the claims of x_1 and x_{11} . However much we narrow and simplify the aspects of good to which we consent to respond, yet the best under the circumstances will never contain all the good that we should wish to be there.

HELEN WODEHOUSE.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

THE personality of Gian Battista Vico continues to engage the attention of Italian students of philosophy. Two among the most recent monographs, *Introduzione allo studio di G. B. Vico* by Franco Amerio (Turin—Società Editrice Internazionale, 1947) and *Ingens Sylva, Saggio su G. B. Vico* by Enzo Paci (Milan, Mondadori, 1949) may indicate the directions taken by studies of Vico nowadays in Italy. Amerio's monograph, which is ample in scope (540 pages) and very accurate in its information and analysis, makes a fresh attempt to bring Vico's work within the frame of orthodox Catholic thought. Amerio sees in Vico a typical representative of Italian philosophy "defined as the most constant and the most steadily balanced current of Christian philosophy," and he develops his thesis by attacking especially the idealistic interpretation of Vico's philosophy, an interpretation which, through the authority of Croce and Gentile, has dominated a great part of the literature on the subject of Vico for the last few decades in Italy. Against this interpretation Amerio brings forward just those aspects of Vico's thought which cannot be subjected to it: the original fallen state of man, the transcendence of the providential historical order in comparison with history in time, the absence of the idea of infinite, necessary progress. But these facts are certainly not enough to make a Catholic thinker of Vico, so that Amerio is driven to insist on the scant importance that Aristotelianism and Thomism have in Vico's thought, and to see in that fact the root of all his deficiencies. In consequence his general estimate of Vico's work is insufficiently historical in as much as it is dominated by a criterion different from that which governed the philosopher's work and development.

Paci's *Ingens Sylva* agrees with Amerio's book in its substantial abandonment of the idealistic interpretation, although Paci has, in face of that interpretation, a somewhat less polemical, or rather, a sympathetic, attitude. Paci in fact sees in idealism an affirmation of the necessity of ideality, of the spirit, of value, in opposition to the naturalism and finiteness of "existence" as it is understood by the existentialist philosophy. And his own interest in Vico's work is determined by the fact that he perceived its fundamental motive in this antithesis. The philosophy of Vico, says Paci, "places at the centre of being and of the world dualism between nature and spirit, existence and reason." Nature is activity, *élan vital*, will, effort; reason is not the Kantian *I* but the historical *I*, which is not pure logos because it is both sense and nature, fantasy and reason; and it is not the romantic personality but "man who is humanity in so far as he realizes in his work the universal conditions of the human." The reconciliation and synthesis of the dualism is then effected in Vico by *myth*. According to Paci, Vico was the first to discover the philosophical significance of myth, that is of myth as the mediation between immanence and transcendence, between certainty that is not truth and truth that is not certainty, and which represents the peculiarly human form of consciousness in so far as it does not preclude the image and the senses.

In reality the mediatory function of myth is an idea very dear to Paci, who frequently avails himself of it in his philosophical and literary criticism (see the essays collected in *Esistenza ed Immagine*, Milan, Tarantola, 1947). And Paci's book is not really a historical study in the sense that English readers would give that word (and many Italian readers also). It is a "col-

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loquy," as Paci himself declares; but it is a colloquy in which not only (as is obvious) are the questions formulated, but the answers are also frequently suggested, and in which there take part not only Vico and Paci, but also Kant and Hegel, Wagner and Nietzsche and Marx, besides the authors and interpreters more directly linked with Vico. This makes Paci's book extraordinarily varied, lively and interesting (Paci is among the most gifted of the philosophers of the new generation in Italy), but not such as to make a valid contribution to the historical understanding of Vico's philosophy. Nor perhaps has Paci made such an understanding his aim, so this cannot be assumed as a defect in his book. However a historical, objective and rigorous effort to comprehend Vico's work would be an extremely important task for the history of Italian philosophy. Vico has had the misfortune, owing either to the insufficient consideration of *all* his fundamental theses or to a point of nationalistic pride, to be considered as unclassifiable, a standard-bearer, a precursor. Romanticism, idealistic and positivist, suddenly took possession of him in the nineteenth century, making him into a supporter of the idea of *progress*, that is of history as the manifestation or revelation of an infinite Principle, an idea that associates Hegel, Comte, and Spencer, who, in this aspect, differ only in the name and form they give to the infinite Principle (Idea, Humanity, the Unknowable). But the very idea of progress was unknown to Vico, nor could it have presented itself to him in any guise in view of his conviction that history could, at any moment, come to a stop, turn back, or take a different road. His "ideal eternal History" is not the infallible and rationally necessary course of human history but rather an *ideal pattern*, which men at first observe dimly and later understand clearly, and which hence avails them as a constant guide and monitor in their temporal affairs. Moreover, the identity of truth and fact in which it has been claimed lies the quintessence of Vico's idealism is deprived of importance by Hobbes (*De Corpore* I, 3) and that establishes exactly its significance and limits. The merit and originality of Vico lie in his having made this principle the basis of the understanding of the world of history, which, as he says, has certainly been made by men; and this merit is sufficient to give him an eminent position in the philosophy of the eighteenth century, even without making him into a precursor of romantic idealism or contemporary historical theory. Certainly Vico's anticartesianism, conjoined with the tacit presupposition that illuminism is essentially cartesianism, has contributed to the historical misunderstanding of Vico and to his exclusion from illuminism, to which he belongs by right and in fact. But it should be henceforth sufficiently clear that this presupposition is fallacious, and that illuminism is animated rather by the spirit of Locke and Newton, and tends to determine critically, that is to *limit*, the powers of man in every field, just as Vico does. A picture of illuminism of sufficient depth and scope, to comprehend the work of Vico, and an authentic historical study of Vico having regard to his own time and his own tendencies, are two aspects of a single necessary task that awaits the historian.

NICOLA ABBAGNANO.

(Translated from the Italian by Beatrice Allen.)

NEW BOOKS

Creative Man and Other Addresses. By THE RT. HON. VISCOUNT SAMUEL.
(London: The Cresset Press, 1949. Pp. 141. Price 9s. 6d. net.)

Those, who, like Socrates, love to listen to the old giving their opinions on matters that are of importance for all of us will derive much enjoyment from these nine lectures and addresses which Viscount Samuel has collected together under the title of one of them, "Creative Man." In a long life of active statesmanship, Viscount Samuel has found time to meditate on the great problems of the modern age, and he brings to bear upon them a practised eye for the issues involved. Three of the pieces are on topics connected with the conflict of science and religion and the need for philosophy to act as mediator. Three are concerned with the problems of democracy and penal reform. Two are short accounts of Bacon and Gladstone, while one is a talk broadcast by the B.B.C., "In My Experience."

This last talk has an attractive personal quality and, though slight, reveals Viscount Samuel's qualities as a thinker. In it he stresses the "value of the obvious." His own way of stating the obvious makes it at once profound and imperative. Those looking for new and startling doctrines will find no grist for their mill. Lord Samuel's method is to take the issue involved—whether it be the contradictions of science and philosophy or the responsibility of society for the criminal—and subject it to a calm and judicious assessment. The verdict is always, one feels, the correct one and the wisdom of the discussion is apparent in every line.

This method is at its best in that borderland between philosophy and politics with which three of the pieces are concerned. Here Viscount Samuel's practical experience of government illuminates and reinforces everything he has to say. So, too, in the short talk on Gladstone, which is enlivened with personal reminiscences of the G.O.M. The talk on Bacon gives an unqualified picture of him as the exponent of a new method which, once applied, produced the development of modern science. Few historians of science would accept so unqualified a picture, but perhaps it is excusable in a very brief wireless talk.

In the more philosophical lectures the method is not so successful. Viscount Samuel works, like a Cabinet Minister, on evidence or minutes submitted to him. This has the disadvantage in philosophy that the solution of a problem often lies in getting behind the evidence rather than in assessing it. For example, the need to reconcile science, philosophy and religion, to see the determinism of science and the free-will of moral action fit together, is his strongest desire, "a theme which fills my mind" (p. 135). But, to distinguish between inner and outer causation, and to suggest that we can thereby hold to both, is not to resolve the problem, though it may be to take one step in the direction of a solution. Again, is it enough to suggest that there is no real conflict between scientific knowledge and religious faith? That it is only because one or the other is misunderstood that there *seems* to be a conflict? Moreover it seems that it is religion that is misunderstood, when it is said that what in part keeps people from religion is "ancient theology." "In proportion as faith accords with fact, and the creeds are made credible, this cause of the religious decline is abated" (p. 29). I find this hard to believe. It is not by reducing its demands that religion will find converts. *Credo quia possibile* has had its opportunity and failed. Here, and here only, Lord Samuel's liberalism seems to me to strike a note out of accord with current needs.

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Perhaps, too, he tends to hope too much from what can be done by conscious effort to meet the moral and spiritual needs of ordinary people. He writes: "The leaders of thought must not for ever offer to the peoples contradictory ideas on fundamental issues. They should come together, out of their professional compartments and across national frontiers, to give to the world the guidance it so urgently needs" (p. 59). That the leaders of thought, in all disciplines and in all nations, should come together is a fitting and desirable end. But if the suggestion is that they should make some sort of agreed pronouncement on matters of ethics and religion and philosophy, it seems to me to be profoundly mistaken. You cannot "produce" an age of faith by assembling an intellectual "ministry of all the talents." You cannot produce even a philosophy for an age of faith. Philosophies and faiths, like oaks and laws, take time to grow. I am sure that Viscount Samuel, though a liberal, would be prepared to make this concession, on reflection, to conservatism.

WINSTON H. F. BARNES.

An Introduction to Aesthetics. By E. F. CARRITT. (Hutchinson's University Library, 1949. Pp. 151. Price 7s. 6d.)

The present condition of aesthetics in England is far from reassuring and might even be called deplorable. There has, it is true, been a proliferation of art criticism and literary criticism in recent years, but frequently enough this has merely emphasized the need for the writers concerned to learn something about the presuppositions on which their criticism is based. (Particularly is this so with the opaque jargon which praises to the skies the latest forms of non-representative and highly abstract sculpture and painting.) It is conceivable that this may be partially due to the scant attention paid to aesthetics (as a branch of philosophy) at our universities. Compared with the United States, our own academic activity in this subject is almost negligible. In that country, with its well-organized post-graduate schools, aesthetic theorizing flourishes, and one is inclined to believe, reluctantly enough, that the torch is now passing across the Atlantic—as with so much English scholarship.

Still, despite the very laudable interest in aesthetics shown by our American friends, we should not feel that this has dispensed us from further enquiry, nor too easily surrender our claim to say something new. One of their number, Professor C. I. Lewis, remarked in a recent book that "in the whole area of philosophic studies there is probably no topic which is marked by so much unclarity and so little unanimity as is exhibited by the subject of aesthetic theory."

For many reasons, therefore, Mr. Carritt's new book is timely. No philosopher is better fitted than he to introduce to the general reader this most fascinating and important branch of philosophy, to give the art critics food for thought, and to stimulate the interest of the undergraduate on whose labours the future of aesthetics in this country may well depend.

Accustomed to write fairly expansively, the author was obviously confronted with a difficult problem: to compress within a narrow compass an introduction to a complex subject, such that it would adequately serve the purpose of the series. To indicate how this has been achieved, I shall give a brief outline of the book, adding, where appropriate, any criticism which seems called for.

Starting with an account of the subject matter of aesthetics, Mr. Carritt commendably proceeds to initiate the reader as quickly as possible into his own subjective or (as I should prefer to call it) "projective" theory of beauty,

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briefly indicating why it is nonsensical to make beauty a quality of *things*. Then follows an all too short chapter on "Good and Bad Taste"—all too short because it has to carry the burden of the defence against the inevitable charge that a subjective theory leads to complete relativism in matters of aesthetic appreciation. In his next chapter Mr. Carritt discusses the nature and significance of aesthetic experience, and makes a sharp thrust at J. A. Stewart's theory of Transcendental Feeling and various other theories which claim that aesthetic experience gives us some form of "higher" knowledge. The controversy over formal and representative art is then dwelt upon (Chap. IV), some highly relevant comments being made about certain modern tendencies, and this is followed (Chap. V) by an analysis of various distinctions commonly postulated between "kinds" of beauty.

In Chapters VI and VII—perhaps the most important in the book—Mr. Carritt deals with the core of any aesthetic situation or experience: expression and emotion. And although not all aestheticians would agree with the vital place assigned to emotion (Professors D. G. James and H. D. Lewis would be prominent dissenters), there is no doubt in my mind that art proper (as opposed to entertainment or propaganda) is best defined, in Collingwood's phrase, as the imaginative expression of emotion—but emotion, of course, "recollected in tranquillity." In Chapter VIII we have a sustained attack on didactic and protreptic art; and although this attack is sound in principle, it seems, especially if read in conjunction with the extreme view set forth on p. 59, to make insufficient allowance for genius. Attention is then given to the tasks of criticism (Chap. IX), and to the genesis of aesthetic expressions (Chap. X), the latter chapter including some illuminating remarks on the psychological theory of *Einfühlung* or empathy.

In his next chapter, entitled "Art, Sympathy and Imagination," Mr. Carritt tries to show that in their aesthetic usage sympathy and imagination coincide. In one sense of course they do; it is just by his sympathy (fellow-feeling) that a dramatist "gets inside" his characters and is thus able "imaginatively" to portray them. But many readers—and especially those who have studied Coleridge and his modern interpreters—will feel that Mr. Carritt does less than justice to imagination conceived as a *creative and transforming* faculty. His bald statement that imagination "is the faculty . . . of calling up more or less vivid images of sensuous objects or internal states, which are, we believe, all memories or *combinations* of memories" (p. 90 my italics)—this statement has far too much of a Hartleian ring and is more than an echo of associationist psychology. On the other hand, to do full justice to the creative imagination requires a whole book—as Collingwood and D. G. James have shown us.

In his remaining chapters (XII–XVI) Mr. Carritt gives us an instructive exercise in the appreciation first of the plastic arts, then of literature, clears up the confusion over that old chestnut the Classical versus the Romantic, discusses "form and subject" in poetry and sums up his arguments in conclusion.

So far as the English part of the text is concerned, I have found no misprints; but considerably more care could have been shown by whoever was responsible for checking the Greek quotations. Accents and breathings are frequently omitted or misplaced (pp. 21, 43, 82, 116), *ἡπριγένεια* is misspelt on p. 122, and the quotation in note 2 to p. 21 requires the substitution of *γένος* for *λένος* before it makes sense.

These, however, are minor blemishes and will doubtless be remedied in the second edition. On the whole, one leaves this book with the feeling that it ably fulfils the purpose of the series which is, as the dust-cover puts it, "to provide popular yet scholarly introductions for the benefit of the general

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reader, but more especially for the unprofessional student who wishes to pursue his chosen subject up to something like a University standard."

J. HARTLAND-SWANN.

Essays in Political Theory, presented to George H. Sabine. Edited by Milton R. Konvitz and Arthur E. Murphy. (Cornell University Press. Ithaca, New York. 1948. Pp. 333.)

These essays may be divided into three classes: those concerned directly with philosophical problems or with the history and interpretation of philosophical ideas, those concerned primarily with the application in practice of the theories of political philosophers, and those not concerned with philosophical ideas at all. This review will deal only with those which belong to the first-mentioned class.

Glenn R. Morrow discusses the problem of how two originally antithetical notions, *nomos* "standing for something peculiarly characteristic of human life" and *physis*, "standing for . . . a disposition of forces independent of human contrivance," could come to be combined in the Stoic concept of a Law of Nature. He finds the solution in the philosophy of Plato. There is implicit, he believes, in Plato's later work a distinction between the actual laws of existing states and an ideal law (that is, presumably, an Idea of law) which is the norm of legislation. For Plato the Ideas alone were truly natural and Mr. Morrow thinks "it was but a short step from the 'natural justice' which occurs so often in Plato's pages to 'natural law.'"

Francis D. Wormuth argues that Aristotle's statement that the rule of law is preferable to that of any individual (*Pol.* III, 16, 3) has been misinterpreted in the history of the subject. Aristotle believed neither in the "inflexible application of positive law" nor in a "superior morality which nullified positive law." Law for him was a means to an end (which was the implanting of the habit of virtue) and not always the best means.

Arthur E. Murphy's essay is an attempt to refute an interpretation of Locke's political philosophy which in his opinion would tend, if it came to be widely accepted, to undermine British and American political ideals. This interpretation is that given in Northrop's book *The Meeting of East and West*; according to it Locke's view that men are free, equal and independent, and that government can therefore be justified only by consent is based on his belief that persons are mental substances, which belief is merely an epistemological consequence of the now outmoded Newtonian physics. Mr. Murphy argues persuasively, with many quotations from Locke, that Locke did not hold that persons were mental substances, and that the central factor in his political philosophy is "not the denial on epistemological grounds of any . . . organic relation between mental substances, but rather the affirmation, on moral grounds, of a quite distinctive relation between free and rational men in terms of which the nature of legitimate political authority can be defined."

Bertram Morris holds that the doctrine of the social contract is a "loose formulation of a principle which a state must embody if it is to be justified morally, and that justification is, in essence, the consent of the governed. . . ." He argues that the existence of this consent depends on a community of interests and can be determined not by the ballot, but only by discovering the degree of satisfaction which men find in their social institutions and common life. The contract is broken when "large elements of a population are excluded from the values which a culture is capable of realizing"; this is the case in many places to-day.

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Milton R. Konvitz discusses the question (which arises out of Mill's essay on Liberty) of how we are to know when the proper limits of tolerance have been reached. He outlines the answer which is given by Morley in his book *On Compromise*.

Katharine Gilbert defends Croce against the criticism (of De Ruggiero) that his historicism "leaves no room for the justification of a genuine moral act."

Julius R. Weinberg discusses the view that moral judgments assert facts and do not merely express emotions. He dismisses as inadequate both Hume's arguments against and Moore's in support of this view, and offers reasons of his own for thinking that it is correct. Part of his conclusion is that our knowledge of value is of a distinct kind, analogous to our perception of physical objects and neither intuitive nor inferential.

Frederick L. Will also is concerned with the problem of judgments of value. He argues that the statement "This is good" expresses a belief that in the long run and for most people this will give satisfaction; the statement is thus corrigible and objective. Mr. Will holds that this provides a sounder basis for democracy than Professor Sabine's theory that moral values "in the last resort are matters of choice."

G. Watts Cunningham holds that what is at issue in discussions about the meaning of "democracy" is the nature of the morally good life and how it may be implemented in human society. He argues that no one has consistently maintained that there is an ultimate end of human conduct, itself beyond the powers of reason to determine or evaluate, by reference to which the moral value of actions is to be judged. It is rather of end and means together that good and evil are predictable. "Thus the moral agent may be said to be the creator of moral values." But all men must be regarded as being equally creators of moral value: this has important social implications.

In the main these essays are written in a scholarly manner and with an agreeable absence of jargon. Perhaps the argument is more rigorous and more lucidly expressed in Mr. Will's essay than in most of the others.

The remaining essays are: "Cleisthenes and the development of the theory of democracy at Athens," by J. A. O. Larsen; "Vico on Roman Law," by Max H. Fisch; "Man and Citizen: applications of Individualism in the French Revolution," by R. R. Palmer; "From Compact to National State in American Political Thought," by Charles M. Wiltse; "Marx and Weitling," by Carl Wittke; "The Political Typology of Moeller van den Bruck," by Albert R. Chandler; "Heroes and the Way of Compromise," by Henry Alonzo Myers; "Clear and Present Danger in Free Speech Cases: a Study in Judicial Semantics," by Robert E. Cushman. There is also a bibliography of George Holland Sabine.

J. A. FARIS.

From Euclid to Eddington: a study of conceptions of the external world. By SIR EDMUND WHITTAKER, F.R.S. Being the Turner Lectures delivered in Trinity College, Cambridge, 1947. (Cambridge University Press. Pp. 212. Price 15s. net).

In 1910 Professor E. T. Whittaker published a substantial volume of 475 pp. entitled *A History of the Theories of Aether and Electricity, from the age of Descartes to the close of the nineteenth century*. This volume has long been out of print, and very scarce. When a few years ago I acquired my own copy, I asked Whittaker to send me a few lines in his own handwriting to insert in the fly-leaves. What he kindly wrote contained the sentence: "I hope before I die to bring the history down to the present time by a second volume."

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Now, at the age of 76, Sir Edmund has given us something far more valuable than a mere second volume of his original *History*, a study of physical conceptions throughout a period embracing the former period and couched in the most vivid language, used with admirable economy of words. The period ranges from the beginning of European physical science in the hands of Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle and Euclid, and closes only with the latest speculations of Eddington. It cannot be said that the exposition is non-technical; but it can be said that each step in technique is explained to the reader in non-technical terms, so that the whole book can be followed by a non-specialist who is prepared to exert his mind. But the work is immensely superior to the usual type of popular exposition of modern science in that no difficulties are shirked, that there is no attempt to bludgeon the reader's understanding with talk of the very small and the very large, that the illustrative analogies are always fair and definitely instructive, and that the reader is introduced to each turn of the drama in an exceedingly short space of argument.

The five parts of the book are: I. *Space, Time and Movement*, (in which non-Euclidean geometry and special relativity occupy the major space); II. *The Concepts of Classical Physics* (devoted chiefly to the notion of the aether); III. *The Concepts of General Relativity* (where the aether is replaced by a curved space-time); IV. *The Concepts of Quantum Mechanics* (which develops with mounting excitement the various notions of waves and particles, the uncertainty principle, electron-spin, quantum statistics, the exclusion principle and exchange energy); and V. *The Eddingtonian Universe* (in which Whittaker gives a far clearer account of Eddington's ideas, and a much less irritating one, than Eddington himself ever achieved).

Considering that Whittaker, in spite of his numerous and distinguished contributions to applied mathematics, has essentially the mind, and what is more, the technical powers, of a pure mathematician or geometer, his knowledge of mathematical physics is amazingly complete, down to the ins and outs of fashions in the quantum theory during the last 30 years. But what most pleased the reviewer was that he does not adopt the attitude of complacency towards the present state of physical knowledge which many popular expositors have adopted. He points out again and again, where physics has taken a surprising turn in the past or where physicists barked up the wrong tree, without excluding the possibility of their being misled to-day. For example, on p. 112 he writes: "the fundamental physical problems connected with gravitation are almost as perplexing to-day as they have ever been." His fascinating account of *spin* in the quantum theory contains the passage: "the statement that all particles whose spin is an odd multiple of one-half of Planck's constant obey the statistics of Fermi, while all particles whose spin is an even multiple obey the statistics of Bose, leaves one with the feeling that we have not yet reached the true foundations on which ultimate physics should be grounded" (p. 181). Lastly: "it cannot be said that any account of the structure of the universe is accepted by physicists and astronomers with unanimity" (p. 185).

A few technical criticisms I must permit myself. He dismisses the attempt of some philosophers to solve the metaphysical problem (of geometry) by asserting the existence of an immediate intuition of space (p. 9) but he has accepted earlier an immediate intuition of congruence (p. 7). He criticizes Euclid as proving general theorems piecemeal (p. 23), but surely even to-day the most recondite theorems are often established by dividing them up into different cases, as when in the theory of numbers one may begin by saying that a number is of the form $3n$, or $3n + 1$, or $3n + 2$. It is not clear what he means

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by "the actual properties of physical space," when all we have at our disposal are ideal geometries. Indeed, he concedes later (p. 36) that it is purely a question of convenience, whether we prefer to have an easily intelligible geometry with complicated physical laws, or a less intelligible geometry with simple physical laws. The account of the proof of the maximum efficiency property of a reversible heat engine is made by Whittaker to turn on the *first* law of thermodynamics, whilst actually it depends on the *second* law (p. 75); its contrary would imply the existence of a perpetual motion machine of the second kind, *not* the first kind. In his account of the equivalence of mass and energy he does not appear to realize that in special relativity kinetic energy is not an invariant but depends on the choice of inertial frame at the point considered.

But these are minor blemishes. The volume contains many original forms of argument. In particular, I may single out Whittaker's novel method of deriving Einstein's relative-velocity formula (pp. 49, 50). This, as prior to the deduction of the Lorentz formulae, is indeed fundamental, as I have found in recent work of my own that the velocity-formulae hold good in much wider circumstances than the Lorentz formulae themselves.

One last comment. Whittaker is so anxious to do justice to the work of others that he scarcely makes it apparent what is his own attitude to vexed questions. Will he sometime soon give us his personal views?

E. A. MILNE.

Whitehead's Philosophy of Time. By WILLIAM W. HAMMERSCHMIDT. (New York: Kings Crown Press; London: G. Cumberlege. 1947. Pp. ix + 108. Price 11s. 6d.)

Mr. Hammerschmidt in this little book endeavours to give us a scholarly account of a single aspect of Whitehead's philosophy—namely that of time. He discusses the nature of Space-Time and the temporal process, outlines Whitehead's views on perception and introduces us to the theory of extensive abstraction. The whole argument is carefully set out with skill and erudition; nevertheless the reader, before he has gone very far, finds himself asking is it possible to give an exegesis of a single isolated aspect of Whitehead's philosophy when we are still so much in the dark as to the nature of that philosophy itself?

In a sense, Mr. Hammerschmidt's book is an answer to this question; it is based on his belief that not only is Space-Time of importance in Whitehead's earlier writings, but that it also forms the core of his later metaphysical position. And it is precisely this assumption which is open to question; as far as Whitehead's theory of extension is concerned, there has been a marked shift of emphasis from the field of perception to that of logic. Paraphrasing Mr. Hammerschmidt one might say, that if not the core, at least the framework of Whitehead's metaphysical position is based on mathematical logic rather than temporal experience. It is often overlooked that before Whitehead concerned himself with the philosophy of nature, he was interested in the application of abstract deductive systems to natural phenomena. This perhaps throws light on a very noticeable omission in Mr. Hammerschmidt's account. In discussing Whitehead's analysis of nature (1900–1924) he omits to discuss the important paper *On Mathematical Concepts of the Material World* (1906) in which Whitehead applied postulate theory to physics, and which is essential for an understanding of his later work.

Mr. Hammerschmidt's belief that Space-Time is basic to Whitehead's philosophy, leads him to assert that the theory of extensive abstraction "is

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a formal and quite rigorous analysis of space-time in terms of regions of space-time as primitive concepts" (p. 35). But he implicitly recognizes the limitations of such a view, when he tells us that in *Process and Reality* a region "is not a physical reality of the same rank as an event" (p. 45). This of course, touches the nerve of Whitehead's argument, an "extensive region" has only logical properties, and is to be thought of as defining a class having spatio-temporal regions as members. On this view, geometrical elements and the concept of serial order are derivative from the logical relationships between classes and not from events or regions of space-time. Whitehead's theory of extensive abstraction and his whole account of geometry then becomes a purely formal theory developed independently of Space-Time.

Putting these criticisms on one side, it must be said that Mr. Hammerschmidt in this little book of just over one hundred pages does skilfully piece together Whitehead's speculations on Space-Time, arranging them in a logical order. The various sections are numbered decimally and neat summaries and criticisms are to be found at the end of each chapter. There is also a selective bibliography, a glossary and an index of references. But despite the amount of work he has put into the book, it is questionable whether Mr. Hammerschmidt is entirely successful. He keeps very close to the text, which means that someone unacquainted with Whitehead's terminology may find it distinctly difficult to follow. However, one must be grateful to Mr. Hammerschmidt for giving us what forms a valuable compendium of Whitehead's views on Time.

W. MAYS.

Phases of Thought in England. By MEYRICK H. CARRÉ. (Oxford at the Clarendon Press. 1949. Pp. xix + 392. Price £1 10s.)

In 383 pages Mr. Carré covers, in a fashion, the course of philosophical thinking in Britain from Bede to McTaggart. But he does not pretend to be giving a history of the philosophy of those twelve centuries. He has nothing to say of ethical or political theories and next to nothing of logical theories. He is trying to trace two or three veins of thought in matters metaphysical, theological and epistemological. His view is that certain dominant ideas in seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century British thought both echo and derive from British scholastic and pre-scholastic speculations. He finds a ding-dong struggle between something called "Aristotelianism" and something called "Augustinianism," a struggle to which is assimilated or affiliated a ding-dong struggle between realist and nominalist theories of universals. This to-and-fro contest is traced through the Renaissance up to at least the beginning of the twentieth century, though its simple metronome-like rhythm was complicated by Newtonian influences.

Mr. Carré's main interests obviously lie in the ages that ended with Francis Bacon. He gets from Bacon to McTaggart in some 150 pages, where he had used 230 odd pages to get from Bede to Bacon. Correspondingly, students of philosophy will learn more from the earlier than from the later stages of the book, since there Mr. Carré provides, what is not easy to get from other sources, a lucid description of the theological, academic and pedagogic background of mediaeval thought.

Indeed, throughout the book Mr. Carré is at his best in describing the general climates of opinion, a task which he carries out largely by sketching fairly fully the views of scores of forgotten worthies. We do not study for ourselves the ideas of John of Salisbury, Richard Billingham, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Henry More, Ray, Hartley or Herbert Spencer; so for those who know the works of the original thinkers it is interesting and useful to have

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collected a set of thumb-nail sketches of the personalities, careers and sentiments of such historically illustrative minnows. On the other hand, young students of philosophy may be puzzled or misled by finding more pages devoted to Herbert Spencer than lines to Bradley; more room given up to the Cambridge Platonists than to Locke, Berkeley and Hume together; one page allowed to Berkeley and two or more both to Ray and to Hartley. He will find no mention of such nineteenth century logicians as Boole, de Morgan, Jevons, Venn or Carroll. In compensation, however, he will get a useful bird's-eye view of the nature of the mediaeval university, of the rise and decline of alchemical beliefs, of the history of the Royal Society and of the tensions between natural science and religious faith in the nineteenth century.

Mr. Carré does indeed undertake to summarize the philosophies of a lot of the major thinkers of his lengthy era—or rather those parts of their philosophies which fit his metronome-picture. He tells us what he conceives to be the gist of the thoughts of John of Salisbury, Adelard, Anselm (who is oddly treated as an honorary Briton), Duns and Ockham, of Francis Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Reid and Mill. But his pen-hand goes sadly limp in expounding the thoughts of original minds.

It would not be possible for a student to satisfy himself—much less his tutor—what was the good of Anselm or Francis Bacon, Locke or Hume by memorizing the points that Mr. Carré has skimmed from their doctrines. I do not think that he could even satisfy himself that any of the thinkers dealt with in this book had very good wits or were confronted by serious theoretical problems. For Mr. Carré is a "Byways" and not a "Highways" topographer. He does not understand that in philosophy, as elsewhere, the man of originality is the man who leaves home for good. The story of his journey is, therefore, never the story of a return to anything.

Hume and Ockham are worth commemorating, not for the fact that they gave pretty much Roscellinus' answer to Roscellinus' question (I don't for a moment think that they did); but for the fact that they gave their own individual answers to questions that had not arisen before, and, more important still, that they invented methods of dealing with questions that no one had invented before. Otherwise they would not be worth commemorating.

Mr. Carré asserts both of Duns Scotus' doctrine of individuality and of Ockham's nominalism that they were responsible for the rise of the natural sciences. It is flattering to our self-esteem to hear that advances in our subject can produce such important effects, but unfortunately Mr. Carré adduces no evidence for his diagnosis. For some not very clear reason Mr. Carré abstains from describing the work of Roger Bacon, the one schoolman who has a reputation for experiment. He was an Augustinian.

On another historical point Mr. Carré disappoints us of evidence. He thinks that mediaeval British philosophy was, in some important ways, continuous with post-Renaissance British philosophy, and that, for example, Ockham's ideas helped to shape the thought of Francis Bacon, Boyle and Locke. He wisely does not suggest that a man like Locke ever glanced at a page of Ockham's writings. So the question how the transmission took place cries for an answer. Presumably the University text-books of logic were one important vehicle of this transmission. But about these Mr. Carré says nothing.

The proof-reading, unlike the price, is not up to the most exacting standards of the Oxford University Press. P. 14, *disciples* for *disciplines*; p. 33, *of allegorizing*, ? for *the allegorizing*; p. 38, *bishop*, ? for *bishops*; pp. 59, 61, *Mono logion* for *Monologium*; p. 80, *Post Analytics* for *Posterior Analytics*; p. 94, *anagogical* for *analogical*; p. 96, *deliverance* for *delivery*; p. 101, *ascendency* for *ascendancy*; pp. 96 and 103, Maimonides appears once as *Moyses*, once as

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Moses; p. 151, *vigorously* for *rigorously*; p. 264, *Syntagma philosophica* for *Syntagma philosophiae*; p. 281, *Huyghensius* for *Huygenius*; p. 288, *proscribe* for *prescribe*; p. 313, *casual* for *causal*; p. 346, *acts* for ?; p. 375, *stories* for ?
GILBERT RYLE.

Social Pragmatism. A Study in the Pragmatic Approach to Problems of Conduct.
By LAN FREED. (Watts & Co. Pp. 264. Price 15s.)

This book has a freshness and boldness of purpose which arrests attention. It is also clearly written. But it seems to me to fail altogether in its main purpose, which is nothing less than an indictment of the whole of ethics in the interest of what the author calls "Social Pragmatism." Mrs. Freed claims that she herself is not writing a book about ethics; but apart from the question whether even a highly critical discussion of the ideas of conscience and duty should not be called ethics, it seems rather strained to refuse this name to the account of good and bad in human experience which the author wishes to commend. Many have forestalled Mrs. Freed in urging that "ought ought to be abolished," and when we come to consider the theory which she herself advances we find that it is not very markedly different from other well-known theories whose authors have not disdained the title "moral philosopher."

The indictment of ethics is directed especially against the ideas of obligation and conscience, on the ground—a very inadequate one it seems to me—that "the hall-mark of ethics is the categorical 'ought' " (p. 227). Two main points are made. Firstly, it is urged that conscientious action consists in doing what we ourselves take to be right, and that accordingly anything may come to be regarded as a duty. We have thus no positive standards, the ideas of conscience and obligation being used, according to Mrs. Freed, solely as a cover for the imposition on others of our own prejudices and inhibitions, and proving in this way mischievous in the extreme. But moral philosophers have, for the most part, been fully aware of the problem raised here, and they have attempted to deal with it in various ways, for example by drawing a distinction between "formal" and "material" sin, or, in recent years especially, between the worth of the agent and the rightness of the act. These solutions may, or may not, be satisfactory, but clearly any attempt to discredit ethical thinking on the basis of the general problem of finding an objective content for duty should direct itself especially to the attempts of various philosophers to deal with this problem. There is little effort to do so in this book, the discussion of celebrated thinkers taking the form of holding them up to ridicule on the assumption that the irrational nature of the idea of obligation, to which they have ascribed importance, is evident from the circular nature of the principle that we ought to do what we believe we ought to do. The treatment of Kant is particularly jejune and cavalier, and one misses in particular an examination of those features of recent ethics in which the matter which Mrs. Freed presumes to settle so confidently has been the main subject of controversy. With the exception of Broad, who is treated with much condescension and held to be an extremely biased writer, there is little mention of any recent writers who have held objectivist views in ethics, the treatise to which most attention is devoted being the symposium on *Science and Ethics* initiated by C. H. Waddington.

Mrs. Freed's second point of criticism, not always distinguished from the first, is that conscientious action must be regarded as action in opposition to desire. Not all the philosophers who give pride of place in ethics to the notion of duty would accept this, and here again one would expect some examination of recent theories (cf. Ross, *Foundations of Ethics*, chapter XII) in which it is

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maintained that the worth of actions is enhanced when the motive of duty is reinforced by a motive like benevolence. I think, however, that Mrs. Freed is justified in holding that conscientious action is only possible when duty and interest conflict, and that it therefore requires an absolute freedom of choice. The main merit of Mrs. Freed's discussion seems to me to lie in the consistency with which she keeps this matter to the fore. But I also think that she is altogether mistaken in supposing that this commits us to "self-frustration" by foolish suppression of all desires. There are surely plenty of opportunities for moral effort without creating them in this artificial manner, even if that could ever be regarded as the part of a good man. In the cases where no such conflict arises there are further non-moral distinctions to be drawn between various activities. But Mrs. Freed dismisses the conception of intrinsic worth on the wholly inadequate ground that "if an end, *any* end, is *desired* by a man, then for him it is good, not intrinsically, but as a means to his own satisfaction" (p. 49), the whole matter being disposed of in half a page. That the idea of obligation, especially when seen to involve absolute freedom of choice, presents very grave difficulties which may well tempt us to seek to be rid of it altogether, has often been felt by moral philosophers. But there are also very weighty reasons for retaining it, and these are certainly not to be set aside without far more exhaustive examination than Mrs. Freed undertakes of the attempt to deal with fundamental difficulties of which moral philosophers have themselves always been aware, and which are moreover paralleled in almost every other field where properly philosophical issues are raised. But philosophers have always had to reckon with the ridicule of those who are not prepared to follow them on "the long and circuitous route" which they travel themselves.

The basis of Mrs. Freed's positive views is that no one can do anything unless he likes to do it, but that it can be shown that reasonable people will like to promote what other people also like. She rightly points out that this is not identical with Hedonism, especially in the forms in which we commonly encounter it, but she fails to notice that it has some very close affinities with certain forms of idealist ethics (Mrs. Freed maintains at one point that "the source of all our values is in our volitional systems," p. 230). The idealists have, however, shown themselves more aware of the difficulties of their view than Mrs. Freed and better able to state the case for men's alleged "identity of interest with the human race which makes them hope that succeeding generations will be able to enjoy their lives" (p. 166); they have also addressed themselves with more determination to the problem of what is to happen in cases where the most enlightened self-interest is unable to persuade us to forgo overwhelming gain to ourselves in the interest of greater advantage on the whole to others—can we dispense with the notion of obligation here? One sympathizes with the writer's anxiety that obscurantist and dogmatic ethical and religious notions should not be allowed to deter us from cultivating more amicable and reasonable relations with one another; and one also readily admits that the record of the moral philosopher, and even more that of religious thinkers, is far from stainless in this respect. But the proper procedure should be, not to dispense with ethics altogether, but to bring greater patience and determination to the continuous task of keeping its principles as clear of confusion as we can.

Mrs. Freed has some shrewd observations to make on some of our ethical attitudes, and even where these cannot be wholly accepted as they stand they will help to stir us out of much of our complacency. She declares, for example: "For preaching must always be sterile. The most it can do as a rule is to produce a state of temporary exaltation, fizzling out as soon as action is

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called for" (p. 232). But in spite of provocative asides of this sort, and some genuine insight, I cannot express the hope that this book will be widely read. Philosophers may benefit by the general challenge to reconsider their basic conceptions, even if they find points of detail in the exposition unimpressive. But the reader who is not already familiar with ethical writings, and thus able to view Mrs. Freed's rather uncritical innovations in the right perspective, may be seriously misled—a judgment which, I much suspect, the author will ascribe to the deep-seated "moralism" of the reviewer. I can only answer that nothing in this book has induced me to repent of it.

H. D. LEWIS.

The Romantic Comedy. By D. G. JAMES. (Oxford University Press. 1948. Pp. xi + 276. Price 18s.)

In this account of the Romantic Movement in English literature Professor James is concerned with the speculations of the main romantic writers about man and the universe, especially as they are expressed in terms of mythology or theology. His "Comedy" begins with the private mythology of Blake's consciously anti-Christian "Gospel of Hell," proceeds to the "Purgatory" of the use by Shelley and Keats of a largely Greek mythology to express ideas which to a considerable extent resisted such treatment, and comes to rest in the acceptance by the later Coleridge and by Newman of a Christian scheme of thought; and all this is presented as a connected progress, so that it is *Romanticism* which finally, after a troubled journey, is portrayed as finding its homeland in Christianity. Wordsworth is dealt with in fair detail at several points. There is no mention of Byron; perhaps he does not fit easily into Professor James's scheme, but his total omission from an account of English Romanticism merits, I think, at least some explanation.

Let me say at once (to offset my later remarks) that the book has very great merits indeed, and is one for which every student of the period ought to be grateful. It is extremely well written and is both scholarly and interesting throughout; furthermore, it is refreshing to find a literary critic who can handle philosophical questions with competence and understanding. Indeed there is much in the book to interest a philosopher, especially perhaps in the discussion of Coleridge's Kantianism, but also more generally in the way in which throughout the book the question is raised of the function of myth-making in the presentation of a view of the world and in the discussions of the notion of the "imagination" as it is found in the various authors dealt with.

Having said this, however, I cannot conceal the fact that I do not think the book as a whole should have been written at all, though I certainly think that at least ninety per cent of its contents were very well worth writing indeed. The trouble is just this, that I do not think it makes sense to speak of the Romantic movement as Professor James does, viz. as if it had a history akin to that of the development of an individual mind. I shall quote one or two typical passages to show what I mean: "To trace Coleridge's intellectual development is to show in what way *Romanticism*, after setting out with a strong antipathy to Christianity, came to acknowledge what Coleridge believed to be its necessity. *Romanticism* was bound, in the course of its history, to come to this acknowledgment" (p. 161, my italics). "We cannot understand the narrow ways into which, in Coleridge and Newman, *Romanticism* came . . . if we do not first discern the scope and range of the Romantic imagination in its original exposure to the world" (p. 165, my italics). "In acceptance of the mythology which is divinely given as history, the long and difficult history

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of Romanticism in England comes to its end" (p. 209). Now we can speak in such terms about the development of an individual person's thought (it is certainly of great interest and importance to trace the process by which say Coleridge became a Christian—and Professor James does this well), or about certain types of communities, e.g. a Church with a relatively stable though developing set of doctrines, or even about a series of thinkers each of whom started more or less where his predecessor left off; but the group of writers with whom Professor James is dealing does not fulfil any of these conditions. "Romantic," after all, is a word used to refer to a certain quality, or "family" of qualities, found in certain literary works (I have no quarrel with Professor James's account of what that quality is); and "romanticism" is, or ought to be, simply the abstract noun from "romantic"—though if one could reconcile oneself to the barbarity of "romanticness" there would be a considerable gain in clarity. I am sorry to appear to be reading Professor James a lesson on the structure of the English language; but once one begins to write "Romanticism" with a capital R it becomes fatally easy to succumb to the vicious confusion of categories of which I have been complaining. It is doubtless very gratifying to the author (and let me add, to make it clear that I am not a prejudiced witness, that it would be to the reviewer also) to be able to think that anything so profound and important as the Romantic movement finds its natural termination in Christianity, but that is just what I do not think it makes sense to say.

What is essentially the same complaint can be put in another way. I suppose it is hardly possible to dispute that towards the end of the eighteenth century certain important writers began to produce literature significantly different in style and content from that of their predecessors, literature of a type which we call "romantic." Suppose we waive the foregoing paragraph and agree to speak about Romanticism as Professor James does; is there not, however, something arbitrary about where we fix the point of its climax or termination? Professor James's choice of Newman and the later Coleridge is one possibility; but if one wanted to maintain a different thesis would it not be equally possible to regard the climax of English Romanticism as occurring about 1820, in the major works of Byron, Shelley and Keats (i.e. in Professor James's "Purgatorial" stage), and to portray Coleridge and Newman as "Romanticism in decadence"? Alternatively, why stop as soon as the author does? In the Epilogue to his book he speaks about the Romanticism of Yeats and the "Celtic twilight" and remarks that in our time Romanticism and Christianity have "taken their separate ways" (p. 275); and this surely gives the game away. For the picture now suggested is surely this: the natural homeland of Romanticism is *not* Christianity; rather the two meet, unite for a time, and then part company. For Romanticism has a history beyond Newman—and not merely, I think we shall have to add, in the Celtic twilight: there is, e.g. the claim (not at all a fatuous one, I should have thought) of the Surrealists to be the "prehensile tail" of the Romantic movement, and a good deal of very recent poetry might with even greater justification be classified as romantic.

I should be sorry, however, to end this review on any other note than one of appreciation of and gratitude for the amount of enlightenment and stimulation which I have derived from Professor James's book; I should not wish the fact that the bulk of my comments on it have been critical to destroy this impression.

I have noticed one slip, on p. 170. In Coleridge's *Christabel* it is surely Geraldine who is the embodiment of evil and who is contrasted with the perfection and beauty of Christabel, and not the other way round.

GEORGE E. HUGHES.

NEW BOOKS

The Foundations of Human Thought. By Fr. Vinding Kruse, Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Copenhagen. (Einar Munksgaard, Copenhagen. Oxford University Press (Geoffrey Cumberlege). 1949. Pp. 404. Price 30s.)

This work is a notable attempt towards a synthesis of the theory of knowledge and the validation of science with ethics, individual and social, and jurisprudence. The later portions of the book are perhaps those of most interest to the general reader; but the professional philosopher will be most interested in the argument of the central section of some 200 pp., entitled "What is science? What is human knowledge?" The author's principal contention is that the conclusions of the British eighteenth century empiricists, Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and of the apriorist Kant cannot be regarded as justified, because the criticisms they make of the existence of an external world of reality are open to precisely the same kinds of criticism themselves. "Even with the most consistent adherence to the psychology of knowledge and theory of knowledge which starts with Locke and proceeds by way of Hume and Kant to the most recent researches of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, philosophers in stating the grounds for the most negative standpoint, denial of all knowledge, cannot help unconsciously employing that very knowledge of difference and likeness, even of general ideas, of which they themselves deny the possibility." Again, "the epistemologists cannot move one step in their self-observation and in their criticism of our knowledge and its fundamental ideas based on this without unconsciously employing and taking their stand on the very same fundamental ideas: time and space, likeness and difference and causal relation, which they either (like the English empiricists . . .) criticise and deny the validity of, or to which like Kant they ascribe only a subjective validity *a priori* but without proof." "They have in fact, cut off the branch on which they were perching" (pp. 90, 91). His way of escape from this is not complete agnosticism but to recognize as elements of cognition other elements than sensations alone. "The distinguishing and comparing process is closely associated with sense perception but is not one with it. On the other hand distinguishing and comparing may very well take place without sense-perception." Another basic element in cognition he regards as our apprehension of cause and effect; here he rejects the analysis of Hume and attributes this apprehension in the first instance to our consciousness of muscular effort and its effects; he also gives an important place to our experience of pain and pleasure. For example, these elements of experience lead to the notion of cause and effect from the occurrence of a single instance only, repetition (as with Hume) not being at all necessary. This leads him to an account of what he calls "law-bound connection," but in discussing this he seems to fall into one of the traps he has accused others of falling into, when he says that "we are absolutely unable to say whether a hitherto observed law-bound connection or causal connection will occur in the future" (p. 128); for this ignores the contentions of Eddington and others that laws of nature are of the same species as theorems in a geometry. In sum, he contends that we may not select *one* out of the hitherto assumed faculties of cognition, notably sense-observation, as the only foundation for our criticism of others, but must include our conception of time and space, our apprehension of causality and our conception of likeness and difference. "Berkeley's and Hume's assertion that the external world is a fiction is entirely due to a basic delusion, since their assertion is based on . . . the distinguishing faculty, to which the assertion denies validity." And he concludes that "distinguishing and comparing, the fundamental human faculty of cognition, then establishes, as surely as a sensation (1) that there is an external world and an internal

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world, the self; (2) that the self is different from its various experiences; (3) that the self, as soon as it has had an experience, a sensing, a thought, an emotion, also has a consciousness of having had this experience" (p. 163).

He says that however far back we carry our series of thoughts, our chain of proof, we shall at last come up against something final, unexplainable, unknown, incapable of proof. But this remark is itself incapable of proof, and is indeed very doubtful. He does not seem to be familiar with the theory of transfinite numbers, when he gives credence to what he calls one of the ultimate mathematical axioms, "The whole is greater than the part" (p. 168; see also p. 180).

Finally, in this section, he concludes that our basic scientific concepts would not come into existence at all without the emotional and volitional reaction of the human mind. For he attributes all the ultimate elements in cognition, enumerated above, to the circumstance that they are accompanied "by feelings which, in the course of time, have been predominantly feelings of satisfaction to mankind" (p. 188). This leads him naturally to his ideas on ethics, which, as he rejects any idea of a greatest good for a greatest number, or a categorical imperative, he simply sums up in the injunction that men should not harm one another. "The experiment for the self-preservation of mankind is the sole basis of all science," ethics and jurisprudence.

The later portions of this lengthy volume are less closely argued than the earlier epistemological portions, but I have no space to describe them. I will only say that in his chapter on *individual ethics* (which is very readable), he adds to the interest of his general contentions by copious examples from mythology, history and fiction.

The book is very badly proof-read; probably because of its having been printed in Denmark, the oddest spelling mistakes occur. The most strange-looking one is *wiev* for *view* on p. 100.

E. A. MILNE.

Deviation into Sense: The Nature of Explanation. By O. S. WAUCHOPE. (London: Faber & Faber. 1948. Pp. 163. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This is a very remarkable book, in that the qualities which the author manifests are all very pronounced and very impressive. There is nothing commonplace about him. He has great power of abstract thought, a delightful power of clear and forceful expression and an almost incredible absence of mental discipline. The commendable qualities are incommunicable except by quotations for which there is no space. If I concentrate on deficiencies, therefore, I hope I shall not be thought unappreciative of the book's positive merits. And after all, this is a philosophical and not a literary journal.

Mr. Wauchope's thesis is very difficult to summarize without departing too far from the text, but it is something like this. All comprehension is momentary, personal, subjective. We can analyse it, but it is not represented by the products of analysis. Thus, our comprehension of the proposition, S is P, can be analysed into a comprehension of S and P separately, but the realization that S is P is something different from this. It just comes; it cannot be communicated—except perhaps through art. We cannot, however, become aware of its meaning without at the same time becoming aware of what it does not mean, though we may be aware of what it does not mean and not of what it does. Comprehension, therefore, has two sides—what a thing means and what it does not mean. The former is qualitative, subjective, non-logical; the latter quantitative, objective, logical. Philosophy has concentrated on the latter because of its value for prediction and because it is the same for everybody; we should, however, look to the former, which is of life and not

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of death. We should start again with the self instead of the not-self, and use a language in which the subjective as well as the objective factor is included. The book then surveys certain fields of thought—biology, psychology, physics, etc.—to show how this may be done.

One may agree that not everything can be expressed in logical terms and yet have a prejudice in favour of imposing some kind of restriction on what he says. He may require, for instance, that statements shall not be made about experience for which experience offers no warrant, and that general principles shall not be asserted and acted on unless experience in general demands them. This kind of discipline characterises scientific thought as well as good philosophical thought and gives room for as much subjectivity as one wishes. Mr. Wauchope, however, seems to regard his emancipation from logic as a licence to utter any generalization he pleases, with or without evidence. Such generalizations follow one another in a breath-taking manner—all living activity is either purposeless or death-avoiding; all pleasure involves purposeless expenditure of material energy; all behaviour characteristic of a species is determined by survival value; energy cannot be spent against nothing; and so on. Sometimes the generalization is obviously wrong. Take, for example, one which is repeated, and so can scarcely be a slip: "A word cannot have the meaning it does have, unless it is different in meaning from all other words." Hence, presumably, there are no synonymous words and only one language.

Perhaps Mr. Wauchope's fundamental error is in writing the book at all. If he wants to insist on the importance of the subjective he must not deny that it is subjective and therefore incommunicable. Having called attention to it (a superfluous act, by the way, since St. Augustine, among others, did it long ago) he should have stopped. But he asks for one postulate—the existence of other people like himself—and that is fatal. If you grant that, you are committed to the objective, the logical, the quantitative. You cannot have it both ways: either you insist on the subjective and then be silent, or you decide to talk and are thereupon bound to the objective. Mr. Wauchope wants to bring in the subjective and at the same time postulate other people to talk to about it. Having swallowed that camel it is difficult to know why he should strain at the gnats that fly about in the book. It is like admitting the right of an unauthorized judge to condemn you to death and then disputing the validity of the sentence because it is pronounced with an Oxford accent.

One example must suffice of the kind of contradiction that one meets over and over again. Things are but objectivations of events. The only events, however, that Mr. Wauchope considers are those which happen to somebody. That would be a legitimate restriction if he were remaining in the realm of subjectivity, but he goes on to define space on this basis and to produce an alternative to the physicist's conception of space. The physicist, however, wants space only to accommodate events that do *not* happen to him, though they may be regarded as the causes of events that do. Nevertheless, Mr. Wauchope seems to think that he has improved on the physicist.

I said that Mr. Wauchope had made an error in writing the book. I hope he will go on making such errors, for reading the book has been a very pleasant experience, even though I cannot claim that it has been a purposeless expenditure of material energy. The conclusion is a charming allegory in which the more one keeps modern history in mind the more allusions he will see. The reader can be entertained without being in the least convinced, for which Mr. Wauchope has his bad philosophy to thank. But perhaps he did not want to convince but only to be his positive, individual, subjective self.

HERBERT DINGLE.

PHILOSOPHY

Books also received:

- BRYNJOLF BJORSET. *Man and This Mysterious Universe*. New York: Philosophical Library. Pp. 1-174. \$3.75.
- A. D. WOZZLEY. *Theory of Knowledge: An Introduction*. London: Hutchinson's Universal Library. November 1949. Pp. 5-196. 7s. 6d.
- ARTHUR L. GOODHART. *Five Jewish Lawyers of the Common Law*. London: Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. 1-74. 5s.
- SAMUEL L. HART, PH.D. *Treatise on Values*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. Pp. 7-165. \$3.75.
- MARTIN HEIDEGGER. *Existence and Being*. London: Vision Press Ltd. 1949. Pp. 9-399. 15s.
- REBECCA WEST. *The Meaning of Treason*. London: Macmillan. Pp. 340. 1949. 18s.
- HERBERT DINGLE. *Science and Literary Criticism*. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd. November 1949. Pp. 3-184. 7s. 6d.
- FREDERICK MARION. *In My Mind's Eye*. London: Rider, 47 Princes Gate. Pp. 272. 1949. 18s.
- SYDNEY CAVE. *The Christian Way*. London: Nisbet & Co. Ltd. 1949. Pp. 280. 16s.
- HUGH WOODWORTH. *The Nature and Technique of Understanding*. Vancouver, British Columbia: The Wrigley Printing Company Ltd. 1949. Pp. 142. \$4.00.
- KARL JASPERS. *The Perennial Scope of Philosophy*. New York: Philosophical Library. 1949. Pp. 188. \$3.00.
- ARTHUR L. GOODHART. *English Contributions to the Philosophy of Law—Seventh Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture, 1948*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. 44. 5s.
- DALLAS KENMARE. *World Invisible: A Study of Personality*. London: Williams & Norgate. 1949. Pp. 144. 8s. 6d.
- G. E. FASNACHT. *Lord Acton on Nationality and Socialism (Two Lectures given in August 1949 at the Oxford University Tutorial Classes Committee)*. London: Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. 32. 2s. 6d.
- H. A. PRICHARD. *Moral Obligation*. Essays and Lectures. Geoffrey Cumberlege: Oxford University Press. 1949. Pp. 200. 15s.
- RICHARD ROBINSON. *Definition*. Geoffrey Cumberlege: Oxford University Press. 1950. Pp. 207. 15s.
- VERGILUS FERM, Editor. *Forgotten Religions: A Symposium*. New York: Philosophical Library. Pp. iv + 392. \$7.50.
- PAUL ARTHUR SCHILPP, Editor. *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist*. Evanston, Illinois: The Library of Living Philosophers. 1949. Pp. v + 781. \$8.50.
- ALFRED NOYES. *The Unknown God* (with an Epilogue reviewing the argument of the book in relevance to the post-Hiroshima world). London: Sheed & Ward. Eighth impression. 1949. Pp. 326. 8s. 6d.
- OSCAR HALECKI. *The Limits and Divisions of European History*. London: Sheed & Ward. Pp. 242. 10s. 6d.
- CHRISTOPHER DAWSON. *Religion and the Rise of Western Culture*. London: Sheed & Ward. 1950. Pp. 286. 15s.
- RADOSLAV A. TSANOFF. *The Ways of Genius*. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1949. Pp. vii + 310. \$4.00.
- C. H. WHITELEY. *An Introduction to Metaphysics*. London: Methuen & Co. 1950. Pp. vii + 174. 8s. 6d.

NEW BOOKS

- A. CAMPBELL-GARNETT. *Freedom and Planning in Australia*. The University of Wisconsin Press. 1949. Pp. x + 327. \$4.00.
- H. A. PRICHARD. *Knowledge and Perception: Essays and Lectures*. Oxford University Press: Clarendon Press, Geoffrey Cumberlege. 1950. Pp. 214. 15s.
- STEPHEN TH. BORNEMISZA. *The Explanation of Life*. Zürich: Rascher Edition. 1949. Pp. 272. No price stated.
- EDITOR. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (Henry Bergson), No. 10. Brussels: Fondation Universitaire de Belgique. October 1949. Pp. 374-516. Belg. francs 300.
- EMMANUEL MOUNIER. *Le Personalisme (Que sais-je? Le Point des Connaissances actuelles)*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 1950. Pp. 136. No price stated.
- ROBERT BLANCHÉ. *Les Attitudes Idéalistes: Nouvelle Encyclopédie Philosophique*. Presses Universitaires de France. 1949. Pp. 137. Francs 200.
- JEAN PIAGET. *Traité de Logique: Essai de Logistique Opératoire*. Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1949. Pp. v + 422. Francs 1,400.
- MARCEL REYMOND. *La Philosophie de Jean-Jacques Gourd*. Paris: Presse Universitaires de France. 1949. Pp. 306. No price stated.
- Revista de Estudios Politicos*: Francisco Javier Conde, Director. 1949. Vol. XXVII. Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Politicos. Pp. 405. 20 pesetas.
- BENEDETTO CROCE. *Una Pagina Sconosciuta Degli Ultimi Mesi della Vita di Hegel*. Bari: Giuseppe Laterza & Figli. 1950. Pp. 67. Lire 360.
- MARIO DAL PRA. *Hume*. Milan: Fratelli Bocca. 1949. Pp. 363. Lire 900.
- ANTONIO ALOTTA, CLETO CARBONARA. *Galilei*. Milan: Fratelli Bocca. 1949. Pp. 314. Lire 900.
- NICOLA ABBAGNANO. *Storia della Filosofia* II. 2. Turin: Unione Tipografico-Editrice Torinese. 1950. Pp. iii + 740. Lire 4,200.
- FRITZ JOACHIM VON RINTELEN. *Von Dionysos zu Apollon*. Wiesbaden: Metopen-Verlag. 1948. Pp. vii + 122. No price given.
- WERNER ZIEGENFUSS. *Philosophen-Lexicon*. Berlin: Verlag Walter de Gruyter & Co. 1949. Pp. 1400. Vol. I. A-K. DM. 30.
- HANS WELZEL. *Um die Finale Handlungslehre* (In the series *Recht und Staat*, No. 146). 1949. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). Pp. 30. D.M. 1.50.
- PAULS JUREVIČS. *Henri Bergson: Eine Einführung in Seine Philosophie*. Freiburg: Verlag Karl Alber. 1949. Pp. 268. Paper DM. 6.60, Cloth DM. 8.80.
- CHARLES DE TOLNAY. *Werk und Weltbild des Michaelangelo*. (Vol. VII of the new series *Albae Vigiliae*.) Zürich: Rhein-Verlag. 1949. Pp. 119. Swiss francs 9.
- E. RUBIN. *Experimenta Psychologica*. Copenhagen: Einar Munksgaard. 1949. Pp. 356. Dan. Kr. 24.80.
- PROFESSOR DR. H. DOOYEWEERD. *Reformatie en Scholastiek in de Wijsbegeerte*. (Part I: Het Grieksche Vorspel.) T. Wever: Franeker. 1949. Pp. 496. Fr. 20.
- MAURICE DOROLLE. *La Logique Dans la Vie*. Paris: Editions de L'Institut Pelman. 1949. Pp. 273. French francs 350.
- PAUL MASSON-OURSSEL. *L'Autorité en Marche*. Paris: Editions de L'Institut Pelman. 1949. Pp. 266. French francs 350.
- ANTOINETTE VIRIEUX-REYMOND. *La Logique et L'Epistémologie des Stoiciens. Leurs rapports avec la logique d'Aristote, la logistique et la pensée contemporaines*. Chambéry: Editions Lire. 1949. No price stated.

INSTITUTE NOTES

During the session a special course of lectures on Synoptic Philosophy was delivered by Professor H. H. Price, of the University of Oxford, and Mr. Karl Britton, of University College, Swansea. Professor Price in his four lectures dealt with "The Philosophy of Nature," based on Bertrand Russell's theory of Neutral Monism, and Mr. Britton dealt with the subject of the Human Mind and its values, under the title of "The Philosophy of Human Nature."

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The Council of Bedford College for Women (University of London) invite applications for the *Susan Stebbing Studentship*, value £150, for post-graduate work in Philosophy; open to suitably qualified women graduates from any University. Apply to the Principal before May 1, 1950.

THE DAVID F. SWENSON-KIERKEGAARD MEMORIAL FUND

The privately-endowed David F. Swenson-Kierkegaard Memorial Fund made available for 1949-50 the first of its fellowships of \$500 to be used for the study of the writings of Søren A. Kierkegaard, 1813-55. The first Fellow was Reidar Thomte, Professor of Philosophy at Concordia College and author of *Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion*.

Another fellowship is being made available for the year 1950-51. Persons of any creed, nationality or colour are eligible. Each recipient is free to choose his own place of study. In view of the character of the subject-matter, a religious interest and a reading knowledge of Danish are requisite. Anyone seeking application forms or information is urged to write to the Secretary of the Swenson-Kierkegaard Memorial Committee, Dr. Paul L. Holmer, Department of Philosophy, 300 Folwell Hall, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

The award will be made in June 1950, and applications must be in the hands of the Committee not later than April 15, 1950.

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PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED
WOKING AND LONDON